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This thesis analyses Kennedy’s foreign policy towards the Arab world and Israel 
in 1961-1963, by focusing on three states of core diplomatic concern for the 
administration: Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Examining the Kennedy administration’s 
policies towards Egypt, Israel, and the outbreak of the Yemen crisis, this thesis adds to 
the historiography on the subject a nuanced understanding of Kennedy’s incomplete 
attempt to find a balance between the American Cold War objective of containment of 
the Soviet Union, and its regional interests in Arab oil and in the security of Israel. 
This thesis argues that Kennedy’s Mideast policies were conceived in the context 
of his strategy of rapprochement with Nasser. The administration extended diplomatic 
and economic support to Egypt in order to gain pro-American sentiments in the region, 
steer Nasser towards a moderate, non-socialist course, and reduce his dependence from 
the Soviet Union. Hoping to succeed in such an effort, Kennedy offset his pro-Nasser 
policy with strategies of containment and stability. The administration embraced Israel’s 
security concerns in order to forestall its pre-emptive strikes against the Arab neighbours, 
mitigate the tensions between Arabs and Israelis, and prevent the Soviet Union from 
gaining strategic and political opportunities. Kennedy’s pro-Nasser policy also compelled 
the administration to secure its economic interests in the Saudi oil through the promotion 
of social, economic and political reforms, aimed at broadening the domestic political 
consensus of the Saudi regime, and thus stave off a possible revolutionary threat inspired 
by Nasser’s propaganda.   
This work challenges a number of studies that have been conducted on the subject, 
such as Warren Bass’s Support Any Friend, Douglas Little’s American Orientalism, and 
Roby C. Barrett’s The Greater Middle East and the Cold War. It is argued, contra Bass, 
that Kennedy’s Mideast strategies were not simply designed to support any regional ally 
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to gain a wider range of Cold War options; that the administration did not intend to 
transform Saudi Arabia and Israel into regional proxies, as Little argues; and that 
Kennedy’s policies cannot be seen as a mere continuation of Eisenhower’s, as contended 
by Barrett. Rather, this thesis argues that the administration’s enhancement of the US 
relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel was the necessary obverse to its Nasser policy. 
Seeking to bolster his rapprochement with Nasser, Kennedy laid the foundations of two 
special alliances for his successors to build upon, but such result was not intended.  
Kennedy’s legacy in the Middle East could best be understood as an attempt to 
balance larger Cold War objectives with more specific regional interests. Of course, it 
was his inability to appreciably influence the course of the events in Yemen, and 
Congress’s amendment in November 1963, to prompt the paradoxical result of his 
Mideast strategy. Indeed, the shift in US strategies occurred after his untimely death, 
ultimately confined Kennedy’s experience to be an ambitious footnote in history, whose 
idealist drive and diplomatic capability with the Arab leaders however, still echoes to this 
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Chronology of the main events 
 
Pre-presidential 
May 1933: The United States and Saudi Arabia sign the contract for ARAMCO. 
March 1947: Truman launches the Truman Doctrine. 
May 1950:  The United States, France and Britain issue the Tripartite Declaration 
July 1952: The Free Officers overthrow the Egyptian monarchy of King Farouk. 
November 1952: John F. Kennedy is elected senator. 
March 1953: Stalin dies. 
June 1953: ARAMCO workers begin to protest against King Saud of Saudi 
Arabia. 
February-April 1955: Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and the United Kingdom enter 
the Baghdad Pact. An Israeli raid against Gaza kills 30 Egyptians. 
Leaders of the Third World meet at the Bandung Conference. 
September 1955: Nasser signs an arms deal with Czechoslovakia.  
February 1956: Khrushchev speaks of “peaceful coexistence” at the 20th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
May 1956: ARAMCO workers demand the fall of the Saudi monarchy. 
July 1956: US withdraws economic help for Aswan Dam project. Suez crisis 
explodes. 
September 1956: Nasser visits Saudi Arabia, opposition to the Saudi regime 
increases.  
January 1957: Kennedy enters the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Eisenhower’s speech to Congress on the Middle East Resolution. 
March 1957: Congress approves the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
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July 1957: Kennedy gives his famous Algeria speech. 
February 1958: Syria joins Egypt in the United Arab Republic (UAR). 
July 1958: Violent uprisings in Jordan and Lebanon. Fall of the Iraqi monarchy: 
Qasim becomes prime minister. President Eisenhower sends marines 
to Lebanon. 
October 1958: Iraq shifts towards the Soviet Union and rejects Nasser’s pan-




January 1961: John F. Kennedy becomes the 35th President of the United States. 
Eisenhower warns new administration of Dimona reactor. 
February 1961: Israel advances HAWK request to the Kennedy administration. 
April 1961: US launches the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. 
May 1961: President Kennedy meets Ben Gurion. Two scientists visit the Dimona 
facility. 
June 1961: Kuwait crisis explodes. 
September 1961: Third World leaders participate in the Belgrade Conference. 
Syria leaves the United Arab Republic. 
October 1961: Kennedy recognises secessionist government in Syria. 
December 1961: Kennedy rejects Brazzaville Resolution on refugees. 
February 1962: Kennedy sends Bowles and Mason to Cairo to discuss Egypt’s 
economic problems. 
March 1962: Violent clashes between Syria and Israel on Lake Tiberias. The 
Kennedy administration condemns Israel’s actions in the UN. 
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July 1962: German scientists begin to build rockets for Egypt. 
August 1962: After long negotiations, Kennedy officialises the PL-480 as a multi-
year agreement. Kennedy decides to sell the HAWK to Israel. 
Administration decides to link HAWK sale and Johnson Plan. 
Feldman travels to Israel to discuss HAWK and Johnson Plan. 
Johnson officialises plan for the refugees. 
September 1962: Israel creates problems on allegedly modified text of Johnson’s 
proposal. News of the HAWK sale is leaked to the international 
press. Nasserite coup overthrows Imam in Yemen. Sallal establishes 
the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Strong Syrian propaganda against 
Nasser and Israel over the refugee issue. Second inspection of 
Dimona (only 40 minutes). 
October 1962: Faysal abolishes slavery in Saudi Arabia. Cuban missile crisis. 
November 1962: The Shah of Iran announces the White Revolution. 
December 1962: Kennedy recognises the YAR. King Hussein of Jordan 
announces he would recognise some Soviet satellites.  
January 1963: Meetings between members of the administration and 
representatives of the oil companies. Kennedy sends Terry Duce, 
former vice president of Aramco, to Saudi Arabia. Israel’s 
unshakable rejection of the Johnson Plan. Kennedy decides to push 
the Johnson plan no further. 
February 1963: Johnson confesses to Kennedy that his plan is officially “dead”. 
Qasim is killed. Iraq shifts towards Egypt. Kennedy recognises new 
Iraqi regime. Macmillan rejects definitively Kennedy’s suggestion 
of recognising the YAR. Kennedy approves operation HARD 
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SURFACE. Kennedy sends Ellsworth Bunker to Saudi Arabia to 
discuss HARD SURFACE. 
March 1963: Coup in Syria. Kennedy recognises new Syrian regime. Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq announce Tripartite Declaration. 
April 1963: UAR constitution includes “liberation of Palestine”. Kennedy rejects 
Ben Gurion’s proposal for joint US-USSR security guarantee. 
Violent uprisings in Jordan. 
May 1963: Kennedy issues informal security guarantee to Israel. Kennedy’s first 
tough letter to Ben Gurion: US support jeopardised by Dimona. 
June 1963: Kennedy’s second tough letter to Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion resigns; 
Levi Eshkol is the new prime minister of Israel. First UN observers 
arrive in Yemen. Controversy over personnel of Jewish faith delays 
HARD SURFACE. 
July 1963: Kennedy’s first tough letter to Eshkol. HARD SURFACE arrives in 
Saudi Arabia. Nasser admits using chemical weapons in Yemen. 
New tensions between Syria and Israel. 
August 1963: Israel and Egypt sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 
September 1963: Israeli leaders suggest US-Israeli intelligence exchange on 
UAR missile capabilities. 
October 1963: Kennedy sends reinforcements to HARD SURFACE. 
November 1963: Faysal extends UN mandate in Yemen and agrees to stop aid to 
the royalists. US-Israel first joint consultations on regional security 
issues. Congress approves Gruening amendment against the UAR. 
Kennedy’s last press conference against Gruening amendment. 





When John F. Kennedy was brutally assassinated on Friday, November 22, 1963, 
the entire world fell into a sorrowful silence. A countless number of people watched the 
funeral on television, while hundreds of thousands of letters of condolence flooded the 
White House, and almost one million stunned Americans lined up in the cold streets of 
Washington to pay their respects to the 35th President of the United States. In his struggle 
for civil rights, tax reform, social welfare programmes and economic development, 
Kennedy forged an image destined to remain impressed in the minds and hearts of 
millions of Americans, who still regard him as the most beloved American president.1 
Despite controversies, allegations and critical re-examinations of the thousand 
days of Camelot, one thing remains immutable: Kennedy was loved, and not just in 
America.  
Among the many letters received by Jacqueline Kennedy after the death of her 
husband, there were those sent from a region that has often slipped under the radar in the 
historical accounts of John F. Kennedy’s presidency, the Middle East. On November 23, 
1963, Abdul Salam Arif, President of Iraq, wrote that he was “shocked by the sad and 
sorrowful death of the late President Kennedy”2; “With deep pain and sorrow I convey... 
on behalf of the Syrian people our heartfelt condolences on the death of the late great 
President John Kennedy”3, followed the President of Syria; “The assassination of 
President Kennedy was a tragedy not only to American people; it also echoed in the hearts 
                                                 
1 Rebecca Stewart, ‘CNN Poll: JFK remains most popular past President’, CNN Politics, January, 20, 2011. 
2 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Arif Condolences to MRS John Kennedy, Baghdad 
Domestic Service in Arabic, 0915 GMT, November 23, 1963. 
3 Ibidem, President Al- Hafiz extends condolences, Damascus Domestic Service In Arabic, 1215 GMT, 
November 23, 1963. 
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of every good person in this world”4, wrote the King of Jordan, as he ordered a three-day 
mourning period in the royal court.  
Such letters are themselves a testament to Kennedy’s impact in the Middle East, 
one that, for better or worse, helped to define America’s posture in the region for years to 
come.  
In a time dominated by the Cold War polarization of the globe, and the 
revolutionary transformations of the Third World that accompanied the gradual 
collapsing of the colonial empires after the Second World War, the Middle East came to 
be a pivotal stage for the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
It was indeed in the Middle East where the first struggles between communist bloc and 
Western world took place. During the crisis of Iran-Azerbaijan and that of the Turkish 
straits, both in 1946, the threat of the Soviets’ attempt to extend their influence in the 
region called for Washington’s first efforts to implement strategies designed to contain 
international communism. 
And it was again the Middle East where the Eisenhower administration focused 
its efforts of foreign policy. The adoption of the Middle East Resolution, the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, is clear evidence of the level of attention that the White House had given to the 
Middle East.  
But why, if during Eisenhower’s presidency the Middle East was at the top of 
Washington’s agenda, is so little attention given to the years of Kennedy? Although the 
events of Cuba, Berlin and Vietnam have rightfully drawn the attention of scholars and 
historians investigating Kennedy’s foreign policy, why do we know so little about his 
approach to the Middle East? And why is it regarded almost exclusively in the context of 
                                                 
4 Ibidem, Husayn cables to Johnson, MRS Kennedy, Amman Domestic Service In Arabic, 1200, GMT, 
November 23, 1963. 
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the making of a special relationship with Israel?5 In short, if the Middle East was arguably 
one of the first stages of the Cold War, then what happened in the region during the 
Kennedy years, when the Cold War was so dangerously hot elsewhere?  
Such questions constitute the premise of this work, and the motivation behind an 
attempt to analyse a portion of history often overlooked and yet so pivotal in the 
understanding of the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Of course, only by investigating the tripartite relations between Kennedy and the 
Arab nationalists, the Arab monarchies and Israel, is it possible to fully discern the 
significance of Kennedy’s approach to the region, and to understand the paradox of the 
final outcome of his foreign policy in the Middle East. Indeed, as this thesis argues, 
Kennedy’s actions in the Middle East paved the way for the making of those two special 
alliances that would define US posture in the region for years to come: the one with Israel 
and the one with Saudi Arabia. However, the thesis explains how Kennedy did not 
actively pursue closer ties with either country, and the above-mentioned result is the 
inadvertent product of Kennedy’s main goal in the Middle East: the rapprochement with 
Nasser. Strongly driven by considerations of Cold War, Kennedy saw the policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser as the best tool to fight the Kremlin’s influence in the Middle 
East. By courting Egypt, the force of attraction of the whole Arab world, Kennedy hoped 
to enhance the US position in the region, to foster pro-American sentiments among the 
                                                 
5 Because of the long-term consequences that it has produced on the bilateral relations of the United States 
and Israel, a number of studies exists on Kennedy’s foreign policy towards Israel: Warren Bass, Support 
Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of The U.S. Israel Alliance, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Abraham Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Arms Sales to Israel, 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002); Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Herbert Druks, John F. Kennedy and Israel, (Westport: Praeger, 2005). 
Critical arguments about Kennedy’s foreign policy towards Israel are also made in Douglas Little, 
American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, Third Edition, (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), Roby C. Barrett, The Greater Middle East and the Cold War: 
US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and Kennedy, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007) and Steven Spiegel, 
The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America’s Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan, (Chicago 
and London; The University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
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Arab population and the nationalist elites, to steer the forces of Arab nationalism in a 
direction that could serve US interests, and to counteract Moscow’s influence in the 
Middle East as well as in the Third World.  
As expressed in a memorandum entitled “Basic National Security Policy”, 
“The United States had a military interest in seeing nations not fall under 
Communist control, an ideological interest in seeing them “evolve in directions” which 
would “afford a congenial world environment for our own society,” and an economic 
interest that “the resources and the markets of these areas are available to us and to the 
other industrialized nations of the free world.”6  
 
That is why, as Robert Komer recalled in his Oral History Interview, Kennedy 
was eager to show to the Arab nationalists that “the New Frontier was really anxious to 
get off on the right foot with them.”7 For its entire duration, the administration sought to 
bolster its rapprochement with Nasser, which remained the main goal of its Middle East 
policy even during the controversial affair in Yemen.  
This thesis explains how the administration’s policies towards Israel and the Arab 
monarchies were thus designed in the context of the policy of rapprochement with Nasser, 
the true core of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East. For this reason, they 
produced a final outcome that was largely inadvertent, as they strengthened Washington’s 
ties with Cairo’s nemeses, Tel Aviv and Riyadh. In its quest to court the revolutionary 
Egyptian leader, the Kennedy administration found itself compelled to enhance Israel’s 
security, with the goal of containing it and forestalling possible military actions that could 
upset US Cold War regional strategies, and to stabilise the Saudi and Jordanian regimes 
through programmes of political, social and economic reforms in order to secure US 
economic and geo-strategic interests (incidentally, the same approach was used in Iran as 
well, where for most of the Kennedy years the Shah was threatened by potential uprisings 
                                                 
6 Editorial note. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, National Security 
Policy, 70. 
7 Ibidem, July 16, 1964, 4. 
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against his authoritarian rule8). Unintentionally, Kennedy’s manoeuvres ended up 
bringing Washington closer to Israel and Saudi Arabia, but ironically enough that was 
never his goal. 
This thesis argues that the Kennedy administration never wished to use Saudi 
Arabia or Israel as regional proxies9 but only to prevent the first from collapsing and the 
latter, (in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk), from feeling the urge “to undertake 
a pre-emptive attack against [the] UAR”.10 The strategies of stabilising Saudi Arabia and 
enhancing Israel’s security were not designed because Kennedy wished to “support any 
friend” (as Warren Bass argues11) or to use them as regional proxies (as Douglas Little 
contends12), but were conceived in an attempt to allow Kennedy to carry out his 
rapprochement with Nasser, without the fear of provoking Israel into undertaking military 
actions against Cairo or of causing the Saudi Royal Family to fall under the weight of 
Cairo’s progressive propaganda: “We want to get across to Saud” Komer told Kennedy 
in early 1962, “that his still feudal regime will come under increasing domestic pressure 
unless it makes more of an effort to keep up with times.” Nasser’s activities, Komer 
continued, “add to the pressure.”13 
                                                 
8 See for instance April R. Summitt, “For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran”, 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4 (autumn, 2004) 
9 Such is the argument of Douglas Little, who in his book American Orientalism: The United States and 
the Middle East since 1945 and in Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: America’s Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, 
suggests that Kennedy’s actively sought closer ties with Saudi Arabia and Israel. A similar point is made 
in Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of The U.S. Israel Alliance, by Warren 
Bass, who sees in Kennedy’s even-handedness an attempt to court as many actors as possible in order to 
gain more Cold War options in the region. 
10 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, August 7, 1962. FRUS 1961-1963, 
Vol. XVIII, Near East 1962-1963, 14. 
11 Bass, Support any Friend…, 12. 
12 Little, American Orientalism..., 137. 
13 Memorandum from Robert Komer to President Kennedy, February 12, 1962. JFKL, NSF, Box 156A, 
Saudi Arabia, General, 2-1-62, 2-19-62. The administration was particularly concerned that the royal family 
would be challenged by elements of the population inspired by Nasser, as well as by Nasserite cells within 
the royal palace. As Komer recalled, the administration wished Faysal to focus on domestic reforms so that 
“our oil assets wouldn’t be endangered by violent revolution or Egyptian-inspired coup”. Robert Komer, 
Oral History Interview (OHI), July 16, 1964, 14. A more detailed analysis is provided on Chapter 2. 
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Both the Arab kings and Israel feared Nasser’s increasing influence in the region. 
They regarded the Egyptian leader as the main threat to their countries, and his pan-
Arabist ambitions as an alarming, destabilising force in the region. In 1952, after the 
Arabs’ defeat in the 1948 war against Israel, Nasser wrote The Philosophy of the 
Revolution14, in which he advocated dissolution of the traditional structures of power and 
the creation of a united Arab front to oppose external powers and to destroy Israel. In 
1956, and again in 1958, Nasser’s actions caused turmoil across the entire region, 
sparking a direct war against Israel and severe crises in Jordan and Lebanon. While the 
Eisenhower administration dealt with the emergencies by forcing Israel to withdraw its 
troops from Egypt during the Suez crisis, and by sending the marines to Lebanon to save 
President Chamoun from a domestic uprising inspired by Cairo’s progressive 
propaganda, Nasser became the hero of the Arab world and a symbol of the fight against 
Western imperialism. However, by opposing Nasser and the Arab nationalists, 
Eisenhower antagonised a leader who was destined to play a crucial role in the Middle 
East for nearly two decades, and leaving Kennedy to deal with a region where anti-
American sentiments were firmly solidified among the Arabs. Eisenhower’s conversation 
with Vice President Nixon in July 1958 says it all regarding the Arabs’ perception of the 
United States’ approach to the Middle East up to that moment: “The trouble is that we 
have a campaign of hatred against us, not by the governments but by the people. The 
people are on Nasser’s side.”15 
From this point of view, Kennedy’s approach to the Arab world emerges as 
significantly innovative. Contrary to Eisenhower and Dulles, who considered Arab 
                                                 
14 Gamal A. Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington: Public Affair Press, 1955). 
15 Memorandum of a conversation between the President and the Vice President (Nixon), White House, 
Washington, July 15, 1958. FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, 139. 
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nationalism as largely “dependent upon Communism”16 and thus unacceptable, the New 
Frontiersmen pursued a policy primarily designed to support the Arab nationalists and 
steer them in a direction that could serve US interests in its Cold War confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. As a result, Kennedy developed an even-handed policy, with the goal 
of enhancing US prestige among its new clients without losing or provoking old ones. 
But even-handedness is not tantamount to supporting any friend. Kennedy was not 
seeking to bolster Washington’s ties with just any taker in the region17, as Warren Bass 
argues, but only to allow himself some time to carry out his policy of rapprochement with 
Nasser without jeopardising the US oil interests in Saudi Arabia or provoking Israel into 
taking up arms against the UAR. In adopting skilful, personal diplomacy with the Arab 
leaders, supporting the Arabs’ desire for self-determination and emancipation, and 
pushing for political, social and economic progress, Kennedy showed much more 
flexibility than his predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, and much less partisanship than his 
successor, Lyndon B. Johnson18, temporarily redefining the role that the United States 
had played in the region until that moment.  
But Kennedy was not a benefactor, he was a hawk. Undoubtedly, to a certain 
degree John F. Kennedy was also an idealist, inspired by Wilson’s famous “Fourteen 
points” and by the numerous senators he cited in his book Profiles in Courage, written 
                                                 
16 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 
Vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan, Yemen, 135 
17 Bass, Support Any Friend…, 12. 
18 Little explains that, already during his time in Congress, Johnson was one of Israel’s leading friends and 
that, as president, he “did not disappoint”. Little, American Orientalism…, 97, 98. Abraham Ben-Zvi argues 
that Johnson’s relationship with Israel “was closely and irrevocably patterned on the basic premises of the 
‘Special Relationship’ paradigm”. Ben-Zvi, Lyndon B. Johnson and the politics of arms sales to Israel: In 
the shadow of the hawk. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 2. Jonathan Colman contends that “Johnson’s 
sympathies in the Arab-Israeli rivalry lie mainly with the Israelis.” Jonathan Colman, The Foreign Policy 
of Lyndon B. Johnson: The United States and the world, 1963-1969, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010), 146. A Similar argument is provided by Spiegel in The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
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after back surgery in 1955-1956. But he was also one “without illusions”19, as he jokingly 
used to describe himself.  
His actions in the Middle East are indeed testament to deep, Cold War 
pragmatism, not to idealism. In the summer of 1961, Kennedy confirmed the programme 
of economic aid to Egypt through the Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act, also known as Food for Peace programme) with the 
hope of gaining leverage on Nasser’s foreign policy, of building up Egypt’s ties with 
Washington as an alternative to the Soviet Union, and of restraining him from foreign 
adventures that could upset the stability of the region. Throughout his entire presidency, 
he also pushed Saudi Arabia and Jordan (as well as Iran) to adopt a series of economic, 
social and political reforms for the purpose of stabilising their conservative regimes 
against possible nationalist uprisings that could threaten the US interests in the region. 
He enhanced Israel’s security, famously through the 1962 HAWK sale, because he sought 
to contain it and prevent it from jeopardising his Cold War policies by exacerbating the 
Arab-Israeli dispute and thus create political and strategic openings for the Soviet Union.  
Kennedy’s actions in the Middle East unintentionally paved the way for the 
formation of the American special alliances with Saudi Arabia and Israel. In an attempt 
to secure his goal of fostering a working relationship with Nasser, Kennedy strengthened 
the regime in Saudi Arabia through programmes of reforms which allowed the Saudi 
monarchy to become America’s future regional proxies under the presidencies of Johnson 
and Nixon. Likewise, by selling the HAWK missile system in August 1962, and by 
starting the first high-level consultations between the two governments in November 
1963, Kennedy put an end to the arms embargo and the cold association that had 
                                                 
19 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963, (Boston, New York, London: Little, 
Brown and Company, 2003), 299. 
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characterised the US attitude towards Israel during the Eisenhower years, opening the 
road to future arms sales and to a closer military, strategic and political relationship that 
would flourish under the presidencies of Johnson and Nixon.  
Such an assessment integrates, or in some cases differs from, the research that has 
previously been conducted on this topic. Although this thesis has been mainly based on 
the analysis of primary sources, it has not – and could not have – disregarded the main 
literature on the subject.  
Warren Bass’s “Support any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of 
the US-Israel Alliance” is possibly the most exhaustive and detailed account of 
Kennedy’s foreign policy in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Bass relies on a number 
of primary sources, including Hebrew documents present in the Israel State Archives and 
the David Ben-Gurion Archive, and his personal interviews with members of the 
Kennedy entourage, such as Theodor C. Sorensen and Phillips Talbot. However, although 
Bass develops his arguments around the Kennedy/Ben Gurion/Nasser triad, he misses out 
on important primary sources available on Saudi Arabia, a key protagonist during the 
Yemen Crisis. For instance, Parker T. Hart’s “Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth 
of a Security Partnership”20 is a crucial book for those investigating Kennedy’s foreign 
policy towards the Arab world, as it is authored by Kennedy’s ambassador in Saudi 
Arabia himself. Hart provides a critical recollection of his first-hand experience in 
Riyadh, integrating the history of Kennedy’s policies towards Saudi Arabia with a critical 
explanation of how they have impacted the Saudi government, which Bass does not 
analyse. On the secondary sources, works such as Madawi al-Rasheed, “A History of 
Saudi Arabia”21, Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, “Saudi Arabia: the Coming 
                                                 
20 Parker T. Hart, Saudi Arabia and the United States: birth of a security partnership, (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998). 
21 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (London: Cambridge University press, 2002). 
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Storm”22, and Rachel Bronson, “Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with 
Saudi Arabia”23, also provide very relevant accounts of Kennedy’s strategies towards 
Saudi Arabia and the simultaneous struggles of power within the royal family, which are 
pivotal to understanding the motivations behind Kennedy’s strategies towards Saudi 
Arabia. The absence of such works in Support any Friend24 is evidence of the scarce 
relevance that Bass gives to Kennedy’s approach to the Arab monarchies. Although very 
articulate on the relationship between Washington, Egypt and Israel, Bass’s work cuts out 
of the picture a key aspect of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East, namely his 
attempt to stabilise the Arab monarchies through programmes of development and 
modernization. Given the historical significance of Kennedy’s policy towards Saudi 
Arabia, one that would affect US posture in the region for years to come, this work 
examines Kennedy’s approach to the Arab monarchies as an integral part of his Mideast 
strategy. 
When it comes to the relationship between Washington, Israel and Egypt, Bass 
makes a number of very insightful points, building the narrative with meticulous 
accuracy, and identifying in Kennedy’s rapprochement with Nasser, the HAWK sale, the 
Dimona issue and the Yemen crisis the main topics of his work. Rightfully, Bass explains 
how the core of Kennedy’s Middle East policy was Nasser.25 He argues that the attempt 
to court Nasser represents Kennedy’s greatest innovation in the region, because it 
“represented a sharp break with past US and UK policies in the Middle East. America’s 
                                                 
22 Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi Arabia: the Coming Storm, (New York; M E Sharpe 
Inc., 1994). 
23 Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia, (Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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traditional Middle East friends had been conservative monarchs”26, and that, above all 
other considerations, the Kennedy administration’s approach to the Middle East was 
driven by Cold War necessities.27 These arguments are largely supported in this thesis. 
Indeed, evidence shows that Kennedy sought closer ties with Nasser as part of a regional 
strategy, and even aspired to a more extended Third World strategy, aimed at reducing 
Soviet gains among Arab nationalists and world neutralist leaders.  
However valuable and comprehensive Bass’s work is, this thesis differs from 
“Support any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance” 
on a number of key points. The first one is his very interpretation of the result of 
Kennedy’s Middle East experience. Bass argues that “The Kennedy administration... 
constitutes the pivotal presidency in U.S.-Israel relations, the hinge that swung decisively 
away from the chilly association of the 1950s and toward the full-blown alliance we know 
today.”28 But coming from such a standpoint prevents Bass from stressing the 
unintentional nature of such an outcome. According to Bass, Kennedy sought to support 
any friend in the Middle East in order to “advance his wider Cold War strategy”29 and 
this eventually resulted in closer ties with Israel, the only country, together with the Arab 
monarchies, willing to take advantage of Kennedy’s strategy of supporting any friend. 
Bass comments that “Kennedy had spoken of supporting any friend; in the Middle East 
he found takers only in Israel and the Arab kingdoms and emirates”30, but Nasser too took 
advantage of Kennedy’s opening, until Congress’s intervention in late 1963 crushed the 
relationship between the two Presidents.  
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Although it is true that Kennedy did support Israel, historically through the 
HAWK sale, the joint high-level security talks and other forms of security guarantees, it 
is not true that Kennedy did this in light of a strategy aimed at securing as many allies, or 
friends, in the region as possible. Kennedy’s focus in the Middle East was Nasser, and 
the rapprochement with the Egyptian leader constituted the core of his Cold War regional 
strategy. Only by supporting Nasser, Kennedy thought, would Washington be able to 
enhance its prestige in the region and steer the forces of Arab nationalism away from 
Moscow and in a direction that could serve US interests. Bass does not fully take into 
account the unintentional nature of Kennedy’s special friendship with Israel, and he does 
not emphasise Kennedy’s decision to enhance Israel’s security with the goal of 
forestalling its “active defence” in order to contain it and prevent it from jeopardising his 
rapprochement with Nasser. This is a crucial point because it is the basis for 
understanding the motivations behind certain policies, particularly the HAWK sale - a 
watershed moment in the history of US relations with Israel. Kennedy feared that Israel’s 
reprisal policy could threaten his reconciliation with Cairo, and thus gave security 
guarantees in the hope that those could somehow satisfy Israel’s main national security 
objective, the bitahon – the defence and security of Israel. 
With regards to the HAWK, Bass makes a point of linking the sale to Israel’s 
“dangerous arms imbalance”31 against Nasser, arguing that, “The ongoing Soviet arms 
sales to Nasser's Egypt had made Israel increasingly vulnerable.”32 Although it is true that 
Nasser was acquiring weapons from the Soviet Union, it is also true that the 
administration never fully believed that Israel was at a disadvantage, as Bass suggests. 
On the contrary, it was a rather widespread belief that Nasser was not in a position to pose 
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any threat to Ben Gurion.33 The HAWK was sold mainly to forestall Israel’s reprisal 
policy, not because the administration believed Israel was in danger. 
Kennedy was not seeking to “support any friend”, as Bass argues, he was seeking 
to support Nasser to achieve his Cold War objective of defeating the Soviet Union in the 
region. Indeed, Kennedy believed that only by providing Nasser with a Western 
alternative to his dependence on the Moscow, could neutralism in the Middle East prevail 
over socialism and lead, in the long-term, to a Westernised development that would thus 
reject communism.34 Because of the centrality of Nasser for the New Frontier’s approach 
to the region, Kennedy’s policies towards Israel and the Arab monarchies were simply a 
result of the policy of rapprochement. Fearing that the administration’s support of Nasser 
could provoke Israel to act and the monarchies to fall, Kennedy adopted strategies aimed 
at securing US interests in the Saudi oil and to contain Israel. Bass states that Kennedy’s 
policies towards Israel and Saudi Arabia were designed to “gain a wider range of Middle 
Eastern options”35, but closer alliances with Israel and Saudi Arabia were never really 
options for the administration. They came to be so only with the later presidencies of 
Johnson and Nixon, and exclusively because Kennedy’s diplomacy with Nasser was 
abruptly interrupted by the simultaneous occurrence of Congress’s decision to stop the 
program of foreign aid towards the UAR, and Kennedy’s assassination. Indeed, evidence 
shows quite clearly that Kennedy perceived Israel as a destabilizing force in the Middle 
East (during the Jordan crisis for instance, Kennedy commented quite plainly that Israel 
was “really the danger”36) and that Saudi Arabia was important exclusively its oil. 
Furthermore, while discussing the bitter end of Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with 
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Nasser, Bass argues that, “Kennedy had tried to moderate the foremost Arab radical and 
failed, which meant that risking Nasser's friendship over a deepening American special 
relationship with Israel was not risking much at all.”37 Such an assessment seems to imply 
that Kennedy, unable to contain Nasser’s adventure in Yemen, chose Tel Aviv over Cairo 
to advance his Cold War strategies. If it is true that Kennedy had lost faith in Nasser as 
result of the Yemen crisis, it is equally unquestionable that only Congress’s meddling and 
his premature death prevented him from pursuing his policy of rapprochement with 
Nasser. The administration’s severe reaction against the Gruening amendment, which 
Kennedy himself described during his last conference in mid-November 1963 as 
constituting “the worst attack on foreign aid”38, shows that, if Washington deepened in 
its special relationship with Israel, it was not in light of Kennedy’s strategic 
considerations.  
Finally, Bass argues that Kennedy was only “occasionally directly involved in the 
Middle East policy.”39 This assessment conveys a misleading picture of President 
Kennedy, who was in fact very heavily involved with any decisions regarding the Middle 
East. Several members of the administration, even those more directly involved with the 
Middle Eastern issues such as Robert Komer, Phillips Talbot and Parker T. Hart, recall 
that Kennedy was very much his own secretary of state, particularly when it came to the 
Middle East.40 Certainly, the Kennedy administration was not a homogenous entity, but 
Bass seems to put too much emphasis on the different voices within the administration 
and too little on the role that Kennedy himself played as the main director of US foreign 
policy in the Middle East. 
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Another key contribution to the literature is provided by Roby C. Barrett’s “The 
Greater Middle East and the Cold War: US Foreign Policy under Eisenhower and 
Kennedy”, which offers an interesting comparison between the policies of the two 
presidents towards the Middle East. While acknowledging the importance of Barrett’s 
work, this thesis challenges his main argument that “both administrations practiced 
containment in a remarkably similar manner.”41 Rightfully, Barrett argues that both 
Eisenhower and Kennedy’s main concern was the containment of communism, but he 
contends that to a large extent Kennedy adopted the same strategies implemented by 
Eisenhower.42 Given that Kennedy’s focus in the Middle East was Nasser, to make such 
a comparison one would thus have to look at his policy towards Cairo, and the profound 
difference between the approaches of these two presidents would become apparent. While 
stressing the centrality of US economic aid to the Arab world, Barrett fails to capture the 
main distinction between the Eisenhower-Dulles team and the New Frontiersmen. While 
the first perceived nationalism as the first step towards communism, the latter regarded 
Nasser as a key neutralist leader, not as a Soviet agent.  
Eisenhower excluded Egypt from his regional strategies in light of his belief that 
Arab nationalists would favour a Soviet infiltration. Thus, he opposed Arab nationalism, 
tried to isolate and replace Nasser with King Saud as leader of the Arab world, and 
designed policies that ended up antagonising the Arab nationalists and favouring Soviet 
infiltration. As this thesis argues, while the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine 
were, in the eyes of Nasser, clear attempts to polarize the Arab world within the Cold War 
framework, Kennedy’s approach was centred around the need of  “adopting a more 
sensible policy”43 towards Nasser and the other world neutralists, and moving past the 
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Eisenhower administration’s tendency of “casting into the outer darkness those countries 
which for one reason or another didn’t feel they should be tied to Washington as opposed 
to Moscow.”44 Kennedy’s prime strategy was based on efforts to improve the Arabs’ 
perception of the Western world, and so to silently steer the forces of Arab nationalism 
in a direction that could serve US interests, and thus frustrate the Soviet’s ambitions in 
the region. The goal might have been the same – containment of communism – as Barrett 
argues, but the means of achieving it were significantly different. Barrett fails to capture 
such a critical difference. 
Indeed it is hard to see in Kennedy’s strategies the same kind of endeavours made 
by the Eisenhower-Dulles team in pushing for alliances, for the creation of regional 
organisations in the style of the Baghdad Pact, or for the subordination of US economic 
help to the Arabs’ willingness to side with Washington in the fight against communism. 
One could look for instance at the events that sparked the Suez crisis to appreciate the 
rather different course followed by the Eisenhower administration. After the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, a milestone in the history of the non-aligned movement, Eisenhower 
realised Nasser would never side with the United States, and refused to provide Egypt 
with the military aid it requested. Again, James P. Richards, the special ambassador 
appointed by Eisenhower to test the Arabs’ willingness to subscribe to the Doctrine, never 
went to Egypt. The Eisenhower administration had no interest in dealing with the key 
Arab nationalist. Conversely, Kennedy made Nasser the main focus of his approach to 
the Middle East. Even during the Yemen crisis, an event that dramatically strained 
Washington’s relations with Cairo, Kennedy threatened to interrupt the PL-480 if Nasser 
did not disengage, never actually doing so. Responsibility for the decision of putting an 
end to Kennedy’s rapprochement with Cairo lay exclusively with Congress, not the White 




House. Thus, Kennedy’s Mideast approach was significantly different from Eisenhower’s 
because its very nature was opposite. Kennedy focused on rapprochement with the Arab 
nationalists; Eisenhower fought them.  
Barrett criticises “Support any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of 
the US-Israel Alliance” because, he contends that Bass “underestimates the understanding 
of Arab policy.”45 While this might be true (as argued earlier, Bass does not refer to some 
crucial works such as Hart’s, which offers a good analysis of Faysal’s policy in relation 
to Washington’s plans), and represents an intrinsic limit of Bass’s work, both authors fail 
to capture that Kennedy’s Middle Eastern policy was designed around the rapprochement 
with Nasser, and consequently his strategies towards both Israel and the Arab monarchies 
were themselves a result of the administration’s effort to court Egypt. Kennedy wished to 
prevent Israel from posing a threat to his policy of rapprochement with Nasser, and 
simultaneously he sought to preserve the stability of Saudi Arabia against Nasser’s 
propaganda in order to secure US interests in the Saudi oilfields. Critically, Kennedy’s 
even-handedness derived from this same policy of rapprochement with Nasser, a crucial 
point that both authors seem to miss. 
Barrett also argues that “Kennedy often overestimated the impact of personal 
Presidential diplomacy”46 and again he seems too quick to dismiss the importance of one 
of Kennedy’s main tools in dealing with international leaders. Indeed, only by 
acknowledging the importance of Kennedy’s personal diplomacy it is possible for 
instance to capture the entirety of Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser. An 
extract from Robert Komer’s interview offers a clear picture of the type of governments 
Kennedy dealt with: 
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“In most of the less developed world there is no firmly structured constitutional 
system or anything like that. It is very largely a matter of personal government. Kennedy 
himself sensed very quickly that through personal communication with these heads of 
state and prime ministers, the key foci of power in these countries, he could far more 
effectively carry out the policy objectives that he had rather firmly in mind.”47 
 
Komer’s argument is far from groundless. In Egypt for instance, Nasser was the 
“real focus of power” and he “unilaterally made major policy decisions.”48 Likewise, in 
countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan (not to mention Iran), the policy-making process 
was handled ultimately by the monarchs, who had the last word over any law or policy 
that the government would suggest.49 Thus, it is unsurprising that Kennedy’s one-on-one 
diplomacy proved to be a terribly important instrument in dealing with the Third World 
leaders. When Kennedy approached Cairo, he realized that the most important thing to 
do was to develop a personal relationship with Nasser: “He had probably concluded even 
before becoming President that this was important”, commented Phillips Talbot in his 
Oral History Interview, explaining how the president, once in office, had immediately set 
out to get into communication with the Egyptian president.50 Such a position is echoed 
by Kennedy’s ambassador in Cairo John Badeau, who admitted that Kennedy’s letters, 
and the way they were crafted, did have a big impact on the Egyptian leader.51 And it is 
by assigning the proper significance to Kennedy’s personal diplomacy, among other key 
aspects of his approach to the Middle East, that it is perhaps possible to understand 
Nasser’s acceptance of US recognition of the new government in Syria after the UAR 
break-up in 1961, and even the almost complete lack of reaction in Egypt after the 
announcement of the HAWK sale in August 1962.52 Nasser’s response to Kennedy’s 
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warning letter on the HAWK sale is probably the best testament to the importance of 
Kennedy’s personal diplomacy: “Of course, I don’t like this. You knew I wouldn’t like 
it, but I’m grateful to have been told”.53 Although Nasser might not have had any other 
choice - after all Kennedy specified that he was not consulting Nasser “in any way”54 - 
there can be little doubt that such a gesture helped at least to generate good will between 
the two governments, particularly after Nasser’s bitter experience with Eisenhower and 
Dulles. 
Finally, Barrett’s most debatable point emerges with regard to Kennedy’s 
relationship with Israel. Barrett argues that “Kennedy, after considerable internal debate, 
succumbed to domestic pressure and increasingly pursued pro-Israeli policies for 
domestic political reasons.”55 Barrett’s position opens a larger debate on the role that the 
Israeli lobby has played in Washington’s policy-making process. However, to the extent 
of analysing the Kennedy years in relation to this issue, Barrett’s analysis appears 
unfounded. In Dean Rusk’s Oral History Interview, the issue of the domestic pressure 
exerted by the Israeli lobby is dismissed quite clearly:  
“I was genuinely impressed by the relative absence of direct pressure on Middle 
Eastern questions… I don’t recall that anybody ever came into see me to pressure me on 
a particular point of policy affecting Israel.”56 
 
Warren Bass argues that, although the lobby had some friends in Congress, it had 
“little true clout in the executive branch in the early 1960s.”57 Although Barrett promptly 
dismisses the analysis provided in Support any Friend, by asserting that Bass 
“consistently understates the impact of the pro-Israeli Lobby on the administration”58, a 
number of studies seem to acknowledge that during the Kennedy years, the lobby was not 
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so powerful after all. David Verbeeten asserts that during the early 1960s, the Israeli lobby 
did not have enough power to influence, let alone shape, the course of US foreign policy59, 
while Henry Feingold contends that the idea that the lobby was able to manoeuvre the 
White House is “far removed from reality.”60 Isaiah L. Kenen argues at length that the 
power of the Israel lobby in American grew with the improvement of US-Israeli relations, 
but did not dictate it. In fact, only after the Six-Day War, did Washington start to perceive 
Israel as a credible deterrent for the containment of communism, enhancing the bilateral 
relations between the two countries and thus benefiting the lobby.61 Even John J. 
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, who certainly do not hold back in their analysis of 
the power of the Israeli lobby in the United States, admit that Israel’s help to the United 
States in containing Moscow’s communism after 1967 was extremely significant for the 
influence that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) had in the United 
States.62 
Barrett centres his focus around the key moment of the HAWK sale, making his 
argument largely by referring to Talbot’s Oral History Interview, where Kennedy is 
quoted as saying: “The trouble with you, Phil, is that you’ve never had to collect votes to 
get yourself elected to anything”63, and on the conversation Kennedy had with Ben 
Gurion in May 1961, when the president said he would do something for the Jews to 
thank them for their support.64 Barrett however moves too hastily over the strategic 
considerations of containment behind the HAWK sale, putting too much emphasis on 
words that Kennedy meant as mere courtesy for the support showed by the American 
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Jewish community during his 1960 presidential elections. Words are words, and Kennedy 
was not committing the US foreign policy in the Middle East to the support of Israel 
simply because the American Jewish community preferred him over Nixon. The HAWK 
was sold with the goal of appeasing the Israeli government, alarmed by Kennedy’s 
support of Nasser, and forestalling possible pre-emptive attacks. 
Another crucial contribution to the literature is provided by historian Douglas 
Little, who deals with Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East on a number of 
occasions: Although “From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed: Seeking Order in the 
Middle East” and “The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism” 
are short, yet considerably valuable accounts of Kennedy’s policies towards the Arab 
world, Little’s great endeavour “American Orientalism: the United States and the Middle 
East since 1945”65 is, in its third edition, a crucial book for those who wish to investigate 
the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East.  
Little identifies the Yemen crisis as the event that forced Kennedy to part from 
Cairo and move closer to Tel Aviv and Riyadh66, and rightfully suggests that “Presidents 
John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson laid the groundwork for what would become 
the Nixon Doctrine, a ‘twin pillars’ policy in which Iran and Saudi Arabia would serve 
as anti-Soviet regional proxies.”67 
However, Little operates from a premise that is not shared in this thesis, as he 
argues that “while Kennedy worked to strengthen the bonds between the United States 
and Israel, he also sought to improve relations with Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser.”68 Such 
an assessment implies that Kennedy actively pursued a closer relationship with Israel, 
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while this thesis argues that he only wished to contain it. The paradoxical result of 
Kennedy’s foreign policy towards Israel lies in the fact that, in order to secure his 
rapprochement with Nasser, Kennedy enhanced Israel’s security to make sure that the 
Ben Gurion government would not feel threatened and thus pre-emptively attack the 
UAR.  
Little makes a similar argument with regards to Saudi Arabia. He contends that 
Kennedy wished to see Saudi Arabia “fill the vacuum created by Whitehall’s eventual 
departure from the region”69 and thus be transformed into a regional proxy. However, 
evidence shows that Kennedy never pursued such an objective, and that his strategy 
towards Saudi Arabia was exclusively designed to secure the Saudi oilfields. Even when, 
during the Yemen crisis, Kennedy approved substantial military help to Faysal, notably 
through operation HARD SURFACE launched in July 1963, his goal was never to 
transform Riyadh into a proxy, but only to deter Nasser from directly attacking Saudi 
Arabia, and thus secure the US oil interests. Eventually, Kennedy’s strategies 
strengthened Faysal’s regime enough to allow it to survive the revolutionary 
transformations taking place in the region at that time, further fuelled by the wave of 
Nasserism sparked by the Yemen crisis. After Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson seized 
the opportunity of putting a definitive end to Washington’s relations with Cairo (Nasser 
was still entangled in Yemen by the time Johnson accessed the White House) and of 
relying more consistently on Faysal, who had given evidence of being a credible ally in 
the region.  
Finally, Little suggests that the administration agreed to make the sale of the 
HAWK in the hope that this would restrain the Ben Gurion government from introducing 
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atomic weapons in the region.70 Although Little’s argument is intriguing (the HAWK was 
the most advanced defensive missile system and would have been ideal to defend the 
Dimona nuclear facility), and has the merit of identifying the Dimona issue as one of 
Kennedy’s great concerns, there is no strong evidence to support the statement. Little 
bases his argument on a conversation that Kennedy had with Ben Gurion on May 30, 
1961, but even though the discussion developed around both the issue of the HAWK 
request and of Dimona, there is simply no evidence of a clear attempt to link the sale to 
the nuclear issue.71 There is however evidence of efforts to link the sale to the acceptance 
on the Israeli side of the Johnson plan for the refugees, a proposal based on the repatriation 
or resettlement with compensation formula that the UN envoy, Dr Joseph Johnson, 
advanced to both Israel and the Arab states to tackle the issue of the Palestinian refugees. 
In this regard, Abraham Ben-Zvi, author of John F. Kennedy and the Politics of 
Arm Sales to Israel, argues that the HAWK sale was authorised by the Kennedy 
administration in order to gain Israel’s acceptance of the Johnson plan.72 Although it is 
true that the administration attempted to link the HAWK sale to Israel’s acceptance of the 
Johnson plan, it is also true that this idea only came about, moreover rather casually, after 
the administration had already pretty much decided to make the sale.73 Such a time-frame 
confirms the thesis argued in this work that, above all other considerations and attempted 
quid pro quos, the key motivation behind the HAWK sale was Kennedy’s attempt to 
contain Israel by enhancing its bitahon.  
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Ben-Zvi also argues that Kennedy perceived Israel as a credible asset in the region 
to contain the wave of Nasserism, particularly after the Jordan crisis of April 1963.74 
However, this thesis argues that Kennedy never really perceived Israel as an asset, but as 
a liability. Specifically, as stated earlier, on the occasion of the Jordan crisis Kennedy and 
his administration spoke at length of the danger that Israel’s threatening position and 
ambitions over the West Bank constituted for the stability of the region. Kennedy feared 
that if King Hussein fell under the pressure of Nasserite elements in Jordan, and if 
consequently the Egyptian leader moved his troops to Amman to secure a new Nasserite 
government (just like he did in Yemen), Israel would pre-emptively attack Cairo’s troops 
and, by seizing the opportunity, conquer the West Bank, causing a full-blown Arab-Israeli 
war.75 As will be discussed in this work, Kennedy made further security guarantees in an 
attempt to restrain the Israeli government from starting a pre-emptive war against the 
UAR. In May 1963 Kennedy reaffirmed publicly the American commitment to Israel’s 
survival, and in November 1963, he agreed to the joint high-level security talks, 
inadvertently laying the foundation of the US-Israel special alliance.  
In this regard, it is important to mention that this work has deliberately not 
ventured into analysis of the presidencies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon. 
Although the two presidents are mentioned, this is intended exclusively to guide the 
reader to through the understanding of the centrality of Kennedy’s actions within a more 
comprehensive overview of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Indeed, this thesis is 
developed around Kennedy’s approach to the Arab world and Israel, and an analysis of 
the following presidencies of Johnson and Nixon would take this work far beyond its 
reach. It would be misleading not to acknowledge the significance of the 1967 war for the 
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American regional strategies, of Johnson’s personal relations with the American Jewish 
community and with Israel, or of Kissinger’s diplomacy. This thesis does not argue that 
Kennedy was directly responsible for the creation of regional strategies based upon the 
special relationships with Saudi Arabia and Israel. These came about later, during the 
Johnson and Nixon years, and in light of a multitude of regional events and new 
considerations of foreign policy. Kennedy, however, inadvertently created the conditions 
for these strategies to be developed, laying the groundwork for their future 
implementation. Kennedy never wished to establish closer ties with Israel, but in an 
attempt to contain it he put an end to the arms embargo, reaffirmed US commitment to 
the defence of Israel and started the high-level joint consultations between the two 
governments. Similarly, Kennedy never wished to transform Saudi Arabia into a regional 
proxy, but in an attempt to secure US oil interests he reinforced Saudi Arabia’s military 
power and strengthened the regime enough to allow it to survive the revolutionary 
transformations taking place in the Middle East. 
It is equally important to state that this work is articulated around the Arab-Israeli 
snare, and has thus excluded actors that are commonly not regarded as part of it, such as 
Iran. Being the focus of this thesis the Arab-Israeli dispute, it deals for the most part with 
the United Arab Republic, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen. Furthermore, while 
the historiography on Kennedy and Iran is fairly comprehensive, that on Kennedy, the 
Arab world and Israel still presents gaps and controversies, which these thesis tries to 
address.76 Of course, although developed around the Arab-Israeli dispute, this work does 
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not confine itself to this binary conflict, but touches briefly on the question of Kennedy’s 
policy of stability in Iran, in order to guide the reader through a general understanding of 
the administration’s strategy of promoting reforms to preserve certain monarchical 
regimes in the region. Given its similarity to Kennedy’s approach to Saudi Arabia, a brief 
analysis of the case of Iran would be provided in Chapter 2. 
 
This work is divided up in the following way:  
In order to clarify the framework within which Kennedy’s strategies were 
developed, the first chapter covers the topic of Kennedy’s inheritance. This chapter allows 
the reader to follow Kennedy’s bid for the presidential sit in relation to his numerous 
stands on Middle Eastern issues during his time as a senator, emphasising his criticism of 
Eisenhower’s overall approach to the region. It also provides the reader with an 
understanding of how Kennedy organised his team, his priorities and his overall approach 
to the region. This chapter argues that when Kennedy accessed the White House, he was 
confronted with a number of issues left on the table by the Eisenhower administration, 
mainly the question of America’s loss of prestige in the Middle East, and of the Soviet 
infiltration in the region. This chapter aims at explaining how Kennedy decided to tackle 
the problems of the Middle East 
The second chapter considers Kennedy’s strategies for the Middle East. It will 
focus on the key features of Kennedy’s Middle East policy, highlighting its strategic, 
economic and ideological drive. This chapter provides a general analysis of the issues that 
are not discussed in the three case studies that are examined in the following chapters. It 
focuses on Kennedy’s strategies of modernization of the Arab monarchies (also including 
an overview of Iran), his strategy of containment of communism, and his relations with 
the British government. This chapter is largely intended to introduce the reader to the 
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three case studies (Egypt, Israel and the Yemen crisis) with an understanding of 
Kennedy’s overall approach to the region.  
The third chapter examines Kennedy’s policy towards Nasser. It argues that 
Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser constituted the core of his overall 
strategy for the Middle East, and that behind Kennedy’s wooing of Nasser lay very 
pragmatic Cold War considerations. This chapter provides an analysis of the development 
of the Kennedy-Nasser relationship, describing the administration’s approach to Cairo 
before the Yemen crisis of September 1962. It analyses the issue of the UAR break-up; 
the PL-480; Nasser’s reaction to the HAWK sale and to the Johnson plan.  
The fourth chapter examines Kennedy’s policy towards Israel. It argues that 
Kennedy’s strategy towards Israel was mainly designed to forestall possible pre-emptive 
attacks against Egypt, and that, in order to do so, Kennedy opted for a policy aimed at 
enhancing Israel’s security. This chapter provides an analysis of the development of the 
Kennedy-Israel relationship before the Yemen crisis, tackling the issues of the Dimona 
nuclear facility, the HAWK sale, and the Johnson plan. 
The fifth chapter examines Kennedy’s policy during the Yemen crisis. It argues 
that in order to bolster his rapprochement with Nasser, Kennedy adopted policies aimed 
at containing Israel and strengthening Saudi Arabia through programmes of domestic 
reforms, thus inadvertently laying the foundations for the making of two special alliances. 
The Yemen crisis provides an excellent lens to understand the many facets of the Kennedy 
administration’s foreign policy in the Middle East, as the number of international actors 
involved and of interests at stake, compelled Kennedy to find a balance between his Cold 




This work offers a unique interpretation of the events that punctuated the history 
of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East, focusing on three overlapping concerns 
(Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia) rather than fixating on Kennedy-Israel relations, as 
previous works have done. Such innovation derives from the need to provide a nuanced 
understanding of Kennedy’s regional strategies, and to present a fresh portrait of a 
president whose actions have significantly contributed in shaping the contemporary 
Middle East. A good assessment of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East is 
perhaps provided by his own New Frontiersman, Phillips Talbot: “We didn’t solve any 
of the fundamental problems…But maybe the combination of everything we were doing 
helped to keep it tamped down. I hope so.”77 On balance however, Kennedy’s foreign 
policy was far more than a buffer. Kennedy showed great initiative and understanding of 
the Middle East: he seduced Nasser, breaking from the Eisenhower-Dulles approach and 
offering the key Arab nationalist a credible alternative to the Soviet Union in his pursuit 
of a neutralist path; he contained Israel, reducing the threat of pre-emptive attacks and of 
a full-blown Arab-Israeli war, even when this appeared to be imminent; he secured US 
interests in the Arab monarchies by designing a strategy aimed to strengthen these 
regimes from inside, even when these were trembling under the wave of Nasserism in 
1962-1963. 
Unfortunately, Kennedy’s death prevented his strategies from ever coming to full 
fruition, and this is perhaps why Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East has too 
often slipped under the radar, or been examined almost exclusively in the context of the 
making of a special alliance with Israel. But there is no doubt that Kennedy’s actions in 
the region were far more than this, and that his presidency constituted a pivotal moment 
in the history of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. 
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Chapter 1. From senator to president: JFK and the making of a new Mideast 
approach 
 
The senator who wanted to be president 
By the end of the 1950s the Middle East had become without doubt one of the 
most important stages for the Cold War. The need for oil still dominated the minds of the 
American policy-makers, as consumption was growing at “a pace that simply would not 
have been conceivable at the beginning of the post-war era”78, while the region was 
progressively becoming the global centre of production79, with profits expected to “reach 
$10,000 million a year by 1975”80 The events of Suez and the nationalisation of the canal 
had proven the importance of its geo-strategic passages for Western economic interests, 
while simultaneously marking the gradual loss of influence of the former European 
empires and the handover of their power to Washington. The question of the rising tension 
between Arabs and Israelis and the issue of the Palestinian refugees were still very much 
on the table as no significant steps towards conciliation had been made. Israel’s reprisal 
attacks against the Arab countries, Jordan in particular, and the occasional episodes of 
“Arab harassment”81 along the Israeli borders, were causing incidents of varying severity, 
further contributing to the instability of a region already stormy with inter-Arab 
disputes.82 In this regard, the local crisis that occurred in 1958 in Jordan and Lebanon, the 
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Iraqi coup of July 1958 and the union between Egypt and Syria into the UAR federation 
in February 1958, proved not only that the wave of Arab nationalism was not a 
phenomenon to be underestimated, but that Nasser was the key regional player to deal 
with. Even more frightening, the Soviet Union was a step ahead of the United States in 
the region, as it was managing to exploit its propaganda to distance the Arab world from 
Washington. In July 1958, the National Security Council informed Eisenhower that 
“Many Arabs believe that the USSR, on the contrary, favours the goals of Arab 
nationalism and is willing to support the Arabs in their efforts to attain these goals without 
a quid pro quo”83, pointing out that the political trends in the Near East were “inimical to 
Western interests.”84 Indeed, during the 1950s, Moscow had managed to conclude several 
military agreements with the Arab leaders, such as the Czech arms deal with Nasser right 
before the Suez crisis, or the one with Iraqi leader Qasim in 1958, and to exploit internal 
divisions within the Arab world to present itself as true supporter of the Arabs’ ambitions. 
On the other hand, given Eisenhower’s opposition to Arab nationalism, the United States 
was portrayed as a force eager to “turn back the wheel of history”, and working for “the 
preservation of colonialism.”85 
As events in the Middle East were developing, a young politician from Boston, 
Massachusetts, was learning how to exploit the failures of the administration to his 
personal advantage, in his quest for the presidency of the United States. Arguably the 
White House had indeed always been John F. Kennedy’s objective, as he grew up with 
one lesson from his father in mind: “If you can’t be captain, don’t play.”86 Acknowledging 
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the fact that his contribution in congressional discussions about global issues could 
encourage party leaders to take his political ascent more seriously87, from the very early 
stages of his senatorial career, Kennedy entrenched himself in the world of international 
affairs, particularly the Middle East, not only because the region was Eisenhower’s hot-
spot, but also because its explosive dynamics had made it critical for the Cold War.88 
At the age of 35, Kennedy became senator, after having defeated Henry Cabot 
Lodge Jr. in the 1952 Congressional elections. He knew that being so young he “would 
be one of the least-influential members of the Senate”89, especially in an era in which, as 
Truman put it later in 1960, only leaders “with the greatest possible maturity and 
experience”90 were taken into consideration. Thus, in order to prove his credentials as 
leader and to gain political credibility, he had to take a stand on the most controversial 
issues and prove in Congress that he belonged to a new generation of progressive and 
innovative policy-makers who could move America forward in an era dominated by 
competition with the Soviet Union.91 The Middle East offered Kennedy the perfect 
platform to prove to Congress he was a credible politician. 
Kennedy had been interested in the Middle East since he was very young. In 1939, 
although still a student, he wrote a long letter to his father, businessman and Government 
Official Joseph Kennedy, regarding the issue of Palestine and the British White Paper. 
Kennedy took a rather firm position, showing great analytical skills and interest in the 
region, and labelling the White Paper as a theoretically good solution that would not 
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work.92 The idea behind the White Paper was the creation of a mixed Palestine, governed 
by both Palestinian Arabs and Jews, proportionally to the number of their population. “It 
surely sounds like a fair plan”, Kennedy wrote to his father, “but they need something 
that would actually work and not something that merely sounds good.”93 Consequently, 
he hypothesized the separation of the country into two autonomous districts both with 
governmental powers “to the extent that they do not interfere with each other and that 
British interest is safeguarded.”94 
However, although a personal intellectual interest in the world of foreign policy 
and in the Middle East in particular was also part of Kennedy’s background95, a clever 
and focused campaigning strategy was behind the numerous stands he took in front of 
Congress. In 1952, Kennedy commented that “foreign policy… overshadows everything 
else”96 and in light of this belief, eager to reach the highest office in the United States, he 
followed Eisenhower’s foreign policy closely, firm in his belief that this could be the key 
to the White House.  
This resulted in Kennedy’s increasing criticism of the policies designed by 
Eisenhower and Dulles and their general approach to the Middle East, which brought the 
young senator that domestic and international attention he sought, both from other 
members of Congress and foreign political personalities.97 Consequently, with each 
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failure of the White House, Kennedy strengthened his conviction that “the old ways will 
not do” and that it was time “for a new generation of leadership”98, for which he 
undoubtedly wanted to be the spokesman. Kennedy learned valuable lessons from the old 
administration’s mistaken approach to the Middle East and, although in 1958 Eisenhower 
had tried to adjust his policy with the NSC 5820/1, a new strategy centred upon the need 
to establish a working relationship with the Arab nationalists99, Kennedy had the merit of 
realising the real regional challenges years in advance.  
Kennedy considered the Middle East during the Eisenhower years a “monument 
to Western misunderstanding.”100 During a conference in 1957, Kennedy attacked 
Eisenhower’s Baghdad Pact, the US sponsored regional organisation born in 1955 which 
included Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, as well as Britain, describing it as a “clumsy 
tool to treat Communist infiltration.”101 Indeed, noticing that Eisenhower’s “tools” were 
trembling under the weight of Arab nationalism, regional fighting, and the imperialist 
attitude that the American policies were conveying, Senator Kennedy began to base his 
criticism on the basic assumption that Washington’s policy-makers had been dealing with 
the Middle East “far too long almost exclusively in the context of the East-West 
struggle”.102 In fact, he strongly believed that the reason the approach had failed up to 
that point was the fact that the previous administration had disregarded the challenging 
peculiarities of the Middle East, dealing with the regional issues exclusively, as he wrote 
in his 1960 book The Strategy for Peace, “in terms of our own battle against International 
Communism.”103 
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Kennedy spoke at length of the urgency to “formulate … a new approach to the 
Middle East”104 based on the need to accept the forces of Arab nationalism and to channel 
them “along constructive lines”.105 Refusing to “talk only in terms of guns and money”106, 
a clear reference to the Eisenhower Doctrine, Kennedy commented that “The Middle East 
needs water, not war; tractors, not tanks; bread, not bombs”107, and that the United States 
should never “consider the problem of the nations of the Middle East apart from the 
economic and social conditions which surround them.”108 Concurring with Walt 
Rostow’s theory that economic development and social and political modernization could 
help the Third World countries to resist “the blandishments and temptations of 
Communism”109, Kennedy concluded that it was crucial for the United States to help 
“move more than half the people of the less-developed nations into self-sustained 
economic growth”110, and thus shield them from the Soviet ambitions.  
This is why Kennedy never fully subscribed to any of Eisenhower’s policies in 
the Middle East, believing that, being designed exclusively to prevent Soviet infiltration, 
they disregarded the real regional challenges: the issue of Arab nationalism and of social 
and economic development. This is not to say that the young senator underestimated the 
relevance of the Cold War, as he was on the contrary very sensitive to it, as any politician 
with presidential aspirations would have been at that time.111 Kennedy always 
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acknowledged the great threat that international communism constituted but, he stated in 
his book, “We were wrong in believing that what was so clear to us could be made equally 
compelling to other peoples with problems very different from our own.”112 The failures 
of the Eisenhower administration moved him to realise that only by understanding and 
playing along with certain regional dynamics could the threat of the Soviet Union be 
removed from the Middle East. 
As the Suez crisis was developing during the spring and summer of 1956, 
Kennedy agreed, albeit reluctantly, to try to run for the office of vice president, along 
with presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, in order to take the next step in his political 
career. He “did not really want to be vice president”, as he confessed to Ted Sorensen, 
already a member of his entourage, but Kennedy recognised that in 1956 it was “the only 
game in town”113, and that the chances of success were high because Eisenhower’s health 
problems had made his re-election rather doubtful.114 The vice presidential nomination 
was eventually won by Senator Estes Kefauver, and thus Kennedy focused back against 
Eisenhower’s foreign policy, particularly towards the Middle East.  
In reference to the Baghdad Pact, the ineffectiveness of which had been proved 
by the Soviet arms deal signed in September 1955 by Egyptian President Nasser and 
Czechoslovakia, the young senator asserted: “We are neither members nor non-members 
of the Baghdad Pact, but some sort of half-member”115, arguing that without the presence 
of its main promoter and contributor, the organisation was left with no real power. 
Eisenhower and Dulles saw it differently. They argued that the real issue “was that the 
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British have taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy - that has drawn 
down upon it a tremendous amount of criticism”116, causing Nasser to be pushed “into 
the deal with the Russians.”117 
Though the British presence had undoubtedly contributed in giving an imperialist 
feel to the organisation, in his 1957 article A Democrat Looks at US Foreign Policy 
Kennedy contended that among the reasons behind the fragility of the pact there was also 
the lack of “identity of interests among all States of the Middle East”118 and the false 
American assumption that there was actually one just because of their geographic 
proximity. “Our response to the Soviet challenge in… the Middle East has been 
exaggeratedly military”119, he continued, arguing that while the Soviet Union was using 
new political, diplomatic and economic techniques to ingratiate themselves with the 
Middle East, based largely on the propagandist support of the Arabs’ ambitions, 
Washington had tried too hard to develop a system of alliances among countries that had 
nothing to tie them together. Kennedy’s analysis was far from groundless, and many 
questioned the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact. For instance, in an article appeared on  
the Pittsburgh Press in 1956 entitled “Baghdad Pact Is Problem”, it was quite plainly 
stated that “None of these steps is seen as contributing to peace and stability in the Middle 
East.”120 After all, just one month before Kennedy’s article, the same Baghdad Pact 
Council had issued a communiqué on the “ever present danger of subversion in the Pact 
area”121, a threat that the organisation was quite clearly unable to contain.  
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Kennedy commented how the administration, unable to tackle the real issues of 
the Middle East, had just “tinkered with notions of a Middle East defence pact” without 
being able to decide “who would be defended and against whom.”122 Kennedy labelled 
the pact as “a creature of crisis jugged in its ups and downs and ambiguous in its 
direction”123, and after the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and its consequent withdrawal from 
the organisation, he simply acknowledged the obvious: “We relied in the Middle East on 
the Baghdad Pact, and yet when the Iraqi government was changed, the Baghdad Pact 
broke down.”124 In The Strategy of Peace, Kennedy finally wrote: “Military pacts provide 
no long-term solutions. On the contrary, they tend dangerously to polarize the Middle 
East, to attach us to specific regimes, to isolate us very often from the significant 
nationalist movements.”125 
Kennedy’s bid for power was just beginning, strengthened by the inexorable 
collapse of the tools designed by the Eisenhower administration. 
 
Suez, the Doctrine, and Kennedy’s bid for power 
The Suez crisis offered Kennedy a perfect opportunity to prove his point: it was 
time to develop a new approach to the Middle East and to change the course of American 
foreign policy. With vice-presidential campaign to run, maturity to prove and political 
credibility to gain, the senator sharpened his criticism against the Eisenhower 
administration. During the many conventions he was invited to attend, he repeatedly 
returned to the issue of Suez, in order to highlight the limits of the Eisenhower 
administration and the need for a change in the government. 
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On October 5, 1956, Kennedy stated: “The security and leadership of the United 
States… are currently threatened most seriously in three Middle Eastern-Mediterranean 
areas - Suez, Cyprus and French North Africa”126, and just ten days later he moved against 
the administration, blaming it for its hesitancy.127 By the end of the month, Kennedy had 
moved directly against Eisenhower: “A leader does not sit back and await with hope... A 
leader is not caught wholly unprepared for an invasion of Suez.”128 
In attempt to broaden his constituency, Kennedy’s speeches on Suez soon started 
to focus on that portion of the electoral constituency that could play an important role in 
his personal ascent, the American Jewish community. In November 1956, standing in 
front of the Hisadrut Zionist Organisation, he declared that “The dependence of the world 
upon the Middle Eastern oil and its transportation through the Suez Canal has been made 
abundantly clear during the past weeks”129, and he stressed Israel’s entitlement to free 
access to the Canal, “both by virtue of international treaties and by virtue of being a 
specific American commitment”.130 Obviously, the senator had no idea how to reopen the 
canal through peaceful means, nor did he discuss it much with his collaborators131, but he 
knew that supporting Israel would be a wise move for his political ambitions, especially 
at a time when Israel was highly antagonised by the White House. That is also why, as 
Feldman recalled, “Kennedy fully committed himself to the free passage in the Suez 
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Canal, and did not commit himself in saying how that was to be achieved.”132 In fact, 
even during the 1960 presidential campaign, the soon-to-be President of the United States 
declared “we must remove all discrimination from the Suez Canal... we must commit 
ourselves to the free transit of the Suez Canal.”133 
In A Democrat Looks at US Foreign Policy, Kennedy accused the administration 
of being too slow in “recognising the need for a broader-gauge and more sustained 
policy”134, and of having dealt with the Suez crisis in a “surprised and divided”135 manner. 
Kennedy asserted that Eisenhower’s hesitancy, and especially his withdrawal of the 
economic help promised for the Aswan Dam, had allowed Moscow to present itself as a 
champion of the anti-colonialism movement and to strengthen its ties with Nasser, who, 
as he would describe in The Strategy of Peace a few years later, was the “leader of the 
Arab bloc, champion of the Arab unity”.136 Moving once again against the initiatives of 
the Eisenhower administration, during a speech in November 1957, entitled “The New 
Dimension of American Foreign Policy”, Kennedy stated: “It is not enough that we 
proclaim our anti-colonialism; we must also help these new states to find the means for 
accelerated economic growth and stable self-rule.”137 
However, Kennedy’s biggest strike occurred during the congressional debate on 
the Middle East Resolution, the Eisenhower Doctrine. By that time, Kennedy was 
becoming progressively more involved in American foreign policy, since after the 
disappointing results of the 1956 presidential elections, in January 1957 he had entered 
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ready to take a more decisive stand on the 
foreign policy platform.138 
His proactive participation in the congressional debate about the Eisenhower 
Doctrine allowed the senator to gain even more exposure in the national press and among 
other members of Congress, thus continuing his personal quest to gain that political 
credibility necessary to access the White House. Right after the polls for the “Mansfield 
amendment”, an extensive clause to the Doctrine that allowed military intervention 
whenever US interests where threatened, even if the threat did not come from the Soviet 
Union or a country controlled by international communism139, Kennedy advanced his 
own proposal to the Senate, suggesting that Eisenhower, “in support of certain general 
policies and principles for the settlement of the problems of the Middle East”140, should 
seek negotiations for such settlements basing his efforts on six principles. These 
principles would later come to constitute the general guidelines for Kennedy’s overall 
approach to the region as president, indicating a certain continuity in his views towards 
the Middle East: 1) recognition of full sovereignty of the countries of the Middle East; 2) 
renunciation of the use of armed forces as a tool for diplomacy; 3) the making of 
permanent Middle Eastern national boundaries; 4) the creation of a free and open transit 
of Suez under the sovereignty of Egypt; 5) repatriation (or resettlement with 
compensation from Israel) of the Arab Palestinian refugees, with economic assistance to 
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Israel in the event of such programme; 6) development of the economic resources of the 
area for the use of its people.141 
Kennedy’s analysis was far from groundless. In his opinion, the doctrine was 
“narrowly drawn”142 because the threat of communism was distant. The people of the 
Middle East, he noted, did not seem to care about the threat of communism, or at least 
not as much as they did about their right to “develop their own resources in that area, and 
whether the United States recognises it.”143 Once again, Kennedy complained that the 
Eisenhower administration was focusing too much on the threat of communism and too 
little on the real challenges of the Middle East.144 
The six principles highlighted by Kennedy did indeed reflect the six big issues 
that were afflicting the Middle East at that time, therefore their importance appeared 
unquestionable. Thus, why should the Doctrine, Kennedy wondered, not allow concrete 
intervention on these subjects? In addition, the Middle East resolution, in its original 
formulation, could easily be manipulated for counter-propaganda: “we are opening 
ourselves by this resolution to the charge of Western imperialism”145, he feared, and he 
believed that the only way to lessen such a risk was by committing to the solving of urgent 
regional issues. Kennedy’s intervention impressed several senators: “When we get 
something like this spelled out, we are really making progress”146, commented Senator 
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Sparkman, as he congratulated his younger colleague for his contribution. Others, 
however, were less convinced.147 
After nearly two months of debate within Congress, the Middle East Resolution 
was eventually passed, without Kennedy’s amendment but thanks to Kennedy’s help. 
Being particularly sensitive to the issue of the Cold War, the senator was more concerned 
with the fact that dismissing the Eisenhower Doctrine would “Blunt out warning to the 
Soviets”148 than with the act of implementing a strategy that “treated the Middle East as 
an American province”149, and thus urged Congress, sceptical about the expense required 
by the Doctrine150, to pass the resolution in order to avoid repudiating the US government 
“on a major foreign policy issue before the eyes of the world.”151 In 1960, after having 
observed the scarce results produced by the Eisenhower Doctrine, Kennedy commented 
in his book that “the resolution should never have been introduced”152 in the first place, 
and made it clear that he supported it only to show unity among the US political apparatus.  
By 1960, Kennedy was closer to the presidency than ever before. The young 
senator had indeed proved to the nation and many of his fellow politicians that he was 
more than a “spoiled candidate”153 as some had suggested, and certainly not a “mediocrity 
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in the Senate… a nobody who had a rich father”154, as Eisenhower had once described 
him. With his campaign efforts finally paying off, Kennedy found himself running for the 
highest office against Eisenhower’s vice president, Richard Nixon. 
In October 1960, Kennedy’s fourth and final face-to-face debate with Nixon on 
television virtually assured him of victory. Millions of Americans followed the event. 
Outside the studio, a crowd of several hundred “demonstrated at the curb for Mr 
Kennedy”, while the New York Times reported no “evidence of any Nixon rooting 
section.”155 Even in Cairo, President Nasser watched the debate closely, eager to get a 
look at the future American president. Muhammad Heikal, one of Nasser’s long-time 
friends, recalled that after the debate, Nasser was convinced that Kennedy was “the better 
man”, and that while Nixon did not do well, Kennedy, on the contrary, perfectly “‘sold’ 
himself to the people.”156 
The two candidates covered a number of topics. Economic and social issues were 
key to win over the American constituency, but in a time of great international peril 
caused by the Cold War, issues of foreign policy inevitably occupied the largest space. 
Kennedy identified Cuba, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East as the most critical 
areas where the United States was “going to have to do better”157, opposing one of 
Nixon’s previous statements that American prestige abroad was “at an all-time high… 
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and that of the Communists at an all-time low.”158 Kennedy stated that in all these areas 
the communist influence was rising because of the lack of US interest or a mistaken 
approach: “I have seen Cuba go to the Communists. I have seen communist influence and 
Castro influence rise in Latin America. I have seen us ignore Africa.”159 With regards to 
the Middle East, Kennedy summed up his long-standing opinions on Eisenhower’s 
foreign policy with one, sharp, comment: 
“We relied in the Middle East on the Baghdad Pact, and yet when the Iraqi 
Government was changed, the Baghdad Pact broke down. We relied on the Eisenhower 
Doctrine for the Middle East which passed the Senate. There isn't one country in the 
Middle East that now endorses the Eisenhower Doctrine.”160 
 
Eventually Kennedy won the elections, entering the White House in January 1961, 
as the 35th President of the United States. Although he was not particularly pleased with 
the results of the elections161, he had no time to dwell on them, or to show weakness or 
second thoughts. The vigour with which he faced the entire presidential campaign had to 
be proved now from the Oval Office. He had to show that the strength with which he 
pursued the White House would now be used to pursue America’s interests, and that this 
new generation of politicians was far more capable than the previous one. It was the time 
for the New Frontiersman to fulfil the promises made during his campaign. 
 
New and old players: reshaping the White House 
With such intellectual background and personal fascination with the region, it is 
hard to subscribe to Bass’s argument that John F. Kennedy was only “occasionally 




161 The 0.2% margin over his rival, made the newly-elected president think that his victory tasted more of 
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directly involved in the Middle East policy.162 Indeed, such an assertion seems to 
disregard the uniformity between Kennedy’s view of the Middle East as senator and as 
president: as a Senator, Kennedy spoke of the need to assist the Arab nationalists, to 
sponsor programmes of economic and social development, to overturn the Arabs’ 
perception of the United States by supporting their ambitions for self-determination and 
emancipation, and in general to secure US interests by adopting a new approach to the 
Middle East (as he wrote in The Strategy of Peace, the United States “should look with 
friendship upon those people who want to beat the problems that almost overwhelmed 
them, and wish to concentrate their energies on doing that”163, a concept remarked during 
the debate with Nixon, when Kennedy stated: “If we become known as friend of 
freedom… helping these people in the fight against poverty and ignorance and diseases… 
I believe… we can put the communist on the defensive”164). As a president, Kennedy 
pursued exactly such goals, giving clear evidence that the administration took exactly the 
direction Kennedy wished it to take. 
The analysis of Kennedy’s White House shows two key features of the Kennedy 
administration. The first one is that, contrary the years of Eisenhower, the appointments 
disregarded the political affiliation or political experience, the seniority or even the age 
of the officials165, but were based exclusively on a practical assessment of their 
capabilities and expertise in the field for which they were chosen, thus revealing the 
pragmatism behind Kennedy’s approach to the world of international affairs. The second 
feature is that, differing again from Eisenhower, Kennedy himself played a crucial role in 
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directing the US policies towards the Middle East. Kennedy was “determined to run his 
own foreign policy”166, a view largely shared by several members of his administration. 
The analysis of the Kennedy administration also offers a valuable insight into the 
orientation of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East. Appointing only one pro-
Israel voice in his administration, Myer Feldman, Kennedy surrounded himself with 
Arabists who could help him design the strategies necessary to pursue his goal of re-
approaching Gamal Nasser. Arguably, much of Kennedy’s strategy to bolster a policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser is reflected in his appointments. 
Shortly after Kennedy became president, he was asked by his collaborators what 
his policy in the Middle East was going to look like. Replying that he did not yet know 
the specifics, Kennedy remarked that he was however certain of the need to elaborate “a 
fresh and unprejudiced… policy.”167 The first step towards achieving such a result was 
thus to find the right people to help him shape his policy towards the Middle East. In 
order to do so, Kennedy relied on his personal skills as well as on his team, known for 
being composed only of the “best and brightest” Washington could offer.  
Kennedy’s White House was rather informal, and the policy-making process was 
based on his “habit of asking you what you thought about problems”168, as many of his 
collaborators recalled, therefore the president surrounded himself with expert and 
dynamic people with whom he would be able to quickly exchange information and 
elaborate strategies. To this end, Kennedy spent “an enormous amount of time”169 trying 
to put the right people in the right places, until he reached the point in which, as Feldman 
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recalled, “We felt that our team was the best in history.”170The team was indeed composed 
of real experts, whether they were old or new officials, Democrats or Republicans.  
For instance, people like Parker T. Hart, the ambassador to Saudi Arabia and 
William Macomber, the ambassador to Jordan, were old members of the Eisenhower 
administration, who were kept on by Kennedy because of their level of expertise, and 
who became true protagonists of American foreign policy during the early 1960s.  
Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy were both Republicans, yet they were 
appointed respectively secretary of defence and special assistant for national security 
affairs because of their skills and qualities. McNamara was “a superlative manager”171, 
and Bundy was “tremendously quick, tremendously well-organised intellectually” and 
“superbly action-oriented.”172 Bundy was also responsible for the appointment of Robert 
Komer, who became national security council advisor and one of the White House’s main 
protagonists during the Yemen crisis, and who had also served during the Eisenhower 
years.  
The story behind Komer’s appointment reflects Kennedy’s pro-Nasser 
orientation. Before joining the administration, Komer sent a memo to McGeorge Bundy, 
already a member of the entourage, seeking a job at the CIA, in which he stated that the 
issues the New Frontier had to tackle were not the “great big issues that your fellows 
already know, like arms control or re-examination of NATO strategy”173, but were 
questions like “Can we establish a workable relationship with Nasser?”174 Intrigued by 
Komer’s new perspective, Bundy replied “Interesting memo. Why don’t you come over 
and talk to us about it?” and after a short interview he told Komer “You’re the kind of 
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guy we’d like to have over here at the White House. The President’s looking for fellows 
like you. How’d you like to come and work for Kennedy?” Komer asked: “How soon do 
you want me?” “How soon can you come?” “As fast as I can empty my desk.”175  
This anecdote clearly illustrates a key aspect of Kennedy’s Mideast approach. 
Having learnt from Eisenhower that a policy of hostility against the Arab nationalists 
would be detrimental to US interests, Kennedy sought to appoint officials who shared his 
strategy of placing Nasser as the main focus of the US new approach to the Middle East. 
The new president was actively seeking to surround himself with collaborators who could 
help him establish a working relationship with Nasser.  
There was great enthusiasm around Kennedy’s White House and people seemed 
eager to serve under him. When McNamara was appointed secretary of defence for 
instance, he declared on his acceptance letter that he would “remain in the job as long as 
you wish me to stay.”176 Such a declaration reflects another difference between 
Eisenhower and Kennedy’s administrations. While in the first one, the designated 
officials had stated right from the beginning that they would serve for a limited period, in 
the second one the commitment was complete and unlimited.177 
However, the administration would not only involve those with political 
experience. Phillip Talbot, the assistant secretary of state, was “well-known for his 
judgement and integrity”178 and was, as Rusk recalled, “the kind of man we wanted in the 
Kennedy administration”179; John Badeau, Kennedy’s ambassador to Cairo, was a true 
expert on Egypt, with a vast knowledge of that world180, and “with a long background”181 
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in the field. Neither Talbot nor Badeau had political experience182, yet they became 
pivotal players among the Kennedy administration.  
Myer “Mike” Feldman, the deputy special counsel to the president and special 
ambassador for Israel, also lacked political experience. Feldman, a Jewish lawyer and 
politician born in Philadelphia, began working for Kennedy on his presidential campaign 
in 1958, and soon became the channel between Kennedy and the American Jewish 
community. It is significant that Kennedy appointed only Myer Feldman as a pro-Israel 
voice in the administration. Kennedy would consult Feldman whenever he required a 
report on the attitude of the Jewish community towards certain decisions of foreign 
policy, but he never let Feldman’s pro-Israel stance dictate them.  
The role of Mike Feldman has contributed to the myth that Kennedy’s foreign 
policy towards Israel was dictated, or at least largely influenced, by domestic political 
calculations. In The Greater Middle East and the Cold War, Barrett argues that Feldman 
“became Kennedy’s ‘de facto ambassador to American Jewry’, a position that did not 
exist in Eisenhower’s White House”183, and that “Kennedy felt obliged to have Feldman 
in the White House and to adjust his Middle East policy… to placate the American Zionist 
community.”184 Barrett’s analysis, however, seems misdirected for three reasons. 
Firstly, because as argued by Komer, “Every President has a minority adviser who 
represents the domestic constituency. Mike Feldman was it.”185 Kennedy was aware that 
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Feldman’s position was strongly one-sided, and would always cross-check Feldman’s 
recommendations with his national security advisers, primarily McGeorge Bundy and 
Robert Komer.186 
Secondly, because Kennedy had made clear that a pro-Israeli position unjustified 
by strategic considerations of foreign policy “would not be tolerated.”187 There are several 
examples of Kennedy dismissing Feldman’s pleas. For instance, during the Yemen crisis, 
Feldman, preoccupied by Kennedy’s pro-Nasser policy, advised against the recognition 
of the YAR, a suggestion Kennedy did not act upon.188 Then, when the Egyptian rockets 
controversy emerged during the spring of 1962 and Israel roared with fear asking for more 
arms, Kennedy told Feldman: “Listen, Mike, go tell your friends.... they’re barking up the 
wrong tree. I don’t have to give them fifty more planes, because there just isn’t any rocket 
threat.”189 
Third, because Feldman’s pro-Israel stance was counterweighted by many 
members of the Kennedy inner circle, such as Badeau, Bundy, Rusk and Komer, who had 
“a reputation of being... pro-Arab and anti-Israel.”190 It would be a mistake to attribute to 
Feldman a more preeminent role than that of people like Komer or Bundy. 
The assembling of the team had not however been an easy task. Kennedy used to 
joke that during his career in Congress he had met so many people who in his opinion 
could be president that now he had trouble finding anyone who would help him be 
president.191 In truth, the resentment towards his victory among the other Democratic 
candidates constrained his selections, as in the case of Adlai Stevenson, who was 
excluded for the role of secretary of state after the problems he created during a 
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Democratic convention in Los Angeles, during which he had made Kennedy’s 
nomination “a little bit less easy than it otherwise would have been.”192 To avoid possible 
troubles, Kennedy relied mostly on the people who had served him during his campaign, 
like his brother, Attorney General Bob Kennedy, and Ted Sorensen, special counsel to 
the president.193 
As far as the vice presidency was concerned, Kennedy offered the nomination to 
his rival Lyndon B. Johnson. There is still much speculation surrounding the real reason 
behind Kennedy’s decision, as Johnson was among those congressmen who had created 
a sort of “cartel” to oppose Kennedy’s nomination. But a strictly political calculation, 
based on the conviction that without Johnson on the ticket he could not win the Southern 
States and so eventually he would have risked the presidency, moved Kennedy to believe 
that Johnson had to get the office.194 Kennedy did not have a great relationship with 
Johnson. He did not like the fact that the vice president would always agree with the 
president, supporting whatever decision he took. Nevertheless, Johnson decided to simply 
“listen and to say, in effect, that he [was] vice president and that he fully supported the 
president’s policy whatever it was going to be or whatever it was.”195 
Among the five names that came up for the position of secretary of state, 
Stevenson, Fulbright, Bowles, McCloy and Lovett, none of them took the office; 
Stevenson, as mentioned, was excluded for the episode in Los Angeles, McCloy and 
Lovett declined the offer, and Fulbright, having signed in 1956 the “Southern Manifesto”, 
a document in opposition to racial integration of public spaces, was excluded for the bad 
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publicity he would bring to the new administration’s relations with Africa. Dean Rusk’s 
name came out during a dinner Kennedy had with Chester Bowles, and after a short 
interview Rusk had with the President, during which he confessed “he didn’t understand 
me, I didn’t understand him”196, he got the position. Bowles became undersecretary of 
state. 
The relationship between Kennedy and Rusk is remarkable. Among the whole 
administration, Rusk was possibly the person Kennedy held in the lowest esteem, for at 
least two reasons: first, because Rusk would refer to Kennedy in a very formal way, 
almost excessive considering that Kennedy was “anything but formal.”197 Second, 
because Rusk, a “courtly Georgian…stuck to his stiff, formal manner”198, as described by 
Ted Sorensen, struggled to keep up with Kennedy’s new policy-making style. 
However, Rusk was appointed because he was not a “dominant man.”199 Kennedy 
wanted to be “his own secretary of state”200, and Rusk perfectly “fell into the role that is 
natural for a secretary of state with a president who is determined to run his own foreign 
policy.”201 Rusk would not challenge Kennedy’s desire to steer the course of US foreign 
policy, and Kennedy could rely on him as head of the State Department.  
Such a noteworthy relationship between Kennedy and Rusk, significantly 
different from that of Eisenhower and Dulles, where the president had delegated the reins 
of foreign policy to his secretary of state, indicates again that Kennedy was committed to 
controlling US foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, under Rusk’s guidance, and so indirectly 
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under Kennedy’s, the State Department came to be a very strong advocate of the policy 
of rapprochement with Nasser.  
After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, just a few months after 
his election, Kennedy implemented important changes in his foreign policy team. Having 
lost faith in the military and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose recommendations were 
seen as “pretty appalling”202 by the president himself, Kennedy took a more direct role in 
foreign policy, reducing the size of the meetings and tailoring them “to the nature of the 
subject to be discussed.”203 
Kennedy’s lead on US foreign policy became apparent with regards to Middle 
Eastern affairs. Kennedy relied largely on Robert Komer, McGeorge Bundy and Dean 
Rusk, officials with whom he shared his overall strategies for the region and who helped 
him overcome disagreements with other members of the administration. For example, not 
everyone in the State Department considered the HAWK sale advisable (Phillips Talbot 
was for instance particularly opposed204), nor did Parker T. Hart and William Macomber, 
ambassadors to Saudi Arabia and Jordan, consider the policy of rapprochement with 
Nasser particularly desirable.205 Yet, under Kennedy’s guidance, the HAWK was 
eventually sold206 and the rapprochement with Nasser remained the main goal of the US 
Mideast policy.  
Conversely, Kennedy was convinced by Robert Komer and Dean Rusk about the 
importance of recognising the YAR promptly in order to gain leverage on Nasser. During 
a meeting between Kennedy, Feldman and Komer (the president contacted Rusk on the 
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telephone), Kennedy was indeed convinced by Komer and Rusk that the sooner the US 
government recognised the YAR the more chances it would have to terminate the conflict 
and restrain Nasser from moving into Saudi Arabia.  
Significantly, both the decision on the HAWK sale and on the recognition of the 
YAR occurred during small, intimate meetings between Kennedy and his closest 
advisors, showing not only Kennedy’s propensity for taking a decisive role in the US 
Mideast strategies, but also the informality of Kennedy’s policy-making style. 
Finally, another key aspect of the Kennedy administration was the role of the 
ambassadors, who became more central in the determination of the policies towards the 
countries where they were assigned to. In fact, while Eisenhower had introduced the 
concept of “country-team”, according to which a policy would be defined and adopted by 
having the embassy’s officers sit down around a table and vote on a certain proposal until 
a majority was reached, Kennedy abolished the system. The first thing he did was to send 
letters to the ambassadors stating that each ambassador “was held responsible for the 
activities and operations of all agencies and departments who had representation 
overseas.”207 This is probably one reason why Kennedy’s selection had been so carefully 
conducted, and why he had changed about 70% of the old ambassadors, because he 
considered them unsuitable for the new direction of the administration.208 
The ambassadors were also invited to meet annually and to discuss in general 
terms the US policy towards the Middle East. If a crisis situation emerged, the 
ambassadors, under direct orders from the White House, would gather together in a city 
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near the area209, and form opinions on the specific issue, through an exchange of ideas. 
Such meetings, which were presided over by members of the State Department (usually 
Talbot and Komer in the case of the Middle East) were intended to gather points of view 
on specific problems, and to formulate a list of recommendations that would be then 
discussed in the White House.210 
But the most significant change in the Kennedy administration was the president’s 
role itself. While as noted earlier, Eisenhower had relied almost entirely on his secretary 
of state for the elaboration of strategies and policies towards the Middle East, Kennedy 
made sure he would have the last word on any issue. This reflected entirely the type of 
president that Kennedy was: young, informal and proactive. A president that evidently 
belonged to a new generation, the generation of the New Frontiersmen. Much as the old 
bureaucrats did not like this new style, Kennedy wanted to be the protagonist of the new 
era that America was going to go through. And he knew that the only way to do this, in a 
time of great danger and uncertainty during the Cold War, was by shaping US foreign 
policy. That is why, when asked about his relation with the secretary of state, pointing at 
the floor of the Oval Office, he said “foreign policy is made right here.”211 
 
The place of the Middle East 
As discussed, John F. Kennedy had focused his presidential campaign on criticism 
of the Eisenhower administration, exploiting the unsuccessful outcome of its Middle East 
policy to his personal political advantage. Stressing the need to move past the old ways 
of the Eisenhower era, Kennedy urged a change in the American approach to the world 
of foreign policy and to the Middle East: as he declared during a speech at the Senate in 
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1960, “We must formulate... an effective and realistic American policy designed to 
preserve peace in the Middle East.”212 
However, in his Oral History Interview, Myer Feldman has asserted that “The 
Middle East was never at the top of Kennedy’s agenda.”213 Indeed, he contends that 
Kennedy often delegated decisions on the Middle East because during his presidency his 
focus had shifted towards different areas of the world, such as Cuba, Berlin and Vietnam, 
where the emerging crisis involved, to different degrees, a direct confrontation with the 
Soviet Union.214 Although it is true that Kennedy spent an enormous amount of time on 
Cuba, probably more than on any other foreign policy issue215, it is also true that he was 
very much involved in the Middle Eastern affairs.  
Robert Komer has indeed conversely argued that “JFK was really heavily engaged 
in the Middle East policy.”216 Such a statement seems to reflect more truthfully 
Kennedy’s contribution to the making of the US policy towards the Middle East, for at 
least three reasons: first, the documents produced show that the president was nearly 
always involved in the Mideast policies, either directly or through Komer, Rusk or Bundy, 
particularly when important decisions had to be made (for instance on the HAWK sale, 
the Johnson Plan for the refugees, the PL-480, and the Yemen quagmire). As recalled by 
Komer, in 1963 Kennedy sent Nasser alone nine presidential letters, which “was really 
quite a substantial number.”217 Second, Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser 
was part of his more global strategy of enhancing American prestige with the major world 
neutralist, such as Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno and others, 
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in order to advance his main goal of containing the Soviet Union. “The underlying 
rationale for this policy”, Komer told Kennedy in early 1963, “is that in the game of 
competitive co-existence, we can hardly afford to let the major neutralists become clients 
primarily of Moscow.”218 Bundy agreed, attaching a personal note to Komer’s 
memorandum: “we should be strong in our assistance in competing for the neutrals, using 
both carrot and stick.”219 Nasser was a key world neutralist leader, and Kennedy was 
acutely aware that much of his strategies towards Cairo would somehow echo across the 
Third World. Third, because during his presidential campaign Kennedy had “stirred great 
hopes”220 domestically and abroad, promising he would “waste no time”221 in taking 
initiatives that could help in solving the problems of the region, facilitating the economic 
development of the Arab countries, ensuring the survival of Israel, and thus promoting 
stability that would allow the administration to guard the Western interests, while 
simultaneously defeat the Soviet Union. Failing to live up to such expectations could 
compromise the US position in a number of regions, and thus jeopardise Kennedy’s goal 
of containing communism.  
Kennedy had also possibly reserved great attention for the Middle East because 
the situation he inherited after eight years of Eisenhower was far from quiet. On a large 
scale, the new administration was confronted with two general issues in the Middle East. 
The United States’ strained relationship with the Arab nationalists and the USSR’s 
growing prestige among the Arab population were arguably Kennedy’s greatest concerns 
in the Middle East.222 
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During the 1950s, the Soviet Union had managed to exploit the imperialist 
impression conveyed by Eisenhower’s policies to establish closer ties with the Arab 
nationalists, and in more general terms, to enhance its prestige among the Arab 
population. Taking advantage of Eisenhower and Dulles’s hostility towards Nasser and 
their reluctance to provide Egypt with arms, in September 1955 Moscow sealed a 250 
million dollars arms deal with Nasser, who had requested military aid after the Israeli raid 
against Gaza in February 1955. This historical deal eventually provided Egypt with 200 
jet aircrafts, six jet training planes, 100 heavy tanks, six torpedo patrol boats and two 
submarines, and was seen in Washington as clear evidence of Soviet infiltration in the 
region.223 
Furthermore, Washington’s refusal to provide Egypt with financial assistance for 
the Aswan Dam further contributed to widening the gap between Cairo and Washington, 
bringing Nasser closer to Moscow. While Dulles, adding insult to injury, publicly 
declared that Nasser had no resources to build the dam without external help224, a 
statement seen by the Egyptian leader as a clear attempt to undermine his prestige in the 
Arab world, Khrushchev’s Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov seized the opportunity to 
advance Moscow’s offer to finance of the project.225 
Along with the events of the Suez crisis, during which Moscow had made clear 
that it would do everything necessary to assist Nasser226, the Czech arms deal and the 
Soviet Union’s support for the Aswan Dam project paved the way for a closer relationship 
between Nasser and Khrushchev. Although Nasser was cautious in his approach to the 
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USSR, whose doctrine he considered as the negation of freedom and equality227, the 
Egyptian leader actively sought to exploit Khrushchev’s military and economic aid to 
advance his regional goals. Nasser was not seeking closer ties with the Soviet Union, but 
simply pursuing a neutralist, pan-Arabist path, which meant he had no problem in seeking 
aid from either the US or the USSR.  
But while the Eisenhower administration had arguably a two-camp view of the 
world, and thus had little interest in the Third World leaders’ neutralism228, Khrushchev 
had accepted the existence of a third pole, the non-aligned countries.229 This allowed the 
Kremlin to portray the United States as an imperialist force whose aim was to polarize 
the Middle Eastern countries through alliances and military bases230, while presenting 
Moscow as the only, true supporter of Arab nationalism. 
As a result, by early 1958 the Eisenhower administration had to come to terms 
with the fact that the Soviet Union had successfully strengthened its ties with Egypt and 
Syria, which would be incorporated into the UAR under Nasser’s leadership in February 
1958. The USSR was indeed providing them “with substantial military and economic 
credits and technical assistance” and thus “acquiring an increasing stake in the area - in 
terms of influence and prestige.”231 Significantly, while the Eisenhower administration 
perceived Nasser’s strategy as a clear indication of his pro-Soviet attitude (speaking in 
front of Congress in 1958, Secretary of State John F. Dulles declared that Nasser was 
taking a “much more benevolent attitude towards communists”232), the Egyptian leader 
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was simply taking from the Soviet Union what he could not obtain from the United States, 
as the Czech arms deal and the Aswan Dam funding controversy reveal.  
Eisenhower’s opposition to Nasser and to the Arab nationalists contributed 
towards spreading the feeling among the Arab population that the United States was 
“opposing political or economic progress”233, working to polarize the Middle East against 
the Soviet Union, exploiting the Arabs’ oil resources and opposing the Arabs’ ambition 
for emancipation and self-determination.234 As a result, reads a report from the National 
Security Council dated January 1958, “the prestige of the United States and of the West 
has declined in the Near East while Soviet influence has greatly increased.”235 That is 
why, during a conversation with Nixon in July 1958, Eisenhower spoke of a popular 
“campaign of hatred” against the United States, because the people were with Nasser.236 
After the July 14, 1958 coup in Baghdad against the monarchy, which brought to 
power Abdul Karim Qasim, Moscow tilted progressively towards Iraq, because of 
Qasim’s shift towards communism in response to Nasser’s pan-Arabism237, and because 
of Nasser’s repressive measures against the communist parties in Egypt and Syria. 
Qasim’s opposition to Nasser’s pan-Arabism opened a range of possibilities for the 
Eisenhower administration, as it could now try to exploit Khrushchev’s shift towards Iraq 
to re-approach Nasser. 
However, the NSC 5820/1, the new policy envisioned by the Eisenhower 
administration during the summer of 1958 and made official later in October 1958, which 
had the purpose of establishing “an effective working relationship with Arab 
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nationalism”238, showed its limits during the events that occurred in Lebanon and Jordan 
during the summer of 1958. Eisenhower’s decision to send the marines to Lebanon 
against the Nasserite forces that were seeking to overthrow President Chamoun, showed 
once more to the Egyptian leader that Washington was not seeking a rapprochement after 
all. As a result, Eisenhower’s experience in the Middle East ended on a bitter note. On 
December 24, 1960, Nasser gave a public speech in Port Said during the celebration for 
the Victory Day, taking a clear anti-American stand and accusing Washington and all its 
allies, whether in the Middle East or abroad, of being “stooges of imperialism.”239 
Kennedy had thus inherited a region where anti-US sentiments were firmly 
crystallised among the Arab population; where the Arab nationalists perceived the United 
States as an inimical, imperialist force; and where the Soviet Union was exploiting 
Eisenhower’s mistakes to enhance its position in the region, signing arms agreements 
with the Arab revolutionaries and crafting its propaganda in line with Arab ambitions.  
This scenario determined Kennedy’s approach to the Middle East, and moved the 
focus of the US policies towards Nasser. As Feldman recalled, Kennedy feared that 
something like the crisis in Suez or Lebanon could happen to him as well, and was 
“concerned about the history of failures in that area.”240 As noted earlier, Kennedy linked 
such failures to Eisenhower’s opposition to Arab nationalism and to his tendencies 
towards perceiving the Middle East exclusively in the context of the East-West struggle. 
Seeking to steer the Arab nationalists in a direction that could serve US interests, and thus 
defeat the Soviet Union by building up neutralism as an alternative to communism, 
Kennedy concluded that the rapprochement with Nasser was the key objective on his new 
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Mideast agenda. The rapprochement with Nasser became the main goal of the new 
administration, who sought to provide him with “a Western alternative to excessive 
dependence on the Bloc”241, while simultaneously gaining leverage on his foreign policy 
and restraining him from stirring up troubles in the region.  
The policies designed by the administration for the Middle East were a result of 
Kennedy’s goal of enhancing US prestige among the Arab nationalists, and among the 
Third World neutralists, to the detriment of the Soviet Union. Kennedy wished to bolster 
his rapprochement with Nasser because he had learned from Eisenhower’s failures that 
opposing the Egyptian leader would enhance Moscow’s standing in the region.  
Clear evidence of Kennedy’s commitment to his policy of rapprochement with 
Nasser is provided by his statement during the 508th meeting of the National Security 
Council, in January 1963: 
“We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutrals to join the Communist 
bloc. Therefore, we must keep our ties to Nasser and other neutralists even if we do not 
like many things they do because, if we lose them, the balance of power could swing 
against us.”242 
 
Of course, the events that punctuated the history of Kennedy’s foreign policy in 
the Middle East might induce one to believe that Kennedy sought to support any friend 
in the region (after all, Kennedy himself declared during his inaugural address that the 
US “shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose 
any foe”243). Indeed, during his time in the White House, and as result of Arab-Israeli 
tension and inter-Arab disputes, Kennedy eventually strengthened Washington’s ties not 
only with Nasser, but also with Nasser’s nemeses, namely Ben Gurion and Faysal. The 
significance of such a result echoes throughout history, because Kennedy had 
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unintentionally laid the foundations for a closer association between the United States, 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would be reflected, during the administrations of Johnson 
and Nixon, in the implementation of a closer, strategic partnership with the two countries. 
Kennedy however was not seeking to rely on Saudi Arabia and Israel to advance 
his Cold War strategies, nor was he seeking to support any friend in the Middle East. The 
New Frontiersman was convinced that the main goal in the region was that of establishing 
a closer relationship with Nasser and thus gaining leverage on the real force of attraction 
of the Arab world. With Kennedy’s Middle East policies being decisively located within 
a more global Cold War framework, Kennedy concluded that only by overturning 
Washington’s relations with Cairo could the Soviet threat in the region be reduced. 
The paradoxical result of Kennedy’s Mideast experience lies in the fact that 
Kennedy adopted policies towards Saudi Arabia and Israel that were themselves the 
outcome of his attempted rapprochement with Cairo. The enhancement of Israel’s 
security, historically through the HAWK sale, was a result of the administration’s concern 
that its support to Nasser could spur Israel into pre-emptive attacks against Egypt. 
Similarly, Kennedy’s decision to strengthen the Arab monarchies through programmes 
of political, social and economic reforms derived from the need to secure these traditional 
regimes at a time when Nasser’s progressive regime, supported by the Kennedy 
administration, was demanding radical socio-political changes in the Arab world.  
As will be discussed later in this work, at the time of his death in late November 
1963, Kennedy’s Mideast experiment looked like a failure because of Nasser’s adventure 
in Yemen. The impossibility of getting Nasser to disengage eventually moved Kennedy 
to believe that the Egyptian leader was untrustworthy, and Congress passed an 
amendment that officially interrupted the US aid program towards the UAR. It was indeed 
Congress that put an end to Kennedy’s rapprochement with Nasser and to the 
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administration’s attempts to do business with Cairo. Despite the problems that emerged 
between Washington and Cairo, by late 1963 Kennedy still believed that maintaining 
close ties with Nasser could offer to United States the best means to keep the Soviet Union 
at bay. But after Kennedy died, US foreign policy in the Middle East took a completely 
different course. Johnson’s pro-Israel sentiments prevailed over the State Department’s 
Arabist outlook244, while the US geostrategic and economic interests in Iran and Saudi 
Arabia convinced the new administration that the two monarchies could be transformed 
into regional proxies.245 Unwilling to rely on Nasser, who was still entangled in Yemen, 
Johnson shifted towards more stable allies. 
Kennedy left a legacy that has affected the course of United States foreign policy 
in the Middle East. He created the conditions for his successors to rely on Saudi Arabia 
as a regional proxy, he sold arms to Israel and established a closer strategic partnership 
through the November 1963 talks, and he failed to move Nasser away from Yemen, 
exacerbating Johnson’s mistrust of the Egyptian leader and his hostility towards the Arab 
nationalists. The most cynical might be tempted to say that Kennedy’s policy in the 
Middle East was the result of mistakes, misunderstandings and, to a certain degree, 
overconfidence246, but in truth, the Kennedy administration did not have many 
alternatives. Indeed, the competition with the Soviet Union and the intricate dynamics of 
the region during the early 1960s, compelled the New Frontiersmen to find new means to 
balance larger Cold War objectives with regional interests. Chapter 2 addresses this very 
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issue, providing an overview of Kennedy’s approach to the Middle East in the context of 
the Cold War.  
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Chapter 2. Kennedy, the Cold War and the Middle East: an overview 
 
A peaceful coexistence? 
In April 1946, as the crises in Iran and in the Turkish Straits were developing, the Truman 
administration listed in a memorandum entitled “Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle 
East” the Soviet Union’s four main goals of foreign policy in the region. According to the 
memorandum, Moscow sought to prevent the United States and Britain from accessing 
the oil reserves; to control ports and marine passages; to replace Britain in the role of 
dominant power in the region; and to create a bloc of countries aligned with the Soviet 
Union.247 As a result, in 1947 Truman elaborated his Doctrine, which allowed the United 
States to provide “assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or 
internal authoritarian forces.”248 
Truman’s containment of the Soviet Union in the greater Middle East was a 
response to the emerging struggle between communist and Western world. Stalin’s 
attempt to create a puppet state in Iran by taking advantage of the presence of the Red 
Army in the north of the country, and to gain control of the Turkish straits in order to 
secure a south-western flank, amplified the significance of the local crisis which exploded 
in Greece between the newly-elected government and the Greek communist party (KKE) 
after the 1946 elections. For the first time, the United States recognised that its national 
security interests in peacetime no longer depended exclusively upon the physical integrity 
of its own territory, but on the survival of Western-oriented regimes threatened by 
communist forces across the world.  
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But beyond these countries and their immediate tensions, both Stalin and Truman took 
much less interest in the rest of the region than they did in other parts of the world. Truman 
was far more concerned with post-war Europe than he was with the Middle East249, while 
Stalin sought primarily to consolidate his control over the Eastern European satellites.250 
However, when Khrushchev took the lead on USSR foreign policy in 1955, a 
significant shift occurred. The new Soviet policy, in the Middle East and in other regions 
of the Third World, was driven, as noted earlier, by Khrushchev’s critical 
acknowledgement of the existence of a third bloc of non-aligned countries.251 Such a shift 
dramatically changed the course of Soviet foreign policy, because Moscow’s foreign 
policy objectives would no longer be carried out through Stalin’s blatant aggrandizement 
strategies, but through “political struggle, economic and scientific competition, 
subversion.”252 
Under Khrushchev, Moscow abandoned Stalin’s plainly expansionist foreign 
policy to focus on more subversive ways to expand its sphere of influence. Wishing to 
avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States, Khrushchev believed that if 
the Soviet Union adopted the instruments of foreign aid and propaganda to gain favour 
with the neutralist leaders, they would move past the model of Western capitalism and 
consolidate their independence under the umbrella of socialist development. By doing so, 
Moscow would thus be able to expand its influence among the Third World countries and 
reduce that of the United States, while simultaneously depriving the West of the resources 
and markets needed to advance the capitalist model on a global scale.253 
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Through this new strategy, known as “peaceful coexistence”, the Kremlin hoped 
to foster pro-Soviet sentiments among the Arab population and thus to manipulate the 
Arab countries into the Eastern bloc. By supporting the Arabs’ cause over issues such as 
economic development, nationalism and anti-colonialism, the Soviet Union sought to 
“capture and organize in broad mass movements the sentiments which focus on the great 
issues of the current period”254, create a political struggle between traditional and 
revolutionary forces, and eliminate Western influence while building up its own. As 
recalled by Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs:  
“The aim I pursued was to destroy capitalism and build a new social system based 
on the ideas developed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. I think…that the capitalist system 
has outlived its time.”255 
 
As noted in chapter 1, Khrushchev’s new strategy allowed the Soviet Union to 
enhance its prestige in the Middle East while simultaneously portraying the United States, 
entangled in pacts and alliances, as an imperialist force. The result of the Northern Tier, 
the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine, products of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s 
“active containment”, was that they eventually estranged the Arab revolutionaries, 
alienated the Arab population, and contributed to the decline of the United States’ prestige 
in the region.256 Since 1955, when Nasser signed the Czech arms deal, Moscow 
successfully managed to expand its sphere of influence in the Middle East transforming 
Egypt, Syria and Iraq into friendly states opposed to the United States.  
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In this regard, it is significant, if not slightly ironic, that the Eisenhower-Dulles 
administration’s view of the world resembled that of Stalin.257 Much like the results 
produced by Stalin’s two-camp view of the world, the Eisenhower administration ended 
up antagonising the Arab population and alienating the emerging nationalist forces in the 
Middle East. As a result, despite the strong ideological differences and some diplomatic 
issues, mostly related to the role of the communist party in Egypt, Khrushchev had 
managed to steer the key Arab nationalist away from Washington and closer to Moscow 
simply by showing support for Arab nationalism.258 
Like that of his predecessor, John F. Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East 
was defined by the Cold War and by the need to contain the Soviet Union to prevent it 
from expanding its influence in the region. Unlike Eisenhower however, Kennedy had 
acknowledged, similarly to Khrushchev, the existence of a third bloc of non-aligned 
countries.  
In 1960, during the acceptance speech for the Democratic Party Nomination, 
Kennedy declared:  
“All over the world, particularly in the newer nations, young men are coming to 
power--men who are not bound by the traditions of the past - men who are not blinded by 
the old fears and hates and rivalries - young men who can cast off the old slogans and 
delusions and suspicions.”259 
Kennedy’s statement reflects much of the New Frontier philosophy in relation to 
the issues of the Third World. Leaders from the main neutralist countries such as India, 
Egypt, Indonesia and Yugoslavia had met at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and forged 
upon the principles of “non-alignment”, “anti-colonialism”, and “anti-imperialism” the 
foundation of a new spirit of solidarity that defined their international posture in the 
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polarized world of the Cold War.260 Kennedy acknowledged the importance of meeting 
the aspirations of the neutralist leaders because, as he commented in 1957, “the forces of 
nationalism are rewriting the geopolitical map of the world”261 and because, as he 
reiterated a few years later, “More energy is released by the awakening of these new 
nations than by the fission of the atom itself.”262 Rhetoric aside, Kennedy believed that 
by showing support to their goals, namely political self-determination, mutual respect for 
sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality263, the 
United States could enhance its prestige in the Third World and reduce that of the Soviet 
Union.  
The Belgrade Conference of September 1961, further strengthened the 
administration’s belief that Third World leaders would play an increasingly significant 
role in the international arena. After the USSR announced its decision to resume nuclear 
testing in August, and with the Berlin crisis in the background, the administration began 
to perceive Sukarno, Nehru, Tito and Nasser’s voices as pivotal on a number of 
international issues, including the East-West struggle over Berlin.264 Back in 1957 
Kennedy had declared: “These nations have gained an effective voice in the United 
Nations… Today the Arab states alone have as many Assembly seats as all the countries 
of Western Europe.”265 After the Belgrade Conference, the feeling that the neutralist 
countries’ “anti-Western, anti-colonial attitudes”266 could result in an anti-US stand over 
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international disputes, contributed significantly in shaping Kennedy’s approach to the 
non-aligned leaders. 
In the words of Arthur Schlesinger, special assistant to the president for Latin 
American affairs, the president’s “tolerance of neutralism was not based on any sort of 
New Statesman belief in the moral superiority of neutrals… but he was quite prepared, 
when feasible, to build neutralism as an alternative to communist expansion.”267 Such 
words reflect well Kennedy’s Cold War pragmatism: his policies towards the neutralist 
leaders, including Nasser, are clear evidence of his attempt to build neutralism as an 
alternative to communism. As Kennedy commented in May 1961: 
“The great battleground for the defence and expansion of freedom today is the 
whole southern half of the globe – Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East - the 
lands of the rising people. Their revolution is the greatest in human history.”268 
 
Thus, the Belgrade Conference soon turned into an attempt, on both the American 
and Soviet sides, to win the neutralists’ support over international issues269, and 
contributed to defining Kennedy’s foreign policy towards the Third World. Kennedy 
believed that winning the sympathy of the non-aligned leaders by showing support for 
their self-determination ambitions, and promoting models of capitalist development 
would be the key to winning the battle with the Soviet Union on a number of international 
issues, while simultaneously allowing Washington to reduce the Soviets’ gains across the 
countries belonging to the non-aligned pole.  
In order to prevent the Third World countries falling under the Soviet umbrella, 
Kennedy relied largely on the theories of Walt Rostow, deputy national security advisor 
and author of the book The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
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Rostow’s argument that capitalist development could bring the Third World countries to 
refuse communism and evolve “within the orbit of the democratic world”270 brought the 
Kennedy administration to acknowledge the importance of using the instrument of 
foreign aid to lead these countries towards self-sustained growth. “Societies in the 
transition from traditional to modern status are peculiarly vulnerable to such seizure of 
power. It is here, in fact, that Communism is likely to find its place in history”271, argued 
Rostow in his book, and Kennedy sought to prevent the Soviet Union from taking just 
such advantage of the Third World’s social, political and economic struggles to extend 
its sphere of influence by building up socialism as an alternative to capitalism. As he 
declared in his message to Congress on foreign assistance “The 1960s presented an 
historical opportunity for the United States… to initiate a major foreign assistance effort 
that could move more than half the people of the less-developed nations into self-
sustained economic growth.”272 Distancing himself from Eisenhower’s military-oriented 
approach to foreign aid , in March 1961 Kennedy asked Congress for a reduction in the 
military aid from 1.8 to 1.6 billion (out of the 4 billion dollar budget asked by the previous 
administration) in order to allocate more founds to development loans.273 
Thus, during the Kennedy years, the US-USSR competition in the Third World 
took a somehow more ideological turn, marking a difference from the years of Stalin’s 
expansionism and Eisenhower’s “active containment”. Under Khrushchev and Kennedy, 
both the Soviet Union and the United States realised that the non-aligned countries were 
destined to play an increasingly significant role in the world of international affairs, and 
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that the best way to steer these countries towards their respective orbits was by sponsoring 
programmes of socio-economic development that could lead such countries to embrace 
either socialism or capitalism, and thus be moved under the USSR or the US umbrella.274 
The Soviet Union hoped to take advantage of the common anti-imperialist sentiment 
shared by the Third World countries to foster pro-USSR and anti-US sentiments among 
their population; it sought to exploit the association between the United States and the 
former colonial empires to crystallise the idea that Moscow would genuinely support their 
struggle for emancipation and self-determination; it sought to support and fund 
programmes of socialist development that might steer the Third World away from the 
capitalist model embraced by the Western world. Conversely, Kennedy hoped to move 
past the assumption that the United States opposed the ambitions of the Third World 
countries by pursuing a strategy designed to promote self-determination and 
emancipation; he sought to enhance US prestige among the Third World countries by 
fostering a working relationship with the key neutralist leaders; he sought to promote 
economic, social and political development that could move these countries to embrace 
the capitalist model and refuse the socialist one. 
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In Latin America, Kennedy established the Alliance for Progress, securing a 500 
million dollar aid programme and an investment flow estimated at around 20 billion 
dollars in a period of ten years; in India, 500 million dollars development aid was 
sponsored through the Public Law 480, and similar economic assistance was provided to 
Indonesia and Ghana as well.275 Kennedy combined the instrument of foreign aid with a 
new, engaging form of diplomacy. His Third World strategy was complemented by his 
support for the ambitions of the Third World leaders - particularly with regards to colonial 
issues - and his personal diplomacy with the key non-aligned leaders. 
In the Middle East, Kennedy hoped that by providing Cairo with economic and 
development aid through the PL-480, Nasser would turn inwards and focus on Egypt’s 
own economic problems, while simultaneously adopting a less hostile attitude towards 
Washington that could allow the United States to enhance its reputation among the Arab 
population. But Kennedy’s focus on Nasser related not only to the objective of steering 
the Arab world towards a pro-US stand, but also to larger Cold War strategies of fostering 
a better relationship with the key neutralists. By showing support to one of the main 
neutralist leaders in the world at that time, Kennedy hoped to foster pro-US sentiments 
among the others as well. In short, Nasser was the key to American strategies towards the 
Third World.276 
As noted earlier, among the Kennedy administration Rusk, Komer, Bundy and 
Badeau became the strongest advocates for the strategy of rapprochement with Cairo. 
They believed that by enhancing US prestige with the leader of the Arab world they could 
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fulfil the double objective of “convincing the Arabs that we [the US] did not oppose their 
legitimate aspirations”, while simultaneously preventing neutralist countries from 
becoming “exclusively clients of the Soviets.”277 
However, other members of the administration such as Hart, Macomber and 
Feldman believed conversely that Nasser was untrustworthy, unpredictable and 
dangerous, and that United States foreign policy in the Middle East should focus on 
relationships with the moderate Arab monarchies, already oriented towards the US 
because of their long histories of economic partnerships.278 
Such a notion however, did not fully convinced Kennedy. As this work 
demonstrates, Kennedy bolstered his reconciliation with Nasser throughout his entire 
presidency - even in spite of the turbulent events that occurred as a result of the Yemen 
crisis and the wave of Nasserism in 1962-1963 - because of the larger Cold War objectives 
mentioned above. Kennedy’s approach to the Arab monarchies lay not in the 
administration’s desire to rely on several regional proxies, as argued in the works of Bass 
and Little, but in the need to secure US interests in Arab oil while fostering a better 
relationship with Cairo. The administration believed that “If Nasser can gradually be led 
to forsake the microphone for the bulldozer, he may assume a key role in bringing the 
Middle East peacefully into our modern world”279, which meant that if Nasser was to 
restrain from his propaganda and focus on the Westernised modernization envisioned by 
the Kennedy administration, he would shield the entire Middle East from the Soviet 
influence, being, as the administration often repeated, “the key guy in Arab world.”280 
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Caught between two worlds: Kennedy, monarchies and republics 
Although Kennedy was committed to his rapprochement with Cairo in order to 
advance his regional and global Cold War strategies mentioned earlier, he found himself 
entangled between the two opposing Arab forces present in the Middle East, products of 
gradual collapse of the British and French empires following the end of World War II. 
The presence in the Middle East of such contrary forces, epitomised in the monarchical 
and republican regimes dichotomy, forced Kennedy to effect policies designed to let him 
pursue his main goal of re-approaching the key Arab nationalist while simultaneously 
preserving US interests (largely economic) in the survival of the monarchical Arab 
regimes. Ironically, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, by late 1963 Kennedy ended up 
closer to the Arab monarchies than he was to Nasser, but that was never his goal. 
Kennedy’s approach to the Arab monarchies should be examined within the larger 
context of his Cold War strategies in the Middle East. It would be a mistake to interpret 
Kennedy’s actions towards the Arab monarchies as an attempt to gain a wide range of 
options in the region, as argued by Bass281, or even to rely on them as proxies, as 
contended by Little.282 Kennedy had no interest in the Arab monarchies in that sense, and 
he did not wish to rely on them as regional proxies. In the minds of the New Frontiersmen, 
the challenges of the Cold War in the Middle East revolved around the confrontation with 
the Arab nationalists, the true expression of the Arab population’s desire for emancipation 
and modernization: “Nationalism will remain the most dynamic force in the Arab world 
and Nasser will remain its foremost leader. His influence is likely to grow rather than 
decline”283, reads a 1961 memorandum from Komer, which followed an estimate of the 
US intelligence agencies that stated that Nasser was in fact the “leading exponent of Arab 
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reformism.”284 Thus, the administration believed, only by courting Nasser and fostering 
pro-American sentiments among the Arab population could the threat of Soviet expansion 
across the region be averted.  
Because the Kennedy administration had long acknowledged the importance of 
establishing a working relationship with Nasser, both in its regional and international 
objectives, the Arab monarchs never really constituted a Cold War option for Kennedy. 
There were three main reasons for this.   
First, Kennedy had learned from Eisenhower’s mistakes about the impossibility 
of relying on Arab monarchs to advance US Cold War strategies. Back in 1956, the 
Eisenhower administration had tried to replace Nasser with King Saud as leader of the 
Arab world. Unwilling to do business with Nasser, and disregarding the issues related to 
Saud’s questionable style of governance, Eisenhower wrote in late March:  
“Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world… 
consequently the King could be built up, possibly, as spiritual leader. When this were 
accomplished we might begin to urge his right to political leadership.”285 
 
This attempt however failed shortly after with the explosion of the Suez crisis. 
Nasser was crowned leader and force of attraction of the Arab world, and his prestige was 
consolidated across the entire Middle East286, while Eisenhower’s hope to replace him 
with the Saudi monarch inexorably collapsed.  
Second, when Kennedy accessed the White House, it was a widespread belief 
among the administration that the monarchies were doomed to disappear.287 The Kennedy 
administration, with the exception of Hart and Macomber, believed that the traditional 
Arab regimes would not be able to survive the revolutionary transformations occurring in 
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the Middle East under the force of Nasser’s progressive propaganda, and was thus 
unwilling to rely on them to advance US Cold War strategies. This acknowledgement that 
the political, economic and social backwardness of the Arab monarchies could cause them 
to fall under the weight of widespread social unrest, brought Kennedy to elaborate 
strategies aimed at stabilising them through programmes of reforms (aimed for example 
at increasing popular participation in the government, reducing bribery and graft in the 
government, improving the education system, restricting the expansion of the 
bureaucracy, and others288), and preserving American economic interests, but it certainly 
did not convince him to transform them into regional proxies. 
Third, on a more personal level, Kennedy neither liked nor trusted Kind Saud289, 
and even the administration considered him “a dissolute person”290 who should not have 
been in power. Even more significantly, Kennedy was tired of being associated with 
clients who “represented yesterday rather than tomorrow.”291 As noted earlier, Kennedy 
had made modernization and social, political and economic development the pillars of his 
Third World strategies, and the presence of backwards monarchical regimes in the Middle 
East was sharply in contrast with his progressive view of the Third World, which 
conversely worked well with Nasser’s role as “key Arab reformist”.292  
But with strong economic interests in the Arabs’ oil, the administration was 
willing, in Komer’s words, “to overcome these moral scruples.”293 Kennedy committed 
himself to pushing the Arab monarchies to implement programmes of reforms that could 
broaden their domestic consensus and thus strengthen their regimes, but this strategy was 
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exclusively designed to secure oil interests, not to bring about reliance on them as regional 
allies. After all, Kennedy had put the rapprochement with Nasser at the top of his Mideast 
agenda, knowing all too well that the Middle East envisioned by the revolutionary 
Egyptian leader was very much in contrast with the old-fashioned one symbolised by the 
Arab monarchies. The 1958 crisis in Jordan and Lebanon spoke loudly of the tension 
between new and old Middle East, which Kennedy did not fail to grasp, remarking: 
“Lebanon and the Middle East, Algeria and North Africa… every part of the world is in 
flames or in ferment… our alliances are crumbling - our prestige is declining”.294 
The inter-Arab tensions that exploded in the region during the 1950s and 1960s, 
were largely a result of the struggle between revolutionary regimes and traditional ones 
that followed the collapse of the former European colonial powers. Indeed, the gradual 
end of the colonial domination perpetuated by Britain and France in the Middle East and 
North Africa, opened the road for a new system of Arab states to develop, marked by the 
search for new economic, political and social systems, and in general a new identity.295 
The 1952 Egyptian revolution that overthrew King Farouk and established 
Nasser’s rule later in 1954, was responsible for spreading new sentiments across the Arab 
world, encompassing principles such as progress, development and secularism, as well as 
anti-imperialism. Demanding a break from the outdated, atavistic rule of the conservative 
Arab monarchies - one anchored to strict sectarianism and a traditional law system - these 
revolutionary, progressive regimes (such as the ones in Egypt, Syria and the post-1958 
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Iraq), were located in a sort of “grey area” between communist and Western worlds, one 
that embraced socialism as well as Arab nationalism. Indeed, such regimes, while 
gravitating closely to socialist concepts such as redistribution of land and the rejection of 
class struggles, embraced to a different degree the concept of pan-Arabism, of which 
Nasser was the main spokesman.296 The administration hoped to take advantage of 
Nasser’s commitment to his policy of “positive neutralism” to provide him with a Western 
alternative to his dependence from Moscow, particularly if the Soviets were to increase 
pressure on his regime, and thus cause a “fundamental breach between Nasser and the 
USSR.”297 
Countries like Syria and Iraq were subject to frequent struggles of power between 
Nasserite and more extreme left-wing elements in both the political arena and the army. 
For instance, under the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (ASRP), the best organised 
communist parties in the entire Arab world298, Syria had established close ties with the 
Soviet Union and expelled, the American diplomatic corps in 1955.299 In 1958, pan-
Arabist sentiments prevailed among the government, and Syria joined the United Arab 
Republic under Nasser’s leadership, but left it, as shall be seen later, in September 1961 
after a coup staged by the army.300 Under Qasim, Iraq adopted a progressively more 
hostile attitude towards Nasser, particularly after the failure of an attempted coup carried 
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out by Nasserite revolutionaries from the northern city of Mosul301, and established closer 
ties with the Soviet Union, resuming trade agreements with Moscow in October 1958 
after they had been interrupted since 1955.302 By early 1963, as a result of the second 
wave of Nasserism that followed the explosion of the conflict in Yemen, both Syria and 
Iraq turned back to Nasser. As a result, Qasim was murdered by members of the Iraqi 
Ba’ath party in February 1963, which inspired a coup d’état in Syria one month later. 
But the internal struggles within the Syrian and Iraqi governments accompanied 
a more important, regional trend, which defined Kennedy’s approach to the Arab world 
and is thus critical to understanding his strategies towards the Arab monarchies. 
Indeed, after Nasser’s 1956 victory in Suez, the Arab population found itself 
reunited by a common hatred for Western imperialism, which manifested itself in 
demonstrations and riots across the entire Middle East, most famously in Jordan, Iraq and 
Lebanon in 1958, and in clear expressions of support for the Egyptian leader.303 Important 
social developments, such as significant growth of the Arab population, migration from 
rural to urban areas, the expansion of the middle class, and increasing illiteracy and 
poverty304, further emphasised the divide between new progressive Arab regimes, 
promoters of modernization and development, (the administration was aware that 
“despite important differences between competing brands of Arab nationalism, the 
significant ones all reflect desires for independence and neutralism, social and economic 
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reform and varying degrees of Arab unity”305, and that it was thus important for the United 
States “not to appear to stand against reformist movements”, of which Nasser was the 
main spokesman306), and the traditional monarchies, entangled in alliances with the 
“Western imperialists” and oblivious to their societies’ needs. As John Badeau 
commented in his later work The American approach to the Arab world, it was in fact a 
revolt of the middle and lower classes against the traditional elites.307 Nasser’s domestic 
socialist revolution, still framed within the non-aligned movement and thus opposed to 
international communism, epitomised perfectly the struggle between “new” and “old” 
Middle East:  
“Each nation on earth undergoes two revolutions: One political, in which it 
recovers its right of self-government from an imposed despot or any army of aggression 
occupying its territory without its consent. The second revolution is social, in which the 
classes of society struggle against each other until justice for all citizens has been gained 
and conditions have become stable.”308 
 
The Arab monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and Jordan, were seen by Nasser 
as an anachronistic presence in the region.309 While the Arab revolutionary regimes, 
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whether directly affiliated to Cairo or not, pursued development, modernization, and 
secularism, and were united by a common nationalist sentiment that often merged into 
Nasser’s pan-Arabism, the Hashemite Kingdom and the Saudi Royal Family were still 
anchored to Islamic law, were defined by a genealogical political structure and, even more 
significantly, were allied with the “Western imperialists”.  
Nasser blamed such regimes for having subscribed to the Eisenhower Doctrine in 
1957, and for having allowed the perpetuation of Western domination in the region 
through their economic partnership with the Western powers310, and he sought to exploit 
his propaganda to stimulate revolts aimed at destabilising their power. Appealing to the 
Arabs’ desire for emancipation from foreign domination and to the socio-economic 
problems afflicting the Arab world, Nasser launched his campaign against the Arab 
monarchies, puppets of the “Western imperialists” and exploiters of Arab oil311, which 
resulted in countless riots and demonstrations that shook the very foundations of the 
power structures of Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon. While Saud was dramatically 
losing domestic support as Cairo labelled him “the special friend of the Western 
imperialism… protector of Israel and the profiteer of the Arab oil”312, in Jordan, as 
recalled by King Hussein, “Amman was torn by riots as the people, their senses blurred 
by propaganda, turned to Nasser, the new mystique of the Arab world.”313 
Thus, Kennedy’s approach to the Arab monarchies ought to be analysed within 
this larger context of social unrest, revolutionary transformations, and the anti-imperialist 
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campaigns launched by Cairo. Unwilling to oppose Nasser, the real force of attraction of 
the Arab world and key figure in the non-aligned movement, Kennedy pushed the Arab 
monarchies to promote reforms aimed at stabilising them internally by broadening their 
domestic political consensus, such as the elimination of extravagant expenditures, 
elimination of the powers of religious officials, acceleration of the government’s 
decision-making process, improvement of the administration of justice and other fiscal 
and economic reforms.314 However, such an approach did not derive from his strategy of 
gaining a wide range of regional options to contain communism, but exclusively from the 
US’s most immediate concerns: the need for oil and the prevention of an Arab-Israeli 
war.315 
 
Kennedy and Saudi Arabia: the importance of oil 
In his 1960 book The Strategy of Peace, Kennedy analysed several critical 
objectives in the Middle East towards which the United States had to focus its foreign 
policy efforts. Among the challenges of Arab nationalism, the issue of economic 
development and social and political progress, as well as the threat of communism, 
Kennedy identified in Middle Eastern oil the second most critical aspect of the region, as 
he wrote:  
“The second permanent factor in the Middle East of which we must never lose 
sight is oil. The dependence of the world upon Middle Eastern oil… has been made 
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abundantly clear… we must remember that Europe’s dependence upon these oil supplies 
will continue - and continue indefinitely...”316 
 
Such a statement reflects much of Kennedy’s pragmatism in relation to his 
approach to Saudi Arabia, a country that alone controlled the 27% of the world’s oil 
supplies317, and which had produced, in the period between 1953 and 1958, over 1.5 
billion dollars in oil revenues.318 As a senator, Kennedy acknowledged the importance of 
the Saudi oil for Europe and the Western world, then, as president, he elaborated strategies 
aimed squarely at preserving American interests in the Saudi oilfields. The New 
Frontiersmen’s interests in Saudi Arabia was limited to its oil. Because of the 
administration’s belief that “the moderate regimes were bound to fail”, and that thus it 
had to “gain influence with the most radical regimes”319, it saw little chances of relying 
on Riyadh to contain communism. Conversely, relying on the rapprochement with Nasser 
to enhance US prestige in the region and foster pro-American sentiment among the Arab 
population was deemed to pay the highest dividends on both a regional and global scale. 
Preservation of the Saudi oilfields in the context of the rapprochement policy with Nasser 
became the administration’s main concern in its strategies towards Saudi Arabia.  
Significantly, the Kennedy administration’s stance in relation to the Saudi 
Arabia/Nasser/oil dilemma emerged clearly on two occasions. 
First, in the summer of 1962, Komer, perhaps unkindly, confessed to McGeorge 
Bundy: “If it weren’t for ARAMCO we ought to treat this country [Saudi Arabia] like 
Yemen, i.e. leave it back in the 15th Century.”320 Komer’s outburst followed Saud’s 
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condemnation of Kennedy’s programme of assistance to the UAR, which, according to 
the Saudi King, implied “a lessening of US concern for Saudi Arabia.”321 
The second, and perhaps more significant occasion, was during the events of 
1963, when a new wave of Nasserism, triggered by the fall of Qasim in February and of 
the military regime in Syria in March, shook the entire Arab world. While the 
administration was discussing how to deal with the new Nasserite regimes in Syria and 
Iraq, in the broader context of the war in Yemen, Komer declared: “It’s one thing to 
defend the Saudis against aggression. It’s another to declare we choose the kings over the 
bulk of the Arab world; that would be the real way to lose our oil.”322 
The episodes described above are testament to Kennedy’s pragmatic approach to 
Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the strategies designed by the New Frontiersmen to enhance the 
security of the Saudi regime through the promotion of programmes of reforms and 
through the military tokens granted during the Yemen crisis (famously through HARD 
SURFACE, a US military operation deployed to defend Saudi Arabia), were exclusively 
intended to protect the Saudi oilfields while carrying out the policy of rapprochement 
with Nasser. Kennedy’s policies towards Nasser defined the administration’s strategies 
towards Saudi Arabia, but these were never intended to transform Riyadh into a regional 
proxy, nor were they intended to secure a strategic friendship between the New 
Frontiersmen and an old-fashioned regime that Kennedy, as recalled by Feldman, quite 
frankly disliked.323 Even Parker T. Hart explained Kennedy’s strategies exclusively in 
relation to US interests in Saudi oil, never mentioning larger geo-strategic objectives.324 
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The Saudi oil was particularly important for the United States because of the 
concessions that King Abdul Ibn Saud had made to the California Arabian Standard Oil 
Company, associated with the American Standard Oil of California. The contract, signed 
in May 1933, granted the United States full ownership of the Arabian American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO)325, generating a business whose total profits (including extraction, 
refining, and transportation) were so high, they were almost impossible to calculate.326 
Aside from the enormous profits of ARAMCO, Washington’s policy-makers were 
confronted by the larger question of oil supply to Europe. Indeed, as Kennedy’s 
reflections on the Middle Eastern oil in The Strategy of Peace suggest, oil became an 
American national security interest because of Europe’s dependence upon it. While the 
United States was the world leading oil producer, with figures of production around 331 
thousands of metric tons327, the economies in Europe were paralysed and the shortage of 
coal was causing a very severe energy crisis throughout the entire “old world”, already 
devastated by the war. With such scenario, it became clear that oil was going to be the 
key instrument in facilitating, if not entirely allowing, the recovery of Europe, and that in 
the long-term, the United States, already experiencing an impressive increase in domestic 
consumption of oil, would be unable to satisfy both its domestic market and its European 
allies.328 Indeed, even by the early 1950s, 80% of the European oil supply came from the 
Middle East329, half of which, an abundant 40%, was transported from Saudi Arabia to 
the Mediterranean Sea through the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, also known as “Tapline”.330 
The need to secure the Saudi oilfields defined Kennedy’s approach to Saudi 
Arabia, but there were no geo-strategic interests, in terms of Cold War regional alliances, 
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behind Kennedy’s attempt to stabilise the Saudi regime. Kennedy did not wish to rely on 
Saudi Arabia to contain international communism - an experiment that had already failed 
during the years of Eisenhower - but only to secure US interests in the large reserves of 
oil hidden under the Saudi soil.331 Furthermore, the relationship between Kennedy and 
Riyadh suffered initially from some awkward diplomatic setbacks. King Saud responded 
more than harshly to Kennedy’s conciliatory letter to the Arab leaders sent on May 11, 
1961, through which the president sought to establish a friendly dialogue with the Arab 
countries around Middle Eastern issues, including the Arab-Israeli dispute. Saud’s 
disrespectful reply, marked by repeated and severe attacks against Washington’s pro-
Israel policy, offended Kennedy to the point that his “face turned white with anger as he 
read the long and acerbic response to his thoughtful and balanced message.”332 This 
incident, together with the issues surrounding the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield 
concession333, made Kennedy less and less inclined to establish a geo-strategic 
partnership with Riyadh. Oil was Kennedy’s sole concern, rather than more far-reaching 
objectives. 
As early as Kennedy’s accession to the White House, things appeared rather 
gloomy in Saudi Arabia. In Washington, Komer made clear to the new president that “the 
staying in power of the Saudi monarchy declines with every passing day”334, a position 
largely shared among the administration and in the State Department; this same opinion 
was common in the Middle East as well, where in Cairo Nasser acknowledged that “the 
Saudi Arabian monarchy was falling apart”335, and in Israel, the Ben Gurion government 
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“considered Saudi Arabia to be quite fragile and likely to crumble”.336 Indeed, the 
impression of quiet conveyed by the lack of direct uprisings against the King, hid severe 
political fragmentation that was expected to cause the Saudi monarchy to fall at the first 
bout of turbulence, likely to be caused by the rampancy of the Arab nationalists. 
Such fragmentation was caused by the power struggle between King Saud and his 
brother Crown Prince Faysal, two political figures diametrically opposed. While the first 
was associated with extravagant luxury, plundering of oil resources, and corruption, the 
second was seen as a sober, loyal leader whose financial wisdom could contribute to the 
stabilisation of the regime.337 Such tension, which lasted until 1964 when Faysal officially 
came to the throne, helps understanding the framework within which Arab upheavals of 
the 1950s and 1960s influenced the dynamics of the Saudi government and of 
Washington’s strategies.  
Problems began to appear as early as June 1953, when thousands of Arab 
ARAMCO workers went on strike to protest against their living conditions and to demand 
the same conditions as their American colleagues.338 Saud’s luxurious lifestyle did not 
help to ease the tensions, for a King accustomed to spending billions of dollars339 on 
extravagant whims could hardly set an example or give comfort to his population. 
Furthermore, the King destined over 60% of the country’s total oil income for royal 
emoluments340 a habit that had made the country go through fairly severe economic crisis, 
and further contributed towards widening the gap between the palace of power and the 
Saudi people. However, this ambition for better working conditions soon turned into 
protests of an increasingly political nature. The people’s desire for a change in Saudi 
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Arabia’s politics grew in parallel to Nasser’s ascent as leader of the Arab world, as his 
progressive visions and propaganda spread the idea that monarchies could be overthrown 
after all.341 As a matter of fact, in May 1956 strikes erupted again among the ARAMCO 
workers, but this time people started demanding the creation of a Saudi republic and the 
fall of the monarchy.342 
Eventually, King Saud managed to crush the protests with bloodshed, but after the 
Suez crisis, as Nasser’s popularity reached its pinnacle, the King found himself more and 
more isolated. Although benefiting from the aid provided by the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
the King was losing domestic support dramatically and, growing progressively more 
obsessed with the new revolutionary trend in the Middle East brought to the fore by the 
Egyptian revolution of 1952, he further estranged himself from Saudi society and refused 
contacts with the circles of intellectuals and educated Saudi personalities who were 
demanding reforms.343 
In September 1956 however, Nasser’s visit to Saudi Arabia finally stimulated the 
more progress-oriented circles in the royal palace, led by Prince Talal Bin Abdulaziz, to 
begin opposing Saud’s reign. This resulted in the creation of a Nasserite cell within the 
royal palace of power, which aimed at replacing the stagnant monarchy with a new, 
constitutional one.344 The distance between Saud and the reformist cell, now gathered in 
the Free Princes movement, grew parallel to Nasser’s popularity and his incessant 
campaign “against the King, his extravagance, his wastage of the oil that should belong 
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to ‘all the Arabs’ and other such charges”345, until 1958, when Saud was forced to resign 
and to turn the management of all the government’s business to his brother Faysal.  
When Faysal stepped in with the blessing of Talal and the Free Princes, he 
immediately sought to tackle the severe economic problems that were afflicting the 
country. He reduced the royal emoluments to from 60% to 14%346, gaining approval from 
businessmen and intellectuals, and pursued the establishment of the first real national 
budget, with the aim of restoring the country’s economy by cutting down royal spending. 
By the end of 1960 however, whether through jealousy of his brother’s popularity or 
through unwillingness to accept the financial stringency imposed by Faysal, Saud refused 
to sign the budget, and Faysal resigned from his role of prime minister, moving to the 
desert to live in almost complete isolation.347 The law still required the King’s approval 
for the proposed budget to come into effect, and Saud used this power - one of the few he 
had left - in an attempt to restore his control over the country.  
With Faysal temporarily out of the picture, Saud seduced Talal and the Free 
Princes by promising reforms and granting them prestigious positions in the government. 
Talal became minister of finance and vice president of the Supreme Planning Board348, 
but he still hoped that Saud would accept the reforms proposed by the Free Princes: the 
establishment of a constitutional monarchy, guarantees for private ownership and equal 
opportunity, freedom of expression and association.349 However, once Saud managed to 
re-establish firm control over the government, he rejected Talal’s programme entirely, 
adjudging that the only law in Saudi Arabia was the Sharia. Betrayed and disillusioned, 
Talal went into voluntary exile.350 
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Only Saud’s deteriorating health during the autumn of 1961 would provide the 
conditions for Faysal’s return, in the guise of prime minister and acting king. Wiser and 
certainly less extravagant, Faysal subscribed to Kennedy’s idea of reforms and 
modernization aimed at stabilising the country’s regime, particularly during 1962-1963, 
when a new wave of Nasserism instigated turmoil and uprisings against the socially, 
politically and economically troubled monarchies in the region. Faysal established local 
governments and favoured the formation of an independent judiciary, tried to improve 
social welfare and to give a push to the economic growth of his country351; he began large 
education programmes, he introduced Western technology352, and he took steps to 
increase the participation of “educated Saudi youth in the administration of the state.”353 
In October 1962, Faysal also proclaimed an end to slavery, one of the great 
embarrassments of the Saudi regime, given its traditional role as defender of the Islamic 
faith. Indeed, as many African Muslims were still “held in bondage”354 through contracts 
enforced by Saudi courts, domestic and international malcontent fuelled by Nasser’s 
propaganda risked bringing Faysal’s rule to an early end. 
The Kennedy administration welcomed the effort of Faisal’s reformist regime. A 
telegram from the Department of State sent in November 1962, informed the royal family 
that “US [is] pleased at evidence of serious intent [to] carry out reforms”, and that 
Kennedy was ready to assist the regime “in finding experts in appropriate fields interested 
in temporary service with [the] Saudi Arabia Government who can aid in work of [the] 
Supreme Planning Board and [the] Saudi Arabia Government ministries.”355 Under 
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Kennedy, the US government also established “a civic action program in Saudi Arabia in 
the form of road building supervised by the United States Army Corps and Engineers”, 
and dispatched the American economic survey team to Saudi Arabia in order to establish 
a closer technical assistance and collaboration between the two countries.356 The team, 
headed by the American Mr Harold Folk, who was employed as top planning advisor in 
the Saudi Supreme Planning Board, collaborated with the Saudi government on specific 
projects for economic development. During a meeting with Hart in mid-November 1962, 
Faysal announced his intention to draft a “Fundamental Law”, a constitution which would 
also include a “statement on the basic rights of the citizens”; to draft a “Provincial Law”, 
aimed at bringing some decentralization of power and increasing the popular participation 
in the governmental process at provincial level; to create an independent judiciary system, 
thus removed from the hands of religious authorities; to restrict the power of the Ulema - 
a council of senior scholars that would advise the King on political issue - to religious 
matters; and to allocate the money from outstanding unsettled claims against ARAMCO 
into a special fund for development. 357 The administration confirmed its appreciation of 
Faysal’s effort: “[The] US [is] impressed with reform program announced by Faysal 
government and believes it provides [the] basis for healthy progress and 
modernization.”358 
Faysal’s set of reforms eventually allowed the Saudi regime to survive the impact 
of the wave of Nasserism that followed the coup in Yemen of September 1962. Although 
in the historiography of Saudi Arabia there is no recollection of direct domestic uprisings 
similar for instance to those of Jordan in April 1963, the political struggle between King 
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Saud, Crown Prince Faysal and the members of the Free Princes constituted a serious 
danger to the survival of the regime.  
By pushing Faysal towards this reformist path, not only did the administration 
bring the acting king to vastly improve “his international image, not only in Washington 
but also in the Arab East”359, but Kennedy himself gained credit and popularity “among 
Saudi intellectuals, diplomats and high officials”, who welcomed the New Frontier’s 
effort to modernise the country.360 Educated Saudi intellectuals were in fact the breeding-
ground for revolutionary propaganda, and by subscribing to Kennedy’s directions, Faysal 
managed to satisfy their demands and quell their unrest.361 Had he ignored Kennedy’s 
strategy, Hart and the rest of the administration, had little doubt about his chances of 
survival.362 
From a long-term perspective, Kennedy’s policies towards Saudi Arabia laid the 
groundwork for the country’s future strategic partnership with the US, for at least two 
reasons. First, because by pushing Saudi Arabia to adopt progressive reforms, Kennedy 
ensured the survival of Faysal’s rule during such a turbulent period, possibly the most 
uncertain in Saudi history.363 It is not unrealistic to think that, had Faysal failed to 
implement such reforms, he would have lost political support and perhaps caused the 
collapse of the Saudi monarchy and the seizure of power by Nasserite cells already 
present in the royal palaces. Second, as will be described in Chapter 5, is that operation 
HARD SURFACE represented in effect a direct pledge of US support to Saudi Arabia in 
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the context of the confrontation between Cairo and Riyadh in Yemen, which eventually 
inevitably strengthened Washington’s ties with the country.   
But Kennedy destined this military aid to Faysal as a mere political manoeuvre, 
in the hope of deterring Nasser from directly attacking Saudi Arabia and to show to Faysal 
Washington’s bona fides during the disengagement negotiations.364 Although Kennedy 
never wished to rely on Saudi Arabia as regional proxy but only to secure US oil interests, 
his actions inevitably opened the road for Johnson and Nixon’s strategies of containment 
of communism and defence of US regional interests through Saudi Arabia. 
 
The case of Jordan and Iran 
While Kennedy’s strategies in Saudi Arabia were confined to the need to preserve 
the American interests in the Saudi oil and maintain the economic partnership between 
the royal family and ARAMCO, in Jordan and Iran the administration was moved by 
larger geo-strategic objectives. Preservation of the Hashemite regime in Jordan to avoid 
an Arab-Israeli war, and of the Shah regime in Iran over both the question of oil and of 
CENTO (Central Treaty Organization- formerly Baghdad Pact), required the Kennedy 
administration to overcome its disliking of these traditional and authoritarian regimes and 
to focus on finding a way to stabilise them. Much like in the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
Kennedy administration referred to its strategy of promoting social, economic and 
political progress as a means to quell the population’s unrest and broaden the domestic 
political consensus of both King Hussein and the Shah. 
Although there are similarities in the approach of the Kennedy administration to 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran, one that advocated progress and modernization to gain 
domestic consensus, there are some differences in the results that this produced. While in 
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Jordan, King Hussein proved himself very slow in implementing reforms (some progress 
would be registered in Jordan only after the food riots in 1989365), and thus was eventually 
forced to rely on martial law to regain control of his country during the crisis in April 
1963366, in Iran the Shah succumbed to Kennedy’s pressure by implementing a 
questionable set of reforms, largely concerning land redistribution, known as White 
Revolution.367 Moreover, there were different interests involved in the case of Jordan and 
Iran. While the first, due to the nature of its soil, had no oil368 and was thus important 
almost exclusively for the Arab-Israeli dispute, the second was pivotal both for its oil and 
for the containment of the Soviet Union.369 
With Palestinians constituting two-thirds of the population370, close ties with both 
the United States and Britain (exacerbated by Hussein’s “foolish marriage” to an English 
girl371), and extreme economic, political and social problems372, Jordan was a hotbed for 
Arab nationalists.373 Anti-imperialist and anti-Israel sentiments, fuelled by Nasser’s 
propaganda, had indeed already caused King Hussein’s regime to tremble under the grave 
social unrest that had hit the West Bank in 1958, the well-known crisis that had forced 
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Britain into direct intervention, and the Eisenhower administration to rely for the first 
time on the Middle East Resolution.  
Just like Eisenhower, Kennedy had promptly acknowledged the importance of 
keeping Hussein in power. A paper prepared by the State Department, conveniently 
entitled “Jordan: Key to Stability”, clearly expressed the significance of Hussein’s 
survival for US strategies:  
“Jordan is the key to the precarious stability which has been maintained in the 
Middle East for the past three years. Were something to happen to King Hussein either 
the surrounding Arab countries, or Israel, or both, might move in militarily to fill the 
vacuum.”374 
 
The problem with Jordan was relatively straightforward. If Hussein’s regime was 
to fall, either Israel or some Arab state (most likely a Nasserite regime, given his 
popularity among the Palestinian population375) would try to take over and thus, wherever 
the first move came from, an Arab-Israeli war might be triggered. The main concern 
related to a possible Israeli pre-emptive action, an issue that would become more visible 
during the 1963 crisis. The administration feared that if Hussein fell, Israel would make 
a move to either prevent an Arab regime from taking over a country so near its doorstep, 
or to directly seize the West Bank. This would consequently set the basis for “acute area 
instability, including a possible renewal of Arab-Israel hostilities, and creation of 
conditions favourable to Soviet interference.”376 In the minds of the New Frontiersmen, 
Jordan was indeed a ‘key to stability’.  
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Kennedy advocated joint US-UK budgetary support (1.6 million dollars on a five-
year programme, and 0.7 million dollars allocated by Britain377) and assistance for 
economic development in order to permit “visible improvement in living standards”378, 
and he pledged Washington’s continued, but limited, military assistance, upon which 
Hussein’s survival largely relied.379 Much like in the case of Saudi Arabia, Komer noted, 
the key for the survival of the Hashemite regime lay in Hussein’s “effort to keep up with 
the times”380, and thus to embrace the path of development and modernization that could 
allow him to resist the “increasing domestic pressure”381 fomented by Nasser’s 
propaganda. To achieve such an objective, the administration recommended the use of 
foreign grants to destine to economic development, the use of technical support to develop 
indigenous sources of income, to practice rigorous budgetary economy, as well as 
frequent bilateral consultations on any expense that might increase the budgetary 
deficit.382  Furthermore, Washington pledged its support for the completion of certain 
local projects, such as the construction of the East Ghor Irrigation Project, and to provide 
surplus commodities under the Food for Peace scheme.383 
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Although puzzled by Kennedy’s overall support of Egypt384, which the 
administration explained was designed to “gain a somewhat greater influence with 
President Nasser”385, and particularly concerned about the HAWK sale386, King 
Hussein’s relationship with Kennedy remained in line with his overall friendship with the 
United States. However, by the time Hussein had reluctantly accepted  Kennedy’s 
decision to sell the HAWK missiles to Israel, the Yemen crisis exploded, dragging Jordan 
not only into the confrontation with Cairo, but also into a crisis that much resembled that 
of 1958.  
Iran was somehow a different case. Separated from the Arab-Israeli tangle387, the 
authoritarian regime of the Shah suffered nonetheless the repercussions of Nasser’s global 
popularity, as leader of the Arab world and of the non-aligned movement. Anti-
imperialism, self-determination, progress and emancipation were concepts that, after the 
Bandung Conference in 1955, echoed through the streets of Tehran through Cairo’s 
incessant propaganda388, provoking turmoil, social unrest and threatening the stability of 
a leader who would later be described by Kissinger in 1972 as one of America’s closest 
allies.389 Because the Shah was corrupt, eccentric, and a dictatorial leader who 
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disregarded his people and their needs390, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Kennedy 
administration was not particularly fond of the Iranian leader.391 But two factors had made 
Iran a critical asset for the United States. The first one was oil. Iran’s vast oil reserves and 
the economic partnership ensured by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was too important 
for both Britain and the United States to risk a repetition of the events of early 1950s, 
when the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC ) was nationalised. Secondly, Iran’s 
geographic position, given its proximity to the Soviet Union, made the country a natural 
buffer-state against Moscow’s ambitions in the region. If the Shah fell, CENTO would 
inexorably collapse. As Talbot reported in October 1961:  
“To prevent Soviet domination of Iran must be our immediate and overriding 
objective. This requires the continuance in power of a pro-Western regime, for the 
ultimate alternative is a weak neutralist government which could not withstand Soviet 
pressures and maintain Iran’s independence.”392 
 
However, as early as January 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Secretary 
of Defence Robert McNamara that Iran was at risk and that “inflation and other economic 
difficulties, the so-far unsuccessful land reform program, Soviet propaganda and 
subversive efforts, and the long deferral of free elections”393 were likely to cause the Shah 
to be overthrown. Indeed, the situation in Iran was far worse than that for instance of 
Saudi Arabia: censorship, police abuses, suppression of personal liberties, economic 
recession and the Shah’s inability to effectively tackle the social and economic issues 
afflicting his country, had provoked a wave of protests from the political opposition and 
other dissident elements. For instance, as early as May 1961, Kennedy was informed that 
50,000 demonstrators had clashed with the army and security forces in Tehran, causing 
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the prime minister and his cabinet to resign.394 Thus, as the Shah appointed a new prime 
minister, Ali Amini, Kennedy put together a task force designed to find a solution to the 
Iranian crisis.395 Among recommendations of a more military nature, the task force agreed 
that political and economic measures had to be adopted in order to “bolster the present 
Western-oriented government.”396 Significantly, and in line with his overall approach to 
the Middle Eastern monarchies, Kennedy subordinated the Shah’s request for more arms 
to the implementation of reforms: “Every time the Shah mentioned ‘more arms’, JFK’s 
response would be ‘more reforms’.”397 
In early August however, a gloomy Komer reported to Kennedy that “the situation 
has gotten worse instead of better.”398 Amini, although regarded by the administration as 
Tehran’s best option, tried to implement a programme of reforms aimed at solving the 
economic crisis and tackling the social issues, but lacked political support, a strong 
cabinet, and the backing of the middle class. In addition, continued Komer, the National 
Front, “a disparate congeries of middle and left politicians”399, was seeking to topple the 
Amini government through demonstrations and calls for free elections. For his part, the 
Shah did not seem to care about reforms as much as he did about the need to boost his 
military through American aid. His “almost psychotic obsession”400 with the status of his 
army resulted in an almost complete lack of interest in Amini’s reforms, and in an 
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increasing insistence on military aid. Although the administration was not particularly 
inclined to arm the Shah, rather wishing to see him support Amini and broaden his 
domestic consensus through social, political and economic reforms, Ambassador Holmes 
reported from Tehran that, should Kennedy decide not to accommodate the Shah, he 
might be moved to rely more heavily on oil revenues – “to the detriment of the country’s 
development programs”401 – and perhaps make a step towards the Soviet Union. Although 
Kennedy and Komer were reluctant at the idea of granting more military aid to the Shah, 
Holmes’s memorandum touched the right spot in Washington: “is it worth the candle to 
threaten so directly our political position in this area by adopting recommendations based 
on theory and unaccompanied, as far as I can see, by careful evaluations of the political 
risks involved?”402 Seeking to avoid such a scenario, and hoping to gain some leverage 
on the Shah, Kennedy agreed to send more arms to Iran, but told the embassy to inform 
the Shah: “this all the give we've got.”403 Kennedy urged the Shah to turn “toward real 
social-economic needs of Iran.”404 The similarity between Kennedy’s approach to Iran 
and Saudi Arabia is remarkable: the Kennedy administration advocated the need to 
promote socio-economic reforms (that might reasonably fall under the notion of 
“democratic reforms”405, as Kennedy told some Iranian diplomats during a meeting in 
March 1961) and pushed them to stabilise them, not through American arms, but mainly 
through internal reformist programmes. 
However, back in Iran, the Shah continued to frustrate Amini’s efforts to 
implement reforms: the prime minister sought to reform the cabinet excluding corrupted 
officials, whom the Shah intended to protect; he sought to devote more funds to 
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agricultural development and education by cutting the expenses of the military, to which 
the Shah was opposed; he sought to decentralize the government, but the Shah 
strengthened his grip on power.406 Exhausted by his confrontation with the Shah, in July 
1962 Amini resigned, and Asadollah Alam became the new prime minister. 
For the following months, the Kennedy administration watched the development 
of the Iranian situation carefully, and by late 1962, things appeared to be back to 
normality. Holmes reassured Washington that the Shah was finally taking measures to 
tackle the issues that had threatened his regime in the first place, and that he had started 
to design a programme of land reform that was “truly revolutionary.”407 With an aid 
package of nearly 100 million dollars per year granted by the Kennedy administration, 
the Shah had managed to retain control of the country and, through strong propaganda 
and the backing of the army, quiet down the dissident voices. Kennedy had managed to 
allow the Shah to gain some precious time “required for necessary reforms, and 
socio/economic progress”408 which would be encapsulated in the so called “White 
Revolution”. 
The “White Revolution”, which mainly consisted of land redistribution necessary 
for the modernization of the country (and thus was fully supported by the people409), also 
included measures such as anti-corruption campaigns, decentralization of government 
functions, privatization of some factories owned by the government and profit sharing 
plans for workers.410 By adopting such programmes, at Kennedy’s insistence, the Shah 
survived, although only temporarily, the crisis which occurred during the Kennedy years. 
With the Shah firmly back in power, the Kennedy administration turned its attention 
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elsewhere, particularly to the crisis that was taking the Arab world by storm after the 
events of Yemen in September 1962.  
With regards to Iran, it is unquestionable that Kennedy’s strategies had managed 
to stabilise, although only temporarily, the Shah’s regime, thus paving the way for Iran’s 
future as regional proxy. For better or worse, the Kennedy administration had accepted 
the “White Revolution” as a sufficient manoeuvre to avoid a communist takeover in 
Tehran. The short-term benefit of having the Shah firmly in power to avoid a communist 
infiltration, overcame in the minds of the New Frontiersmen the need to find a balance 
between the impulse towards modernization and the more conservative forces in Iran.  
However, the reforms soon appeared designed to gain support among the lower-
classes rather than genuinely reforming Iranian society through the redistribution of 
wealth411, and they soon backfired. The most conservative Islamist forces in the country 
considered the Shah’s “White Revolution” an immorality prompted by the West that 
sacrificed the true Islamic values of their country412, and in the summer of 1963 they 
began to fuel protests against the Shah, who crushed them violently. The Kennedy 
administration did not pay much attention to this development, the true consequences of 
which would become obvious in 1979, perceiving it as a confined event caused by a few 
fanatics, “bazaar employees, South Tehran gangsters and riffraff, and many 
unemployed.”413 
For the purpose of this analysis, it is significant to stress however that, unlike the 
case of Saudi Arabia where Kennedy never subscribed to the idea of using Riyadh as one 
of Washington’s regional agents but only to secure access to the oilfields, the geo-
strategic importance of Iran was the driving force behind the administration’s efforts to 
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rescue the Shah. But the parallels between the case of Saudi Arabia and that of Iran are 
easily drawn. After all, Komer himself had tried to stimulate Faysal to adopt reforms in 
Saudi Arabia by suggesting the comparison with Tehran: “We think Saudi future will 
hinge most… on the extent Faysal succeeds in reform and modernization at home. Look 
how Shah of Iran greatly strengthened his regime in just this way.”414 
 
Kennedy, Macmillan and the changing of the guard 
By the time Kennedy accessed the White House, US policy-makers had long 
acknowledged the importance of taking the reins of the Western policies in the Middle 
East. The gradual collapse of the former European empires convinced the Eisenhower 
administration “that the United States must make its presence more strongly felt in the 
area”415, and although Washington tried to reassure the British and French government 
that its policies “were not designed to replace them”416, after the Suez crisis and the 
adoption of the Middle East Resolution, the United States became in effect the principal 
Western actor in the region.  
Kennedy too acknowledged the new American role in the region: “The Persian oil 
crisis, the Israeli war for independence, the British evacuation from the Suez area”, he 
wrote in 1957, “these and other events marked a recession of British influence from the 
Middle East and a sudden pressure for American intervention.”417 Much like during the 
Eisenhower years, Kennedy’s presidency reflected Britain’s decline and its inability to 
significantly influence the American plans: Washington pursued its Cold War strategies 
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centred upon the rapprochement with the Egyptian leader, and London remained more 
attentive towards certain specific regional interests.  
The centrality of Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser for the US 
Mideast strategies is largely reflected in the relationship that developed between Kennedy 
and Macmillan in the period between 1961 and 1963. Indeed, even though on a larger 
scale the alliance between the United States and Britain and the coincidence of their 
strategic and economic interests in the region remained unaltered, the divergence between 
the two governments over the Yemen crisis, the proxy war between Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia exploded in September 1962, is testament to two key aspects of the relationship 
between the US and Britain during the Kennedy years. 
First, it illustrates the different priorities between London and Washington, the 
former still anchored to a system of alliance based on the support of the traditional, 
Western-oriented Arab monarchies, the latter committed to the pursuit of a different path 
based on rapprochement with Nasser, and to supporting progressive, neutralist Arab 
regimes. Second, it shows that despite the insistence of the Macmillan government, 
Kennedy did not alter his policy towards Nasser, who was perceived by the administration 
as the key to a more stable Middle East even during the crisis. Withstanding London’s 
pleas to withhold the recognition of Sallal’s Yemen Arab Republic, Kennedy pursued his 
strategy confident that his manoeuvres could allow Washington to gain leverage against 
Cairo’s foreign policy and prevent an exacerbation of hostilities. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that in The Greater Middle East and the Cold War, Barrett argues that 
Kennedy often found himself compelled to change his foreign policy in the Middle East 
because of British influence.418 The analysis of the Kennedy-Macmillan debate over 
Yemen proves the very opposite.  
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Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister from 1957 to 1963, was well aware of 
the strategic importance of Aden, the little seaport city in the south of Yemen overlooking 
the Aden Gulf, which had been a British protectorate for over a century.419 After the tragic 
events of Suez, the city became in fact a sort of British last stand in the Middle East, a 
key intervention post for the defence of the Persian Gulf’s oil, and a fundamental staging 
area for routes to the Far East.420 Given that the anti-Imamate rebels were both inspired 
and supported by Nasser - whose ability to get on British nerves was renowned since the 
events of 1956 - following the coup, Macmillan immediately made clear the implications 
of the crisis: “If things go wrong, we may be faced with the loss of Aden and therefore of 
the Gulf… Nasser may be intervening openly.”421 Unable to trust the new regime in 
Yemen, Britain supported the royalist faction despite Kennedy’s opposite 
recommendation, never managing however to play a significant role in helping to define 
or even simply influence the American strategies designed to deal with the crisis. The 
evolution of the Yemen affair, and the different approaches adopted by Washington and 
London, eventually caused the two allies to drift apart, and the two leaders to question 
each other’s competency, bringing back frightening memories of the Suez crisis, the 
emblem of the divergence of the two governments. 
In early October 1962, Komer informed Kennedy that London had an “acute 
concern”422 over the Nasserist regime in Yemen, because it feared it could constitute a 
threat to its protectorate in Aden. Indeed, during a Cabinet meeting that occurred on 
October 9, 1962, Macmillan acknowledged that even though the development of an actual 
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civil war between republicans and royalists would be “politically repugnant”423, the news 
of the Egyptian troops being deployed in Yemen left no alternatives other than covertly 
supporting Prince Hassan to re-establish the Imamate against the republicans.424 
However, on October 12, John Badeau was informed that the UAR Ambassador 
in Washington, Yusuf Haikal, had met just the day before with the British ambassador in 
Egypt, Sir Harold Beeley, extending the following communication: “President Nasser 
wished [to] assure Her Majesty’s Government he did not intend any damage to British 
position [in] Aden.”425 In light of this communication, and in consideration of Kennedy’s 
willingness to maintain close ties with Nasser, the Cabinet started to take into account a 
possible recognition of the Nasserite regime in Yemen:  
“It would be necessary to watch the situation as it developed from day to day so 
that recognition would be timed to take place after the ground had been sufficiently 
prepared by talks with the Rulers, but would not be so delayed that our relations with the 
republican Government in the Yemen would be damaged.”426 
 
During December 1962, as the debate between the Colonial Office and the Foreign 
Office over the issue of recognition divided the government in London427, Macmillan 
asked Kennedy to get on the phone on a secure line to discuss Yemen, promptly 
confessing that the crisis was “a very difficult dilemma” because, he explained, Britain’s 
troubles lay with “the protectorate and the colony.” 428 As Komer recalled, Macmillan 
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gave Kennedy “some big song and dance”.429 After a while, since Macmillan was 
repeating the same things over and over again Kennedy told him: “You and I seem to be 
going around in circles. I’ve got my Yemen expert here... he’ll explain to you why we 
don’t think delay is such a good idea.”430 The prime minister, while discomforted by 
Kennedy’s impassibility, eventually agreed to speak to Komer, who promptly explained: 
“The trouble is that Nasser is not going to get out until he wins because he knows he is 
ahead. So we have to get the Saudis and the Jordanians out as the condition of getting 
Nasser out.”431 Komer added that part of the plan was “to recognise and then convince 
the Saudis and the Jordanians that they are backing the losing side.”432 But Macmillan 
maintained his scepticism: “I was just wondering whether in the modern world it would 
be better for all parties to say that they will not intervene”, he stated, and Komer replied: 
“Nasser will not move until the other two have moved. We cannot get him to move 
first.”433 The prime minister again expressed his concern over Aden when he clearly said 
“I am afraid that your recognition will depress the people in Aden”, but Komer had 
nothing better to offer in reply than a “Yes. We recognize this is a risk”.434 
Acknowledging Kennedy’s firm position over the issue, Macmillan reported in his diary: 
“The situation in Yemen... is developing very badly for us. If the new revolutionary 
government is established, the pressure on the Aden Protectorate and then on the Aden 
Colony and Base will be very dangerous”.435 
Kennedy urged Macmillan to “play it smart”436, and thus to recognise the YAR in 
order to maintain some leverage over Nasser, but the British prime minister begged to 
                                                 
429 Robert Komer, OHI, July 16, 1964, 17. 
430 Ibidem. 




435 Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957-1966, Ed. Peter Catterall 
(London, Basingstoke, Oxford; Macmillan Publisher Limited, 2011), 503. 
436 Robert Komer, OHI, July 16, 1964, 17. 
119 
 
differ: “The danger seems to be that if you play your cards... in exchange for mere words, 
you may lose all power to influence events”437, he told the president on November 14, 
1962. “You apparently feel that to keep it going as long as possible is not adverse to our 
interest”438, Kennedy replied the following day, “But we are convinced that... a 
Republican victory is inevitable.” He explained to Macmillan that “Nasser is so 
committed to victory in Yemen that he will do whatever is necessary to assure it.”439 
However, Kennedy failed to convince Macmillan. On November 15, 1962, the 
British prime minister wrote “Sir Charles Johnston, who is Governor in Aden... has 
reported very strongly that recognition... would spread consternation among our friends 
throughout Arabia”, and concluded by saying “So I am quite convinced that we should 
not give recognition in exchange for mere words.”440 Finally, when in early February 
1963 the YAR communicated its decision to close the British Legation in Taiz by 
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February 17441, Macmillan was offered the perfect opportunity to escape Washington’s 
pressure:  
“As you probably know we have now received a message from Taiz to say that 
the President of the Yemen requires our legation to leave... As you know, we have been 
very torn between the benefits, of which you are very conscious, of our recognising the 
Republican regime and being able to have a man in Taiz and the serious difficulties which 
recognitions seemed likely to make for our friends in Aden”442 
 
With some sense of relief, Macmillan concluded: “But as I say, the Yemeni 
Republicans have now got impatient and so we shall just have to accept this situation for 
the time being.”443 
Macmillan never recognised the Yemen Arab Republic. On October 9, 1963 he 
resigned from the role of prime minister, disappearing from the scene just one month 
before Kennedy’s assassination. Ironically enough, Britain would completely evacuate 
Aden just four years later, on November 30, 1967, in light of a massive review of its 
foreign policy brought about by Prime Minister Harold Wilson.444 
The diplomacy that occurred between Washington and London over the Yemen 
crisis reveals a critical aspect of the Kennedy years: the decreasing role of Britain in the 
confrontation of superpowers in the Middle East, and the independence of the White 
House’s thinking from the Whitehall’s concerns. With the decline brought to light by the 
1956 great embarrassment over Suez, by late 1962 the government in London found itself 
once again at odds with Washington’s policy-makers, and unable to change the course of 
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US foreign policy in the Middle East. It is interesting to note that the first Arab crisis in 
the Middle East during the Kennedy years, caused by Iraq’s claim over oil-rich Kuwait 
in the summer of 1961445, saw an almost exclusive collaboration within the UN between 
London and the UAR, when Nasser expressed his willingness to support Kuwait’s entry 
into the United Nations and the Arab League, and even to meet Kuwait’s request for 
troops to deter Qasim from making a move in their country.446 But during the Kuwait 
crisis, everyone’s interests coincided. Nasser and the other Arab countries were not 
willing to accept Qasim’s expansionism, Britain wished to preserve its interests in the 
Kuwaiti oilfields and even Kennedy had been assured that “the UAR had come out 
flatfooted for Kuwait’s independence.”447 But when interests did not coincide, as for 
example in the case of the Yemen crisis, things fell apart. Nasser and Macmillan renewed 
their hostilities, albeit indirectly, and Britain and the United States realised that they were 
pursuing different strategies after all.  
Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser prevailed eventually over the 
ambitions of the former European colonial power, but this should hardly come as a 
surprise. Indeed, Nasser was not only the leader of the Arab world, but a leader among 
the neutralist countries, and Kennedy was committed to enhancing American prestige 
among the Third World countries, even if that meant displeasing traditional allies. After 
all, one of Kennedy’s most famous speeches as a senator was aimed squarely at the French 
ambitions in Algeria: 
“US retreat from the principles of independence and anti-colonialism has 
damaged our standing in the eyes of the free world, our leadership in the fight to keep the 
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world free. Perhaps is already too late to save the West from the total catastrophe in 
Algeria, but we dare not fail to make the effort”448 
 
Although Yemen was not Algeria, it is nonetheless significant evidence of 
Kennedy’s priorities in his foreign policy agenda. Unwilling to jeopardise his strategy of 
enhancing US prestige among the Arab and Third World countries, Kennedy eventually 
chose Nasser over Macmillan, further contributing to the decline of British influence in 
the region.   
Indeed, an insurmountable divergence between Washington and London emerged, 
emblematic of the US new approach to the Middle East and of the inevitable changing of 
the guard in the region. While Kennedy saw Nasser as the key for his Cold War objectives 
in the region, Macmillan was still anchored to a rather inflexible opinion among the 
British government’s policy-makers: “For Nasser put Hitler and it all rings familiar.”449 
Of course, it was the very collapse of the European colonial powers, and the rise 
of the nationalist movements across the Third World, to prompt the shift in the American 
foreign policy in the Middle East. The Kennedy administration saw slim chances to 
contain communism if Washington opposed to the reformist ambitions of the Arab 
population, and disregarded the nationalist voice of the Egyptian government. The goals 
of subduing the Arabs’ hostility towards the West, and of building up neutralism as an 
alternative to communism, guided the Kennedy administration’s policies through a 
delicate and ambitious diplomatic effort based on courting Nasser while keeping the other 
regional actors in check, and on protecting the Western economic interests while abating 
the charges of ‘Western imperialism’. By mid-1962, the Kennedy administration 
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succeeded in its attempt of fostering a working relationship with Nasser, and taking 
advantage of the propitious moment, it even attempted a mediation over the refugee issue. 
But by late 1962, the White House would come to term with the limits and problems 





Chapter 3. Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser 
 
Devil in disguise 
Although Kennedy’s Mideast policy is mainly regarded in relation to the making 
of the special friendship with Israel, it was the rapprochement with Nasser’s Egypt that 
constituted the core of the New Frontiersmen’s foreign policy in the Middle East and that 
dictated the general posture that the American government would keep in the region 
during the Kennedy years. Indeed, arguably most of the administration’s policies in the 
Middle East were set in the context of its strategy of establishing a working, friendly 
relationship with Nasser. For instance, the enhancement of Israel’s security was dictated 
by the need to forestall possible pre-emptive attacks that Kennedy’s pro-Nasser policy 
could instigate the Ben Gurion government to launch.450 Likewise, Kennedy’s strategies 
towards Riyadh found their roots in the administration’s attempts to secure the US 
economic partnership with the Saudi royal family, which, as noted earlier, could be 
threatened by the Nasserite progressive propaganda against the traditional Arab 
regimes.451 
Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East has thus to be examined in the larger 
context of the policy of rapprochement with Nasser, which constituted the real driving 
force behind certain historical decisions such as the HAWK sale or the HARD SURFACE 
operation, or even less famous ones, such as the recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic 
or the White House’s attempt to push the Arab monarchies to embrace programmes of 
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development and modernization. For this reason, it would be a mistake to interpret 
Kennedy’s even-handedness as merely an attempt to “support any friend” in the region. 
It is significant to note that, contrary to Warren Bass’s argument, Kennedy did not 
seek to establish friendly ties with both Nasser and his nemeses, Saudi Prince Faysal and 
Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion, with the hopes of gaining more Cold War options.452 
Kennedy’s even-handedness rested largely on the administration’s attempt to allow itself 
time to carry out its rapprochement with Nasser, without putting in jeopardy its economic 
interests in Saudi Arabia, or provoking Israel into pre-emptive attacks against the Arab 
nationalists. Even if the final result of Kennedy’s policies in the Middle East was indeed 
closer ties with both Ben Gurion and Faysal, this work argues that such a result was 
largely unintentional.  
As noted previously, in the minds of the New Frontiersmen, the Cold War 
confrontation in the Middle East gravitated around the challenges with the Arab 
nationalists, and there was clear reasoning behind such firm beliefs. Kennedy had learned 
from Eisenhower that a policy of hostility towards Nasser would be detrimental to US 
interests in the region, because not only would it alienate the Arab population 
(Eisenhower’s 1958 conversation with Nixon about the “people’s campaign of hatred 
against the United States” speaks for itself) but it would also push the Arab nationalists 
into the welcoming arms of the Soviets. As noted earlier, Eisenhower’s refusal to provide 
Egypt with weapons after the 1955 Israeli raid in Gaza, brought the Egyptian leader to 
sign the historic arms deal with Czechoslovakia, opening the road for Moscow’s future 
arms sales to the Arab nationalists.453 The new administration blamed the old one for 
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having pushed Nasser towards the Soviet Union by closing the doors to any collaboration 
with Cairo on the assumptions that Nasser was a “Soviet stooge”454 and that Arab 
nationalism was nothing more than a first step towards communism, and Kennedy thus 
sought to correct such a misguided posture by supporting and feeding Arab nationalism 
in order to guide it in a direction that could serve US interests.455 
There were several reasons behind the administration’s belief that establishing a 
working relationship with the Arab nationalists would be beneficial to Washington’s 
interests in the Middle East. Firstly, because it would offer Nasser an alternative to his 
dependence on Moscow, and would thus reduce the Soviet Union’s influence in the 
region. The Czech arms deal and the Aswan Dam controversy were, in the minds of the 
New Frontiersmen, clear indications of the need to avoid leaving the Cairo government 
with no other options than the Soviet Union. As Komer pointed out in early January 1962, 
“Egypt’s economic troubles are such that if we do not help her she will almost be forced 
to turn even more to Moscow.”456 Secondly, because by embracing the Arab nationalists’ 
desire for emancipation, self-determination and modernization, Kennedy hoped he could 
enhance US prestige among the Arab population and reduce that of the Soviet Union. As 
a report from 1956 had illustrated, the Soviet position was considerably enhanced among 
the Arab people because Moscow “appeared as the defender of the sovereignty of small 
countries and of Arab nationalism against the threats of Western “Imperialism”.”457 
Nasser was the leader of the Arab people, especially after his “victory” during the Suez 
crisis, and by establishing a working relationship with him Kennedy hoped to foster pro-
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American sentiments among the Arab population as well. After all, in 1958 Eisenhower 
himself had concluded, rather too late, that the people were with Nasser.458 Thirdly, 
Kennedy hoped that by gaining leverage on Nasser, he could prevent Cairo’s foreign 
policy from causing troubles with its Arab neighbours or with Israel.459 As noted earlier, 
Eisenhower’s opposition to Nasser ended up alienating the Arab world and fuelling the 
struggle between the old-fashioned, Western-aligned monarchies and the progressive, 
nationalist ambitions of the Arab people, which resulted in a series of crises that in 1958 
hit Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and which Kennedy was determined to avoid.460 Finally, 
on a more global scale, Kennedy hoped to overturn the perceptions that the Third World 
countries belonging to the non-aligned movement had of the United States, in the hopes, 
as noted earlier, of gaining pro-US votes in international disputes, such as Berlin or the 
Nuclear Ban Treaty. The administration was aware that there were little chances of 
bringing Nasser directly “into the Western camp”461 but, seeing the Egyptian leader as 
the centre of gravity in the region, it hoped that by establishing a working relationship 
with Egypt, it could reduce his dependence from the USSR, effectively build up 
neutralism in the region and thus reduce the Soviet influence, and steer the region towards 
a Western-friendly, moderate course that would not endanger US interests.462 
During the short Kennedy presidency, the relations between the two countries 
improved exponentially. They benefited from Washington’s programmes of assistance, 
mainly through the economic aid provided by the PL-480, and Kennedy’s personal 
diplomacy with Nasser, but gradually collapsed over the Yemen affair, an event that 
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showed the unpredictability of the Egyptian leader and the limits of Washington’s 
capability to manoeuvre the big players in the Middle East. The administration lost its bet 
on Nasser, and Nasser lost contact with the most accommodating American president he 
had ever dealt with, marking a bitter ending to his relationship with the United States. As 
a matter of fact, L.B. Johnson would not be a new Kennedy to the government in Cairo. 
In general, the strategy of rapprochement with Egypt was based on the need to 
“get back on a better footing with the key actor of the Arab world”463, and so to steer the 
forces of Arab nationalism away from Moscow and possibly towards the Western world, 
by inculcating “a respect for Western culture”464 that could in the long-term prevent the 
spreading of communist ideology: “Given the undoubted geo-political importance UAR”, 
reads an action memoranda of October 1961, “it appears obvious that we must continue 
to do business with Nasser and the UAR, and make the best of it.”465 Such an approach, 
while inspired by Eisenhower’s 1958 NSC 5820/1, found in Kennedy an innovative 
spokesman who regarded Nasser as the Mr Big of the Arab world, Arab nationalism as 
an unstoppable force capable of re-writing the geopolitical map466 and the US-sponsored 
development of Arab countries as a strategically vital step to undertake in order to defeat 
the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Kennedy broke with the traditional US stand in the 
region of supporting the Arab monarchies over the Arab nationalists, and gave priority to 
those progressive regimes that, as noted above, could better serve the US Cold War 
strategies in the Middle East. Indeed, while some in the administration, such as Hart, 
Macomber, and Feldman, as well as other officers in the State Department and the CIA467 
                                                 
463 Robert Komer, OHI, June 18, 1964, 2. 
464 “Guideline of United States policy and operations toward the United Arab Republic”. JFKL, NSF, Box 
168, UAR, General, 3-62, 5-62. 
465 Memorandum from L.D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, October 16, 1961. JFKL, NSF, Box 332, Policy 
towards Egypt and Syria, 10-16-61. 
466 Kennedy, A Democrat looks…, 44 
467 John Badeau, OHI, February 25, 1969. 
129 
 
believed that “the fragmentation of the Arabs after World War I”468 had become so deep 
that it was impossible to avoid the tumbling of one regime after another despite the 
promotion of economic development, Kennedy embraced the theory that “a general 
consolidation of the Arab world was in process” and that Egypt was going to be “the force 
of attraction” of the entire Arab world. 469 Thus, by fostering a working relationship with 
the Cairo government, the Kennedy administration hoped to gain pro-American 
sentiments across the region to the detriment of the Soviet Union. 
The centrality that the Kennedy administration attributed to Nasser was such that 
all the other actors in the Middle East, or those involved with its affairs, were regarded 
and dealt with in relation to Washington’s policy of rapprochement with Cairo: “France 
will be most unhappy, and even UK and Turkey may need convincing. Such anti-Nasser 
clients as Jordanians and Saudis will also need a lot of reassuring as our plans become 
clearer”470, confessed Komer in January 1962, also pointing out, under Feldman’s advice, 
“the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel.”471 Komer’s reflection is testament to 
the true nature of Kennedy’s even-handed approach in the Middle East. Kennedy made 
sure that for every kindness towards Nasser similar gestures to the other Mideast actors 
would follow, but there was a clear strategic objective behind this. Indeed, Kennedy’s 
even-handedness should not be interpreted as an attempt to merely support any friend in 
the region, but as a strategy designed to foster a new, working relationship with Cairo, 
while simultaneously restraining the other actors from taking actions that could put in 
jeopardy the policy of rapprochement with Nasser. As expressed in a document entitled 
“Guidelines of United States policy and operation toward the United Arab Republic”: 
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“We seek to turn the energies of the UAR government to programs of internal 
development with benefit to the peace and tranquillity of the area… The UAR needs (a) 
strong US able to offset Soviet power and to restrain Israel and other enemies from 
attacking Egypt, and (b) US assistance in modernizing its economy and feeding its people. 
The US should continue efforts to emphasize those areas were mutually beneficial 
cooperation with the UAR is possible, notably in Food for Peace, social development, 
economic development and cultural exchanges… efforts to inculcate a respect for 
Western culture is of prime importance.”472 
 
As noted earlier, the new approach that the administration developed was largely 
influenced by the regrettable experience of the Eisenhower years. Eisenhower’s refusal 
to provide military aid to Cairo led to the 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia. The 
withdrawal of the funding for the Aswan Dam led to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
and to Britain, France and Israel’s tripartite invasion of Egypt. The opposition to Arab 
nationalism led to the crystallisation of anti-American sentiments across the region, the 
enhancement of Soviet prestige and the 1958 wave of nationalism against the Western-
oriented Arab monarchies. Although NSC 5820/1 was designed to correct the American 
strategies by showing support to the Arab nationalists, by late 1958 the relationship 
between the Cairo government and the White House was so strained that it had become 
impossible for Eisenhower to repair nearly six years of misguided policies.   
Kennedy subscribed to the key points of NSC 5820/1, such as the need to develop 
a working relationship with Nasser, to sponsor a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute and to promote social and economic development in the Middle East473, and he 
combined these goals with economic aid provided by the PL-480, his skilful personal 
diplomacy with Nasser and his general support to the Arab nationalists’ cause, the three 
main pillars of his rapprochement with Cairo. Eager to steer Arab nationalism away from 
the Soviet Union in order to respond to more general Cold War objectives, Kennedy also 
hoped that establishing a working relationship with the Egyptian leader would allow the 
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administration to gain some leverage on his foreign policy, restrain him from foreign 
adventures and thus create a more stable Middle East, that would safeguard the Western 
economic interests and shield the region from the communist influence.   
Although the relationship between Washington and Cairo ended on a bitter note 
over the Yemen affair, Kennedy had the merit of being the “first American President who 
really understood the nationalist revolution and the revolution of modernization in the 
underdeveloped areas”, and of keeping the Yemen crisis from becoming a major 
emergency despite the multitude of actors involved and conflicting interests at stake.474 
Although his premature death prevents a full assessment of the long-term effectiveness 
of his policies towards Nasser, the Kennedy administration had effectively managed to 
keep a certain balance in the Middle East while simultaneously accomplishing its Cold 
War objective of developing an enduring rapprochement with Cairo.  
It would be a mistake to interpret Kennedy’s policies towards Israel and Saudi 
Arabia as an attempt to shift the administration’s focus onto more trustworthy allies 
during Nasser’s adventure in Yemen, as argued by Bass.475 By late 1963 the 
administration still believed it could exercise a positive influence on the Egyptian leader’s 
foreign policy. Kennedy sided with Nasser until the New Frontier was “criticized both at 
home and abroad”476 and blocked through Gruening amendment by a Congress unable to 
fully appreciate the benefits of Kennedy’s strategies towards Egypt. The friendship 
between Washington and Cairo during the years of Kennedy ended in fact on Capitol Hill, 
not in the White House.  
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A limping start 
Although he benefited largely from the lessons he learned during his time on 
Capitol Hill during the Eisenhower years, Kennedy struggled to make a fresh and genuine 
start during the early phases of his rapprochement with Cairo. While the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco of April 1961 spread the belief across the Arab world that the new American 
president would in fact “continue to pursue the very same policy which has been 
denounced by the peoples who are fighting for freedom and independence”477, Nasser 
was particularly suspicious of the rumours that the US government was negotiating the 
sale of “arms, tanks and planes to Israel”478, and of the relationship between Kennedy and 
the American Jewish community.479 Indeed, during his time as a senator, Kennedy had 
remarked not only on the importance of securing Western interests in Arab oil, as noted 
in his 1960 book The Strategy of Peace480, but also on the obligation to ensure Israel’s 
survival: “For Israel was not created in order to disappear - Israel will endure and 
flourish”481, he declared in August 1960, garnering the praises of the American Jewish 
community but also the criticism of the Cairo press.482 
Kennedy was however aware of the need to reject the previous administration’s 
two-camp view of the world, the philosophy of which was “either you sign alliance with 
us... or you are a neutralist and ... we don’t trust you”483, and he promptly sought to show 
Nasser that the United States would not oppose the aspirations of the Third World 
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countries: “The United States… is no stranger to the aspirations of other people to true 
liberty and independence”484, he wrote to Nasser shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, 
“Noting your evident interest in this problem, I have therefore considered it useful to 
make clear…my own convictions with respect to the meaning of recent Cuban events.”485 
Nasser’s reply, which arrived at the White House two weeks later, contained words of 
appreciation for Kennedy’s declaration of full responsibility over the Cuban crisis.486 
During the spring of 1961, the administration was presented with a range of 
possibilities that emerged over some rather vague, favourable circumstances, and that 
allowed the US government to launch its policy of rapprochement with Nasser. Indeed, 
after the 1958 crisis, tensions between the Arab monarchies and the Arab nationalists 
appeared to be reducing, Nasser seemed more interested in tackling the severe economic 
crisis that had been afflicting Egypt since early 1961 (mainly caused by a severe reduction 
on both the country’s production and exports – an enormous problem for Egypt’s 
economy487), and severe frictions between Moscow and Cairo had been mounting over 
significant ideological differences between Nasser and Khrushchev since 1958. While 
Nasser was committed to a neutralist path and harboured severe doubts about the political, 
economic and social system in the USSR and communist China488, Khrushchev, irritated 
by the Egyptian-Yugoslav planning of a non-aligned states conference and by Nasser’s 
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incarceration of several key members of the Egyptian communist party489, spoke at length 
of the “inevitability of communism in Egypt” and of the futility of Nasser’s attempt to 
contain it.490 The administration knew that such doctrinal difference could not in itself 
constitute a reason for a major breakdown in USSR-UAR relations, especially given 
Moscow’s leverage on Cairo “resulting from military aid, cotton purchases, high dam and 
economic development credits”491 but it believed that “Soviet-UAR tension… may 
provide [the] US with certain tactical opportunities”492, such as a closer relationship with 
Washington. 
As a matter of fact, eager to preserve close ties with at least one of the two world 
powers so as secure a certain level of foreign aid, Nasser had eventually welcomed 
Kennedy’s presidency despite the rumours of his support for Israel that had accompanied 
his ascent to power493 and, as noted earlier, the clumsy attempt to overthrow the Castro 
regime during the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. A polite and frank 
diplomacy developed between Kennedy and Nasser after the Cuban invasion, which 
revealed the high level of strategic interests that both leaders harboured in each other. 
This diplomacy became one of Kennedy’s main tools in dealing with the Egyptian leader. 
Kennedy justified his actions to the Cairo government by saying that that Castro’s new 
government was violating basic human rights, and that the nature of the Cuban revolution 
was far from Nasser’s genuine nationalist revolution494, and the incident was eventually 
put behind them. Simultaneously, fearing that the rumours of his support for Israel and of 
Ben Gurion’s visit to the White House scheduled for May 30, 1961, could spoil the 
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effectiveness of his rapprochement with Nasser, on the 11th of the same month Kennedy 
wrote to Cairo:  
“In recent weeks I have noted some speculation as to the direction of the policies 
of the new United States administration with respect to the Middle East…  Let me assure 
you… You will find us at all times and all places active in the struggle for equality of 
opportunity”.495 
 
Eager to encourage the rapprochement with Nasser, in June 1961 Kennedy 
instructed his ambassador in Cairo John Badeau, an Arabist “with a long background”496 
and a direct experience in Egypt, to begin the talks by putting controversial issues, such 
as the Palestine question, in an “icebox” and focusing on “points of mutual interest”497: 
“What’s the use of use of starting every conversation with an argument about Palestine; 
we’re not going to change our policy and attitude, and you’re not going to change 
yours”498, Badeau told the Egyptian leader, and much to his surprise Nasser agreed. Such 
an exchange reflects again the centrality of Kennedy’s rapprochement with Nasser for the 
US strategies in the Middle East. The administration was more concerned with making a 
good start with Nasser than it was with imposing its mediation over the controversial issue 
of the Palestinian refugees. Indeed, in early June 1961, Komer made clear that the 
administration should not try to exercise direct pressure on Nasser in order to achieve 
“quick solutions of central problems, such as the Palestine issue”499, but conversely it 
should try to make some gestures towards Nasser in the hope that they could eventually 
set the basis for future understandings. “The new policy is based on long-term rather than 
on short-term calculations… it is in our long-term interests to encourage Egypt to steer a 
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moderate neutralist course”500, Komer told Kennedy in January 1962, pointing out that, 
while a debate on controversial issues such as the Palestinian refugees was likely to 
reduce dramatically the chances of a successful rapprochement, a genuine effort to 
promote the economic development of Egypt through a US-sponsored programme of 
foreign aid could indeed “open a new chapter in US relations with this key neutralist.”501 
Strengthened by such beliefs, in Cairo Badeau tried to push Nasser to focus on the 
economic problems afflicting Egypt rather than on foreign adventures: “If you try to 
involve yourself in the inner working of all the other Arab states, you are going to run 
into trouble after trouble after trouble. Modernize Egypt and you’ve got a place in 
history.”502 
Badeau’s statement reflects much of the administration’s strategy towards Nasser. 
First, the United States would seek to exploit the Egyptian economic crisis in order to 
provide the Cairo government with economic aid that could offer an alternative to its 
partnership with the Soviet Union, already strained by the growing tension between 
Khrushchev and Nasser.503 Second, it would seek to foster a working relationship with 
Nasser, in the hopes that it could “help over [the] long-term in resolving [the] Arab-Israeli 
dispute”504 because, as noted by Komer, “Egypt’s attitude is the key to such a settlement; 
no other Arab state dares get out ahead of Nasser in moving toward a settlement, lest he 
revile it as a traitor.”505 Third, it hoped that “greater reliance on the US would also have 
some restraining influence on UAR policies”,506 which meant that if Nasser was to turn 
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inwards and focus on the economic recovery of Egypt, he would restrain himself from 
foreign adventures across the Arab world. It is also significant to note that, while Nasser 
had made clear to “high-level Western leaders”507 that he did not intend to declare war on 
Israel because he knew “he would be defeated”508the administration had received hints 
from Ben Gurion that it “would help”509 if Nasser was to turn inwards, because it would 
create “conditions of calm”510 that Israel could use to focus on its economic development. 
The administration believed that if it could move Nasser to focus on Egypt’s own 
economic problems, it would indeed contribute towards creating a quieter Middle East: 
“In the short run, the basic positions of the Regime on international issues are not subject 
to much change”, wrote Talbot in May 1960, “but the violence with which they are 
expressed and promoted might be reduced.”511 
However, during the early stages of his rapprochement with Egypt, Kennedy 
struggled to prove the genuine nature of his intentions to Nasser. By late 1960, the 
Egyptian press began to perceive Kennedy’s campaign speeches on Israel and his 
commitment to ensuring its survival as proof that he too would “become a tool in the 
service of Zionist ambitions”512, while the disaster of the Bay of Pigs invasion lingered 
in the back of Nasser’s mind as evidence that Washington had not abandoned its imperial 
designs in the Third World. To complicate things, in early 1961 the Kennedy 
administration was confronted with the issues of the UAR break-up and of the Israeli 
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nuclear facility in Dimona, two events that further contributed to threatening the policy 
of rapprochement with Cairo and revealed the urgency of showing Nasser the good-will 
behind Washington’s policies.  
 
The UAR break-up and Dimona 
Washington’s rapprochement with Cairo suffered straightaway from the 
development of two issues that emerged under circumstances over which the new 
administration had no real control. These put Kennedy in a rather difficult position in 
dealing with an already suspicious Nasser, and tested immediately the administration’s 
determination in bolstering its policy of rapprochement with Nasser. The 1961 UAR 
break-up and the rumours of CIA involvement513, the issue of US recognition of the new 
Syrian regime during September 1961, and the simultaneous revelation of the Dimona 
nuclear programme, a facility that the Israeli government had been building since 1958, 
not only constituted serious threats to the stability of the region (firstly on account of the 
risk that Nasser might restore his leadership over Syria through direct military 
intervention, and secondly because of the fear arms race in the Middle East), but also 
risked spoiling the effectiveness of Kennedy’s overall approach to the region before it 
could even be implemented.   
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The UAR break-up that occurred in late September 1961514, a major setback in 
Nasser’s pan-Arabist ambitions, was accompanied by rumours that CIA agents played a 
role in staging the coup that left the Egyptian leader with no governmental support in 
Syria. Nasser, tormented by the Syrian secession and obsessed with the fear that domestic 
or international players were plotting against him, wondered provocatively why “if 
Kennedy was making new approaches to him... was the CIA working against him.”515 
Over the following days, John Badeau worked hard to prove to him that the rumours of a 
CIA involvement in the secession were unfounded, pointing out that the United States 
had no interest in plotting against him, but it is reasonable to think that, although he might 
have allowed himself to be persuaded, Nasser maintained some scepticism on the matter.  
Evidences show however that the CIA played no role in staging the coup.516 First, 
because Nasser was the key priority in Kennedy’s Mideast agenda, and the administration 
would hardly have risked its rapprochement with Egypt to prompt a new regime in Syria. 
As Komer noted in November 1961, “peace with the largest and most influential country 
of the Arab world”517 was indeed more important than setting up a “volatile” new regime 
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in Syria.518 Second, because the US government believed that a new regime in Syria 
would be detrimental to its strategies, because it was “likely to be affected with same or 
worse chaos and rivalry that existed prior to union.”519 After all, the union between Egypt 
and Syria prevented the Syrian regime from being absorbed into the Soviet orbit, which 
played well with Washington’s strategy of containing communism. Third, because shortly 
after the coup in Syria, CIA director Allen Dulles himself showed genuine surprise as he 
complained that CIA officers had not “adequately forecast the events that occurred… in 
Syria”, and that “it should at least have noted that a coup was being attempted”.520 
In terms of US strategy, the UAR break-up opened up the question of the 
recognition of the new Syrian regime. In an attempt to reduce Nasser’s regional influence, 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan immediately cabled Washington, urging Kennedy to recognise 
the new Syrian regime, which was after all “more pro-Western than [its] predecessor”.521 
However, resisting the temptation to secure Syria among the pro-US regimes and placing 
the rapprochement with Nasser ahead of the hopes of the Arab monarchies, the Kennedy 
administration decided to withhold recognition, aware that only by treating the Egyptian 
leader with the utmost sensitivity could it manage to overcome yet another hindrance in 
its rapprochement with Cairo.522 As pointed out by Rusk:  
“If … [the] US should “jump” to recognition while forgetting trends in the area, 
forgetting its impact upon public opinion in the Arab world, it will be endangering its 
own interests and antagonizing the biggest country in the area (Egypt)”523 
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Furthermore, the administration believed that early recognition of the new regime 
in power would only contribute to estranging the Egyptian leader and increasing his sense 
of isolation, thus pushing him to intervene directly to restore his leadership in Syria. 
Indeed, in early October 1961, Komer pointed out that this would inevitably “open the 
Pandora’s box”524, because if Nasser was provoked into military action to win back Syria, 
there was the possibility that Saudi Arabia and Jordan would move against him, and that 
Israel would try to exploit the situation so as to seize the West Bank.525 Although at first 
the administration believed it was unlikely that Nasser would move into Syria because of 
the military difficulties related to “problems of distance and geography”526, an 
“unequivocal” interception of a conversation between Nasser and members of the 
Egyptian army revealed that the Egyptian leader was indeed “determined to snuff out 
[the] revolt.”527 Thus, while Kennedy advocated further discretion and sensitivity in 
dealing with Nasser, the administration sent telegrams to Jordan and Israel in order to 
“forestall active interference by third parties”528, urging them not to undertake pre-
emptive actions. The administration informed Hussein that his move could “contribute to 
a catastrophe that will engulf area, have unforeseeable outcome for Jordan itself and have 
wider consequences than simple intra-Arab conflict of interests.”529 Likewise, the Ben 
                                                 
524 Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 3, 1961. JFKL, NSF, Box 322, Staff 
Memoranda, Robert Komer, 10-61. 
525 Ibidem. 
526 Memorandum for the record, September 28, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVII, 109. Nasser also 
confessed that “he really felt relieved” by the Syrian secession. Memorandum from Senator Hubert H. 
Humphrey to President Kennedy, October 23, 1961. JFKL, NSF, Box 168, UAR, General, 7-61, 10-61. He 
admitted that he was more concerned about the impact that this would have on his prestige in the Middle 
East than about losing control of a country in which “he never felt at home.” Ibidem. 
527 Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, September 28, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 
XVII, 110. 
528 Memorandum for the record, September 28, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVII, 109. 
529 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, September 28, 1961. FRUS 1961-
1963, Vol. XVII, 111. 
142 
 
Gurion government was asked to use “extreme circumspection in taking internal military 
precautions” and to refrain “from provocative public statements.”530 
Sensing Nasser’s distress, on October 3, 1961, Kennedy sent a warm message to 
Cairo, in which he stated that “decision on recognition of Syrian regime has not been 
undertaken”, and that he still wished to “continue development of fruitful relations on 
both [a] personal and official plane.”531 By the end of the month, as a “result of [a] change 
of heart or [the] inability of advance [his] force [to] gain [a] foothold”532, Nasser 
renounced his ambitions in Syria. It is significant to note that, in terms of US strategies, 
Kennedy had managed to secure the two objectives he pursued during the Syrian crisis. 
On the one hand, he managed to hold off the recognition long enough to please Nasser, 
and although Cairo’s decision to not intervene in Syria cannot be directly attributed to 
Kennedy’s actions, these at least served the purpose of proving the administration’s good-
will to Nasser. On the other hand, Kennedy had also successfully managed to contain 
Jordan and Israel, thus preventing them from undertaking pre-emptive actions Syria that 
could have sparked a war against Egypt. 
When in October 1961 the administration decided to recognise the new Syrian 
government, as there had been reports of Nasser’s “increasing flexibility”533 on the issue, 
Kennedy made sure the decision was conveyed to the Egyptian leader before any official 
statement was made, in accordance with his diplomatic strategy of communicating in 
advance any unpleasant decision. After a meeting with his advisors, the president said: 
“Look, I’m going to have to tell this guy we’re going to have to recognize the new 
government because it is the government that’s in power, but let’s explain our policy”.534 
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Shortly after Badeau informed the Cairo government of the decision and, although the 
Syrian secession was indeed a very bitter moment for Nasser535, the Egyptian president 
sent signals of interest towards Washington’s friendliness. 
In early 1961, the administration was also confronted with another serious 
hindrance to its policy of rapprochement with Cairo and to the preservation of stability in 
the region. The development of the Israeli nuclear facility in Dimona was an issue that 
the Kennedy administration had inherited from Eisenhower, and one that remained on the 
table for the entire duration of his presidency.536 It constituted a severe threat to 
Kennedy’s attempts to foster a working relationship between the United States and Egypt, 
already trembling under the allegations of Kennedy’s support of Israel, the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco and the rumours of CIA involvement in the Syrian coup of September 1961. 
By the beginning of February 1961, Kennedy had already confessed to Rusk his 
concerns about Nasser’s reaction to Israel’s nuclear plan, urging his administration to 
make a “public announcement concerning the peaceful use of the Israeli project”537 
Indeed, even if the administration did not fear an actual nuclear confrontation in the 
Middle East - as it was aware that Israel would not start a nuclear war against the Arabs 
and that the Soviet Union would not provide the UAR (Nasser had kept the name ‘UAR’ 
despite the Syrian secession) with the means to produce nuclear weapons538 - the 
implications of Dimona were nonetheless dangerous for Kennedy’s Mideast strategies. 
One worry was that Israel might use the nuclear deterrent to “press its interests more 
vigorously and be less inclined to give concessions” on a number of “deep-seated disputes 
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which do not seem capable of early solution.”539 Another concern was that if Israel 
acquired nuclear weapons, the Arab world would “blame the United States as well as the 
French for Israeli accomplishments”, exposing the United States to anti-Western 
propaganda while simultaneously jeopardising Western interests in “the transit of the 
Suez Canal and access to the Middle East oil”.540 Finally, it could provoke Nasser into 
acquiring larger and more sophisticated non-nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, thus 
causing the Arab nationalists to shift towards the Communist Bloc, and further 
accelerating the arms race in the region.541 
Unable to force Israel to terminate its nuclear research, the nature of which was 
still peaceful at the time, the administration decided to keep the Arabs constantly updated 
on the issue, and to reassure them that the United States would not allow military nuclear 
development in the region. Indeed, during a meeting with UAR ambassador Kamel held 
in early February 1961, Rusk tried to reassure Cairo that Washington would oppose the 
“spread [of] nuclear weapons” and that it would make “every effort to remain currently 
informed on the status and nature of the Israeli development [in] this field”.542 Despite 
this attempt to reassure the Cairo government, the administration was informed shortly 
afterwards that a furious Nasser had threatened to “mobilize four million men”543 against 
Israel. Such a declaration, which according to Harman, the Israeli ambassador in 
Washington, was caused more by the big around the issue than from a genuine risk of a 
Middle Eastern nuclear war544, nonetheless constituted a serious danger to the American 
goals of both maintaining peace and stability in the region and channelling the Arab 
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nationalists towards a Western-oriented neutralist course.545 Significantly, by taking 
advantage of Nasser’s threat, Harman advanced during the same meeting Israel’s request 
for the HAWK missile system, adjudging that Cairo’s acquisition of Soviet weapons had 
moved Israel “into a state of arms imbalance”546 This argument, however, never fully 
convinced the administration.547 
Ben Gurion’s visit to Kennedy in May 1961 offered a good chance to make 
contact with the Egyptian leader. Bowles cabled Badeau recommending that Ben 
Gurion’s visit be explained to Nasser as an opportunity to “move forward with respect 
to... Israel’s nuclear reactor”.548 After the Israeli leader assured Kennedy that the Dimona 
reactor was used only for peaceful purpose549, Rusk wrote to Nasser that the inspection 
of the nuclear site showed “no evidence that the Israelis have weapons production in 
mind”.550 
Despite the good result of the first inspection, the administration was aware that 
Israel’s nuclear development could produce significant consequences for Washington’s 
strategies, causing Nasser to shift towards the Soviet Union and exacerbating the tensions 
between Arabs and Israelis. In the meantime, the administration sought to exploit the 
propitious moment to move forward its rapprochement with Nasser, made even more 
urgent by these dangerous dynamics developing in the region. 
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Grain for gain: the PL-480 
Once Kennedy had managed to temporarily reassure the Arabs over the Dimona 
issue, to ward off the dangerous allegations of CIA involvement in the UAR break-up and 
to secure Nasser’s permission for the recognition of the new Syrian government, it was 
time to attempt a “limited marriage of convenience with the guy who”, Komer pointed 
out, “is still, and will remain, the Mister Big of the Arab World.”551 
To this end, by late 1961 the administration revived talks on possible foreign aid 
to be distributed to Cairo through the PL-480, a programme of assistance that made 
American grain available to developing countries, which had been offered to Egypt on a 
year-to-year basis since 1955552, and had been interrupted in 1957 and 1958 as a 
consequence of the Suez crisis.553 Even if Kennedy resumed a tool previously adopted by 
the Eisenhower administration, (of course, the rapprochement included other measures, 
such as Kennedy’s personal diplomacy), it was only during his term that a significant 
effort to use the PL-480 to enhance Egypt’s economy was made.  
The administration considered the moment propitious, as the political crisis 
caused by the UAR break-up and the rising tension between Khrushchev and Nasser (an 
article had appeared in the Soviet press in January 1962 hinting negatively at Nasser’s 
crackdown on the communist party in Egypt554) constituted the backdrop to a severe 
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economic crisis afflicting Egypt. The underdevelopment of rural areas, rapid population 
growth, high level of corruption and “unwillingness of industrialists to expand their 
investments in a growing productive system”555, had put Nasser in a position where he 
was dependent on foreign aid.556 The administration was aware of Egypt’s economic 
troubles, and sought to exploit them in order to woo Nasser. If Washington could manage 
to encourage the economic development of the country by sponsoring direct programmes 
of assistance, not only would it have more leverage against the Cairo government and its 
foreign policy, but it would also prove to Nasser the benefits of developing under the US 
umbrella rather than that of the Soviets.  
A talk on the PL-480 had already taken place back in June 1961, during a meeting 
with the UAR ambassador in Washington, Kamel. The Egyptian ambassador confessed 
that if the programme was to be put on a multi-year basis that could allow medium to 
long-term economic planning and save the country’s economy, the relations between the 
United Sates and Egypt would improve greatly.557 In the hope of achieving such a result, 
Washington started to contemplate the possibility of agreeing to Nasser’s request: “We’ve 
come to another crossroad in our relation with Nasser, similar to that over Aswan 
Dam”558, pointed out Komer, bitterly recalling how the awkward withdrawal of the dam’s 
funding had eventually led to the Suez crisis. 
However, as Talbot recalled, one question delayed the administration’s decision: 
“How much carrot do you put out there?”559 Although the PL-480 aid package was 
generally granted on a three-year basis, the administration was more careful in dealing 
with Nasser than with other Third World leaders as, given his unpredictability, no one 
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could be sure how he would use the aid560, nor if his desire for closer ties with the US 
would eventually “trip up and fail at one point or another.”561 If the foreign assistance 
programme was to be made available to gain some influence over Cairo, many thought 
that essentially it would be advisable to keep the year-to-year deal.  
A strong supporter of this viewpoint was William Gaud562of the Agency for 
International Development, who thought that the PL-480 had to remain on a short term 
basis, instead of being made on a three-year arrangement under Nasser’s pressure. Gaud 
feared that Washington would end up losing its leverage on Nasser because it would be 
“much harder for us to cut off the food to his people who needed it badly when we had 
an outstanding agreement” based on a long term programme.563 His position however was 
opposed by other members of the NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs), such as Talbot, 
who believed that a three-year agreement “would help persuade him to do things that we 
wanted him to do”564, such as reducing Cairo’s hostile propaganda against the Arab 
monarchies and Israel, and preventing the country from shifting towards the Soviet 
Union.565 He also feared that a leader as sensitive as Nasser might be offended if 
Washington showed “first class recipients and second class recipients”566 in the making 
of the foreign assistance programmes. Komer too suggested a policy of friendship based 
on genuine help: “As a very important wheel in the Arab and neutralist world, he too 
should get the Kennedy treatment”.567 
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Even Kennedy, backed by an enthusiastic Badeau, believed that a genuine and 
“fresh” effort would eventually “set the stage for better relations.”568 A year-to-year 
agreement could help to improve the political effectiveness of the policy, but it would 
also reduce the long-term economic benefits. If Washington was looking for better 
relations with Cairo, already trembling under the rumours about the Syrian coup and 
Kennedy’s alleged closeness to Israel, it could not manifestly favour its own political 
gains to the detriment of Cairo’s economic benefit.569 
Throughout January and February 1961, the administration was also confronted 
by the Israeli government and the regimes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, who were 
concerned that such a manoeuvre was dictated by Nasser’s pressure and that Kennedy 
was going “too fast and too far”570, as well as by Congress571, who were reluctant at the 
idea of making an effort with Nasser. In addition, rumours about Cairo’s intention to use 
the American aid as a trading tool to obtain weapons inevitably slowed down the entire 
process and contributed to making the effectiveness of a rapprochement with Nasser more 
uncertain in the eyes of a Congress already sceptical about the Egyptian leader. In early 
January 1961, the New York Times published an article after a tip-off from one 
correspondent, in which it stated that they had some information about Nasser’s desire to 
barter the PL-480 cotton supplies “for two new wings of Soviet jet aircraft.”572 In an 
excess of zeal, Kennedy informed Nasser of the difficulties he was experiencing in getting 
Congress to agree on financing a programme of assistance to Egypt, as they believed that 
the Cairo government would use it as a trading tool to get weapons.573 Nasser was 
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particularly offended by the message, and blamed Kennedy for having failed to take into 
consideration the difficult times Cairo was facing.574 However, swallowing yet another 
bitter pill in order to proceed with the negotiations, he informed the administration that 
since mid-1961, the UAR “has been severely restricting its cotton exports to the Soviet 
Bloc” and that he intended to reorient 60% of its export to Western countries.575 Nasser 
was determined to keep “Communism out of the Middle East”, and indeed was aware that 
the American aid was far more appropriate than the Soviet socio-economic model to 
tackle the crisis in Egypt.576 Comforted by Nasser’s position and determined to start a 
new, better relationship with Cairo, the administration decided to acquiesce to Nasser’s 
request of putting the PL-480 on a multi-year agreement.577 
Before making the agreement official, in February 1962 Kennedy sent Chester 
Bowles to Cairo in order to reassure Nasser of Washington’s desire for a long-lasting 
friendship and, more importantly, to see how the Egyptian leader envisioned the 
development of this new relationship.578 The special ambassador was quite impressed 
with Nasser’s cordiality and frankness, but warned Kennedy that “It would be foolhardy... 
to expect Nasser or any likely successor to stop acting like the revolutionary leader that 
he clearly is”.579 Bowles pointed out that Cairo would still “use the Soviets as a source of 
arms or investment whenever it suits their purpose”, exactly as it would do with the US 
and that, having “underestimated the basically revolutionary character of the regime”, the 
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administration’s idea of Nasser was “oversimplified and defective”.580 However, Bowles 
recommended a “skilful, sophisticated, sensitive effort to establish a more affirmative 
relationship” confident that, if treated properly, Nasser would be “likely to meet us more 
than half way.”581 
Harvard economist Edward Mason echoed Bowles’s position, following a trip to 
Cairo conducted shortly afterwards to assess Egypt’s economic requirements. Although 
he was not “too impressed” with the economic planning carried out by Nasser’s 
associates, he too recommended the multi-year agreement.582 In fact, as Nasser’s 
economic policies appeared to be dictated more by “reactions rather than on advance 
planning”583, Mason too believed that, in order to pursue a policy of friendliness and 
cooperation with Egypt, Washington needed to undertake the multi-year PL-480, expand 
technical assistance, increase development lending and thus allow the long-term 
economic planning that Egypt needed.584 
In addition to the overall policy of rapprochement to Cairo, two strategic reasons 
strengthened the administration’s belief that the multi-year agreement was the best course 
of action. The first one was connected to the fact that Soviet agents were spreading 
rumours in Egypt of another “imperialist plot”585 designed by the Arab monarchies, 
London and Washington to overthrow Nasser, which were intended to push Egypt back 
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towards Moscow by aggravating Nasser’s fears and sense of isolation. Knowing that 
“Nasser and his associates are products of the long history of suspicion, fear and 
weakness”586, further exasperated by the events of the UAR break-up, the administration 
concluded that making a fresh effort with the Egyptian leader and proving Washington’s 
good-will was indeed a matter of urgency.587 As Mason pointed out: “the mood right now 
is forthcoming and it would be a mistake not to take advantage of it. If this opportunity 
for meaningful but modest progress is missed it may not soon reoccur.”588 
The second one was connected to the question of Dimona, an issue that, lurking 
in the background of US-UAR relations, further convinced the administration of the need 
to promptly try to turn Nasser inwards while simultaneously restoring his faith in 
Washington. The talks for the PL-480 had given the administration some leverage over 
Cairo’s attitude towards the Israeli nuclear facility. Back in November 1961, when Kamel 
and the Kennedy administration were beginning the negotiations for the PL-480 
agreement, the UAR ambassador had suggested that the Arab-Israeli controversy “should 
be left alone for a time”589 to allow both factions to focus on the aid programme. Already 
by January 1962 things seemed to have quietened down: Rusk informed Kennedy that 
Nasser was moving towards “a more truly neutral position”590 with regards to nuclear 
proliferation and his relations with Moscow, and that he seemed determined to make the 
best of Washington’s friendliness. Thus, when in February 1962 Bowles was sent to Cairo 
for his meeting with Nasser, he took the opportunity to test Egypt’s “attitude toward 
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Dimona Reactor”591, and Nasser’s general intentions of increasing its armament. 
Reporting Nasser’s belief that the Arab-Israeli tensions could be “scaled down... if [the] 
UAR [was] reassured of US intent to help preserve peace”592, the administration decided 
to move forward its negotiations with Cairo, reassuring Nasser of US support to Egypt 
and strongly hinting at the acceptance of the multi-year programme, which would be 
made official in August 1962.593 
Analysing the pros and cons of the new policy towards Cairo, the administration 
concluded not only that the rapprochement would be based on “long-term rather than 
short-term calculations”, and would thus be “quite expensive without many quick 
returns”594, but also that an approach aimed to “modify basic UAR policies” would not 
only be “unproductive but damaging”595, and that any coercive manoeuvre would 
inevitably alienate the Egyptian leader. After all, the experience of the Eisenhower years 
was still fresh in Kennedy’s memory. Nasser could be guided, but he could not be 
manoeuvred. In addition, Komer highlighted the strategic benefit of the improvement of 
the US-UAR relations, as it would offer Washington “more leverage toward promoting 
an ultimate Arab-Israeli settlement than any other course”596, but he also stressed the 
importance of making similar gestures to both Saudi Arabia and Israel. While the first 
was asking for various forms of economic assistance597, the second, alarmed by US 
rapprochement with Cairo, demanded “more tangible reassurance”598 for its bitahon. 
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Concerned by Kennedy’s friendliness towards Nasser, and stressing how the Egyptian 
acquisition of Soviet weapons had caused military imbalance in the region, during his 
visit in May 1962, Israeli Minister of Defence Shimon Peres pressed the administration 
for military aid, listing the HAWK as a “vital element in Israeli military requirements”.599 
It was the beginning of a long negotiation between Washington and the Israeli 
government that, running parallel to the rapprochement with Egypt, brought the Kennedy 
administration to elaborate its quid pro quo policy with the goals of simultaneously 
containing Israel, courting Nasser and attempting a mediation over the refugee issue. 
 
The HAWK sale and the Johnson Plan 
During the spring of 1962, the relationship between Washington and Cairo 
flourished under the ‘Kennedy treatment’. The two presidents had by then established an 
intimate and friendly diplomacy, “practically unique in the history of US-UAR 
relationship”600 and largely appreciated by the Egyptian leader, who started to perceive 
the United States as a positive force in the world of international affairs. Furthermore, 
Nasser appeared to be increasingly committed to focusing on Egypt’s domestic problems 
rather than on his pan-Arabist objectives, and to embracing a Western-oriented model of 
development that incidentally suggested a further parting from Moscow. After having 
denounced the communist ideology, the Egyptian leader accepted the idea of 
decentralization of authority, advocated social reforms, opened the doors to foreign 
investments and even extended “an olive branch to former imperialist countries”.601 Thus, 
already by the summer of 1962, the policy of rapprochement with Nasser seemed to have 
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settled into a working friendship between the two countries: Komer commented “We’ve 
made a score on relations with the key guy of the Arab world. Let’s keep nurturing it”602, 
and taking advantage of the propitious moment, the administration sought to move 
towards some kind of settlement for the refugee issue, the core of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute.603 Indeed, despite the administration’s concern for other issues, such as Dimona 
or the Israeli diversion of the Jordan waters, the refugee problem constituted a central 
issue because, as Robert Komer pointed out in May 1962, “all Arabs love to use the 
Palestine issue as a popular diversion from their own domestic failings”604, and they could 
thus use it as an instrument to “force Nasser into a more actively anti-Israeli policy.”605 
Having pledged during his presidential campaign to “initiate action designed to 
facilitate an Arab-Israel settlement”606, already back in May 1961 Kennedy had 
approached the Egyptian leader over the issue of the refugees.607 A warm letter sent to 
Cairo, in which Kennedy recognised the “deep emotions” involved in the controversy of 
the Palestinian issue, served the purpose of confirming Washington’s desire “to help 
resolve the tragic Palestine refugee problem on the basis of the principle of repatriation 
or compensation for properties”.608 After apologising for his delay in giving a response, 
justified by “the deep and careful consideration”609 that Kennedy’s letter required, Nasser 
wrote an honest but severe reply, arguing that the promise of a Jewish home in Palestine 
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deriving from the Balfour Declaration610 was “a fraud which any tribunal would 
condemn”, deriving from a decision taken by “he who did not own giving to him who did 
not deserve”.611 Nasser also accused Washington of putting “its entire weight”612 in 
support of the Jewish cause in order to win “Jewish votes in the Presidential elections.”613 
The Suez invasion, Nasser continued, provided the best example of Israel’s imperialism 
and it should have made Washington realise that the Arab opposition against it was not 
dictated by ideology, but rather by a concrete fear of aggression. Nasser concluded his 
letter by saying that independence and development were the only keys to solving tension 
in the Middle East and that he was sure that the New Frontier would work towards an 
easing of Arab-US relations. 
Despite Kennedy and Nasser’s mutual decision to put the issue on ice and focus 
on points of mutual interest that could ease the relations between the United States and 
the UAR, from the summer of 1961 the administration quietly started to think about a 
plan to settle the refugee problem, aware that the issue was one of the main obstacles to 
reaching stability in the Middle East. In May 1962, referring to the issues relating to the 
Arab-Israeli disputes, Komer made clear: “We ought to be forehanded in anticipating new 
troubles in the Near East, not just sit back and wait for it.”614 Indeed, as noted earlier, the 
administration feared that the refugee issue could reignite the hostilities between Arabs 
and Israelis, bringing the Arab countries to press Nasser for a more anti-Israel stand (in 
September 1962 the State Department informed the White House that Syria had urged the 
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Cairo government to “arm the refugees in the Gaza sector and in the Arab countries”615 
against Israel) and thus jeopardising Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Egypt by 
forcing Nasser to “queer his relations”616 with the United States and to turn back to the 
Soviets. The administration’s approach to the refugee issue reveals once again that 
Kennedy’s Mideast policy was elaborated in the context of his policy towards Nasser. 
Kennedy hoped to bolster his rapprochement with Nasser by adopting a “quiet 
diplomacy”617 to remove the refugee issue from causing friction not only between Arabs 
and Israelis, but between Arab states as well. 
In March 1961, Kennedy talked to Feldman about the possibility of elaborating a 
plan and, having learned that a private discussion with Nasser and Ben Gurion would 
“perhaps lead to some kind of solution”618, Kennedy decided to rely on Badeau for the 
talks with the Cairo government and on Feldman for those with the Israeli leaders.619 In 
August 1961, after a preliminary conversation with the Egyptian leader, the ambassador 
confessed that Nasser’s position would probably depend on “his mood and feelings at the 
moment the question arises”, adding however that “a proper approach to Nasser is the 
obvious starting point”.620 Thus, when in the spring of 1962 the relationship between 
Washington and Cairo had reached its highest point due to the Kennedy treatment, the 
administration decided the time was right to attempt the elaboration of a plan. 
After having learned that Nasser was coming under mounting criticism from 
Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for having adopted an allegedly softer line with Israel in 
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exchange of US economic aid, particularly with regards to the refugee issue621, Kennedy 
tried to promote some sort of settlement to the Palestine question in the hopes of 
preventing the refugee issue from jeopardising his rapprochement with Nasser. In May 
1962, Dr Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 
flew to Cairo in the guise of special representative of the UN Conciliation Commission 
for Palestine, and in a “uniformly friendly atmosphere” the two spoke for two hours about 
a possible plan for the refugees, agreeing on the importance of starting some sort of 
negotiation.622 Stressing the importance of having most of the refugees returning and of 
creating “a Palestine in which Jews and Arabs would have equal rights”623, Nasser 
appeared much more favourable to discussing the Johnson plan than any other Arab party: 
the representatives of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria were for example among the most 
sceptical, making clear that they “would not accept that Israel would have last word”624, 
while the Egyptian leader had at least “promised to give further thought to [the] Johnson 
Plan”.625 
Although Nasser seemed willing to discuss the Johnson plan, the final draft of 
which was presented on August 7, 1962, on the Israeli side things looked much more 
difficult, as Ben Gurion feared that a massive number of Arabs would choose repatriation 
over resettlement.626 Thus, having agreed to sell the HAWK in order to forestall Israel’s 
active defence, on August 14, 1962, the administration decided to link the HAWK sale to 
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the Johnson plan, in the hope of exploiting Israel’s bitahon to persuade Ben Gurion to 
accept the plan for the refugees.627 
From the Israeli side, the HAWK sale could not have come at a better moment, as 
in July 1962 Nasser had fired the first rocket built with the help of German scientists, 
brought to Cairo in order to develop rockets and aircraft.628 But from a military point of 
view the issue was nothing more than “a tempest in a teapot”, not only because they were 
“very poor rockets” but also because it was clear that the German scientists were focusing 
on air frames and engines for aircrafts and not so much on rockets.629 The Kennedy 
administration knew that the chief reason behind Nasser’s decision was his desire to 
reduce Egypt’s dependence on Soviet’s military equipment630, but it was also aware of 
Ben Gurion’s obsession with the Arab threat and of the need to enhance Israel’s security 
with the goal of containing it and forestalling its “active defense”.631 Thus, responding to 
Kennedy’s quid pro quo policy, in August 1962 the Johnson plan was eventually tied to 
the HAWK sale. 
In accordance with his personal diplomatic technique, Kennedy sent Nasser a sort 
of preliminary letter, in which he stated that he would have Badeau discuss with him some 
“hot” topics, but that he could be reassured that “there is involved no change in United 
States policy toward the United Arab Republic”632. Hoping to make Nasser “more 
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cautious about further Soviet arms deal”633, the administration agreed to justify the 
HAWK sale in light of the “UAR acquisitions of new types of equipment”634 from the 
Soviet Union. However, the real strategy behind the HAWK sale was clear: 
“The main problem … was the danger that if a serious imbalance of vulnerability 
should develop it would create a real temptation to pre-emptive attack. This, rather than 
whether there was a defense “gap” on either side of the Arab-Israel quarrel, was seen as 
the central problem.”635 
 
Much to Kennedy’s surprise, Badeau registered “practically no reaction in 
Egypt.”636 The ambassador informed Washington that there had been “no newspaper 
attacks, no artificially created crowds”637and, perhaps even more oddly, that Nasser even 
expressed some sort of appreciation for Kennedy’s sensitivity: “Of course, I don’t like 
this. You knew I wouldn’t like it, but I’m grateful to have been told.”638 Arguably, 
Nasser’s need for American economic aid prevailed over his concern at the Israeli 
acquisition of such advanced defensive weaponry. Furthermore, during his meeting with 
Badeau on August 24, 1962, Nasser expressed more concern about the political 
repercussions that Kennedy’s decision would have across the Arab world than about the 
military significance of the HAWK. He commented that the argument of the need to 
balance out Cairo’s acquisition of Soviet weapons was unfounded because his non-
aggressive policy towards Israel had made “increased defensive capacity [of] 
Israel irrelevant”639, and he stressed his concern at the “intra-Arab propaganda” accusing 
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him of adopting a softer line with Israel in exchange for US economic aid.640 Although 
contained in his reaction, Nasser concluded his meeting with Badeau with a warning:  
“the American or Western sale to Israel of any kind of missiles even those known to be 
purely defensive would be countered by [the] Soviet offer of [a] variety missiles to Arab 
states”.641 He implied that the responsibility for an arms race in the Middle East would 
thus lie with Washington’s decision.  
During the following weeks, the administration pursued its quid pro quo policy in 
attempts to secure some sort of agreement over the Johnson plan before the news of the 
HAWK sale leaked into the press and caused Washington to lose its leverage over Israel. 
However, that hope did not last long. If during the month of August Nasser appeared 
“moderate and slightly encouraging”642 towards the plan, Ben Gurion had managed to 
delay the process by aggravating and appealing the problem of the quota of refugees that 
would repatriate or resettle. Eventually, by late September 1962, the news of the HAWK 
sale leaked, and the press announced to the world that the United States would sell the 
HAWK to Israel. As discussed in Chapter 4, when the news became public, Israel closed 
the doors to the Johnson plan.  
The Arabs reacted to the news of the HAWK sale fiercely. Radio Baghdad 
labelled Washington’s policy as aggressive, newspapers in Jordan regarded it as a 
“disgraceful attempt to support the entity of the Jews”643, while words of condemnation 
and surprise arrived from Lebanon, Tunisia, Kuwait, India and Pakistan. Moscow 
immediately accused the United States of favouring Israel and of threatening the peace 
and stability of the Middle East, and even Nasser eventually wondered with some dismay 
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if the US government was so infiltrated by Israeli agents “that no policies could be 
evolved in secret.”644  
The Yemen crisis, which exploded in late September 1962, diverted everyone’s 
attention from the issue of the HAWK sale. Nasser engaged in a proxy war against the 
Arab monarchies in Yemen, and the controversy over the HAWK missile system fell 
under the radar. The same destiny awaited the Johnson plan, since, after Israel’s definitive 
refusal to subscribe to Johnson’s “repatriation or resettlement with compensation” 
formula, the administration decided to adopt a policy of non-commitment towards the 
plan, and so to avoid the embarrassment of pushing a proposal that had been refused by 
both Arabs and Israelis. The refugee issue was eventually consigned to talks within the 
United Nations645, while during the last year of the Kennedy presidency the 
administration became more “involved in other more pressing questions of US-UAR 
relations.”646 Significantly for the US strategies, the quid pro quo policy did not work, 
but the administration could at least be reassured that its policy of rapprochement with 
Cairo had not been jeopardised by the sale of the HAWK. 
The administration’s approach to the Johnson Plan and the HAWK sale reveals 
once again a critical aspect of Kennedy’s strategy, which is the centrality of the policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser. Indeed, Kennedy’s attempt to tackle the refugee issue should 
not be interpreted as an effort aimed at taking advantage “of whatever regional openings 
he could find or create”647in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute, but as a strategy 
designed to bolster his rapprochement with Nasser. Bass is correct when he argues that 
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Kennedy did not try to solve the refugee issue as much as he tried to circumscribe it648, 
but he misinterprets this approach as an effort to gain “more Cold War options in the 
Middle East.”649 
Kennedy’s mediation over the refugee issue derived from his attempts to shield 
Nasser from inter-Arab propaganda. During a meeting at the White House on August 21, 
1962, Robert Strong, director of the office of Near Eastern affairs, told Kennedy that 
Nasser was under “quite serious attack from the Saudis, from the Jordanians and from the 
Syrians”650 for having allegedly liquidated the Palestinian issue in exchange for US 
economic aid. As expressed in Komer’s memorandum to Feldman, sent in May 1962, the 
Arabs used propaganda around the refugee issue to divert popular attention from domestic 
social and economic problems, and their attacks against Nasser risked bringing the UAR 
into a more active anti-Israel and anti-US policy.651 Given that the entire focus of 
Kennedy’s Mideast policy was Nasser, the New Frontiersmen sought to protect their goal 
of fostering a working relationship with Cairo by attempting mediation over the refugee 
issue. But Kennedy himself was quite sceptical about the Johnson plan, declaring during 
the same meeting: “I don’t see how it’s possibly going to work.”652 It should not come as 
a surprise that when the Johnson plan started to tremble under the opposition from both 
Arabs and Israelis, Kennedy did not hesitate to disengage from it. When the Yemen crisis 
exploded, the administration shifted its focus towards more immediate concerns, while 
on his side Nasser sought to regain the prestige lost after the Syrian secession by 
committing Cairo to the YAR independence.  
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Similarly, the administration did not decide to sell the HAWK missile system 
because of a military imbalance in the region653, let alone to force Ben Gurion’s hand into 
accepting a plan that even Kennedy was not too sure of.654 The decision to sell the HAWK 
to Israel was once again in the context of the policy of rapprochement with Nasser. 
Because of Kennedy’s pro-Nasser policy, the administration concluded that “some kind 
of satisfactory reassurance to Israel is the essential obverse of our policy towards 
Nasser”655, an approach that the administration would return to during the Yemen crisis, 
when in 1963 it allowed the first US-Israeli joint talks on the security of the region.  
 
Yemen Crisis and “Disillusion” 
The military coup that overthrew the Yemeni monarchy of Imam Mohammed al-
Badr in September 1962656, and that brought to power a pro-Nasser regime led by Colonel 
Abdullah Sallal, opened a fourth phase of US-Egypt relations, one which Heikal called 
“Disillusion”657, as it was indeed defined by a mutual sense of distrust and 
disenchantment that gripped both leaders until the very end of their relationship. Because 
of the multitude of regional actors involved, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and 
Israel, as well as international actors such as Britain and the Soviet Union, Kennedy and 
Nasser found themselves progressively more entwined with their own personal priorities 
and objectives, realising that an insurmountable divergence had emerged because of the 
incompatibility of their goals. It was however Congress, not Kennedy, that decided to end 
the policy of rapprochement, when in November 1963 it amended the foreign aid bill, 
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terminating the programme of foreign economic assistance to the UAR. Kennedy’s 
reaction to the amendment658 is testament to the president’s desire to keep open the door 
for Nasser. Tragically, he would be assassinated only two weeks later.  
In a region shaken by the new wave of Nasserism triggered by the coup in Yemen, 
the Kennedy administration soon found itself juggling on the one hand the need to protect 
the Saudi oil fields, to secure the British interests in the Aden port and to defend Jordan 
from a possible Israeli move to seize the West Bank, and on the other the need to bolster 
its rapprochement with Cairo by supporting the new, republican regime in Yemen. 
Shortly after the coup, on October 4, 1962, the administration received reassuring words 
from Yemen’s Prime Minister Sallal, who stated that his intention was to focus on internal 
economic reform, maintain independence from outside influence, refrain from “foreign 
adventures” and establish friendly relations with Saudi Arabia.659 Such principles were 
dear to Kennedy, who had focused his Mideast policy on the promotion of Arab 
nationalism, self-determination and modernization, especially if these would replace 
stagnant and traditional Imamates like the one of Yemen.  
For his part, Nasser took advantage of the coup to regain prestige in the region. 
Driven by his pan-Arabist ambition, which was sparked again by the coup against the old 
Yemeni monarchy, the Egyptian leader saw in the events of Yemen a perfect opportunity 
to move past the devastating UAR break-up, to redeem his popularity in the Arab world 
by supporting the nationalists in Yemen, and by resuming the Arab fight against Britain’s 
colonialist desires, represented by its possession of the Aden port. On a more practical 
level, Nasser was also facing serious troubles in Egypt itself, as members of the Free 
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Officers had started to challenge his foreign policy, urging him to fill the vacuum left by 
the Syrian secession.660 
The crisis soon evolved into a civil war, with the royalists on one side supported 
by Saudi Arabia and Britain, and the republicans on the other supported by Egypt and the 
Arab nationalists. The Soviet Union, trying to make the best use of the crisis to get back 
into Nasser’s good books, extended support to Cairo, warning all the other parties to 
“keep ‘hands off’ Yemen”661, while the United States, committed to the defence of its 
economic interests in Saudi Arabia and those of Britain in Aden, tried to mediate between 
all the factions involved without jeopardising its rapprochement with Nasser.662 
When the issue of the recognition of the new republican government in Yemen 
emerged, the Kennedy administration reached a crossroad. Britain, Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia urged Kennedy to delay the recognition and stop aiding the UAR, charging 
Nasser’s involvement with being provocative and dangerous.663 Israel demanded 
reassurances as to Cairo’s intentions664, while Congress started to wonder how much 
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longer the Egyptian leader could be tolerated.665 However, very few in the US 
administration wished to reverse the positive trend that had been developing in the US-
UAR relations by refusing to recognise the new regime, which also happened to be in line 
with Kennedy’s idea of a progressive and modern Middle East. Seeking to ease the 
tensions, on November 17, 1962, Kennedy wrote a personal letter to Nasser, in which he 
urged him to promptly withdraw Egypt’s troops from Yemen and proceed with 
disengagement, an action that he guaranteed would be reciprocated by Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan.666 Nasser replied a few days later, stating that his involvement in Yemen was a 
consequence of Saudi Arabia’s attack on the will of the Yemeni population, but he also 
manifested interest in cooperating with Washington.667 
Three reasons brought Kennedy to recognise the new government on December 
6, 1962. First of all, the administration still perceived Nasser as the key to enhancing 
Washington’s prestige in the Arab world and among the other international neutralist 
leaders. It believed that by extending recognition to the new regime it could placate 
Nasser and encourage all factions to disengage, thus preventing the risks of deepening the 
crisis, endangering the Saudi oilfields and causing an explosion of popular anti-
Americanism in the region. Second, the Soviet Union had already gained ground in the 
region by granting prompt recognition to Sallal’s new government.668 All the work done 
until that moment to shield the region from the Soviets by steering the nationalists away 
from Moscow, could be jeopardised by refusing or delaying the recognition. Third, 
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Kennedy and his administration were getting tired of supporting “old Kings against 
Republicans”669and of being associated with old-fashioned, backwards clients.670 
Thus, when in early December 1962 the United States decided to extend formal 
recognition to the Yemen Arab Republic671, Nasser’s response seemed to give credit to 
Kennedy’s strategies. On December 14, 1962, Cairo stated that since “the Yemen Arab 
Republic has firmly established itself” it was now ready to “undertake a reciprocal 
expeditious disengagement and phased removal of its troops from Yemen”.672 
On December 19, 1962, the recognition was made official. A few days later 
Kennedy wrote to Nasser, emphasizing the need “to reach an understanding among the 
parties involved in the current conflict in Yemen”673 and hoping that Nasser would keep 
his promise. Shortly after however, the administration was informed that on December 
31, 1962, a new UAR raid had taken place, this time against the city of Najran, in Saudi 
soil.674 Although the new raid was allegedly provoked by the deployment of 15,000 
Saudi-supported royalist troops near Najran675 and by the fact that Britain was mounting 
a progressively more hostile attitude towards the republican government676, the 
administration began to fear that Nasser’s interest was extending beyond the objective of 
ensuring Yemen’s self-determination. As the incident “created new difficulties in 
resolving the Yemen conflict”, Washington promptly informed Cairo that it would 
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consider “any attack on that integrity as damaging to direct US interests”677 and asked 
Badeau to investigate if Nasser was really after the Saudi oil. The Egyptian leader denied 
it promptly.678 During the meeting, in which the ambassador underlined the nature of US 
commitment to protecting Riyadh, Nasser made clear: “I know you’ve got oil interest[s]. 
I’m not after the oil of Saudi Arabia”.679 The same statement was repeated a couple of 
months later when, in March 1963, after Kennedy had sent Ellsworth Bunker as a special 
ambassador to mediate between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Nasser told him that the rumours 
about him marching into Saudi Arabia’s oilfields “were nonsense” and that he went to 
Yemen for a whole different reason.680 Arguably, much of Nasser’s commitment in 
Yemen derived from his attempt to regain prestige after the UAR break-up rather than 
from an actual military effort to invade Saudi Arabia. Indeed, while on the one hand it is 
hard to believe that Nasser would have disregarded the American and British interests in 
Saudi Arabia, or that he would have risked losing Kennedy’s support, on the other it is 
plausible to argue that his campaign in Yemen was aimed at restoring his prestige in the 
Arab world after the 1961 Syrian secession, and at countering Arab propaganda against 
his allegedly soft line on the Palestinian question.681 Even the administration did not 
believe that Nasser would venture into Saudi Arabia: “UAR bombings are designed to 
pressure [the] Saudi Arabia government to move rapidly towards cessation [of] aid and/or 
to stimulate [the] United States government into increased efforts so to persuade [the] 
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Saudi Arabia government”682, reported Badeau in January 1963, while in March the CIA 
confirmed that Nasser would be “concerned about [the] United States reaction” should 
something happen to Saudi Arabia.683 
However, as events in Yemen appeared to be escalating, such conjectures began 
to be insufficient. The Kennedy administration found itself under mounting pressure from 
Britain, Israel, the Arab monarchies and even the American oil companies, over its 
support for a leader whose actions were threatening the stability of the region and the 
multitude of Western interests. Representatives from ARAMCO, Texaco, Gulf Oil and 
others oil giants, “violently anti-Nasser in their policy”684, made clear that they were “very 
unhappy”685 with the course of Kennedy’s policy in Yemen and advocated an end to the 
policy of rapprochement. During a meeting held in the White House on January 28, 1963 
between Robert Komer and Kermit Roosevelt of Gulf Oil, the administration was 
informed that the oil companies were indeed rather sceptical about turning Nasser inwards 
because, as Roosevelt commented, “each time Nasser has tried this, he has found it so 
frustrating (because of the enormity of the problem) that he has turned back to foreign 
adventures.”686 In response, Komer tried to explain to the oil representative that it would 
be “folly not to cultivate decent relations with him” because such a course of action would 
leave Nasser an “exclusive client of the Bloc.”687 But despite Komer’s words, Roosevelt 
walked away unconvinced.688 
The Egyptian leader was indeed making it difficult for the administration to justify 
its UAR policy in light of the events taking place in the Middle East as a consequence of 
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the new wave of Nasserism that fuelled the regional disputes in the period between 1962 
and 1963. By April 1962, King Hussein of Jordan was trembling under the threat of a 
Nasserite coup caused by violent uprisings, which the administration also feared could 
open the doors to an Israeli invasion of the West Bank and thus spark an Arab-Israeli war. 
Saudi Arabia feared both direct military action from Cairo as well as internal uprisings.689 
Congress, Ben Gurion and the oil companies feared for both the security of Israel as well 
as for the Arab oilfields. Britain feared for its possession of Aden. All these players 
advocated an end to Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with Nasser, arguing that the 
events were proving that despite the “Kennedy treatment” the indomitable Egyptian 
leader was above all guided by his pan-Arabist ambitions and by threatening objectives 
of foreign policy. Yet even though all the actors involved had their reasons to be alarmed 
and to press Kennedy to overturn his approach to Cairo, the administration still believed 
that Nasser was the key to a more secure Middle East, as only he could ease the tensions 
in the region by starting to withdraw his troops from Yemen and by focusing back on the 
modernization of Egypt. Once again, the administration was not inclined to reverse the 
positive trend that it had managed to develop through the “Kennedy treatment”, and it 
also feared that a policy of hostility would only provoke Nasser to escalate his foreign 
adventures while simultaneously causing an explosion of anti-Americanism in the 
region.690 
However, acknowledging the difficulty of getting Cairo to disengage from Yemen 
and the importance of pacifying the other factions involved in the crisis, the 
administration decided to adopt a different line, moving from carrot to “stick”691 in the 
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hope of bringing Nasser’s “policies and actions within tolerable limits”692, and placating 
the domestic and international actors who were mounting increasing attacks on the US 
stance. Komer suggested Kennedy send a blunt letter to Nasser, in the hopes that “a few 
harsh words” would move the Egyptian leader to a more conciliatory position.693 On 
January 19, 1963, Kennedy expressed his disappointment to Cairo: after outlining that 
Washington’s policies were not designed “to support Saudi policies in Yemen”694, the 
president made clear that the “mutually promising relationship” they had tried to establish 
was being jeopardised by the events of Yemen, as every time the administration had the 
feeling they were “making some progress toward disengagement” Nasser’s reaction had 
set everything back.695 Kennedy finished however with a note of hope: “Many people in 
both of our countries question whether good relations between us are really possible. I 
think they are wrong, but it is up to us to prove them wrong.”696 
Even if during a follow-up meeting with Badeau held in late January 1963, Nasser 
reaffirmed that he had no intention of overthrowing Saudi Arabia’s regime, and that it 
was in “no one’s interest”697 to prolong the conflict, by the beginning of February 1963 
the administration was still receiving information that Nasser was reinforcing his troops 
in Yemen.698 Thus, in mid-February 1963, Kennedy approved operation HARD 
SURFACE699, a “politico-military reassurance of a plate glass fighter squadron" aimed at 
deterring Nasser from moving against Saudi Arabia and at reassuring Faysal of the 
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American support.700 Despite Kennedy’s manoeuvres and diplomatic efforts, by late 
November 1963, the conflict in Yemen was nowhere near resolution.   
Was HARD SURFACE the moment at which Kennedy’s rapprochement with 
Nasser began to crumble or, as Warren Bass puts it, at which Faysal managed to reinforce 
“the centrality of the House of Saud to American diplomacy”701 to the detriment of 
Kennedy’s rapprochement with Cairo?  
Significantly, Feldman argued in his Oral History Interview that from that 
moment Kennedy began to think that Nasser was “completely untrustworthy” and that he 
should not have believed “anything he said.”702 From the day of Sallal’s seizure of power 
in September 1962 until that tragic November of 1963, the administration had received 
various reassurances from Nasser, such as that he would “reduce his commitment to 
Yemen” or that he would “let the Yemenis rule themselves”, but his course of action 
eventually moved Kennedy to think that “what Nasser was saying bore no relationship to 
what he was thinking”703 According to Feldman, Kennedy even regretted his decision to 
recognise Yemen, but it was one decision that he could not take back.704 
In truth, whether Kennedy changed his personal opinion about Nasser or not, his 
overall strategy in the region remained largely unchanged. During the last year of 
Kennedy’s presidency, and despite the difficulties of bringing the factions to disengage, 
the administration was still convinced of the importance of its policy of rapprochement 
with Nasser for the American strategies in the Middle East. 
Indeed, Komer’s memorandum to the president, dated February 21, 1963, shows 
that the strategies towards Cairo still prevailed over Riyadh’s concerns: “to commit 
                                                 
700 Robert Komer, OHI, September 3, 1964, 1, 2. 
701 Bass, Support Any Friend…, 4. 
702 Myer Feldman, OHI¸ July 29, 1967, 507, 508. 
703 Ibidem. 
704 Ibidem, 509. 
174 
 
ourselves to take on Nasser in defense of Faysal's right to intervene covertly in Yemen 
seems folly”705, he told Kennedy, pointing out that if the administration shifted towards 
the royalist side, it would lose prestige in the Arab world, turn Nasser back to the Soviet 
Union, and show Faysal that Washington would “bail him out of his scheme to bleed 
Nasser in Yemen”706 “True, Nasser may still try greater pressure on Saudis”, continued 
Komer “but Faysal is asking for it.”707 Komer concluded by saying that it was important 
to “make any commitments to Faysal dependent on his willingness to play ball.”708 
This memorandum reveals three important aspects of the administration’s 
approach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the context of the Yemen crisis. First, it shows 
that Cold War objectives still prevailed in the minds of the New Frontiersmen. The 
administration was still committed to enhancing US prestige in the Arab world by 
supporting Sallal’s regime, rather than supporting an Imamate that “would be unpopular 
with most Arabs except Faysal and Hussein.”709 Second, it demonstrates that the Kennedy 
administration was still committed to steering Nasser away from the Soviet Union by 
showing him support rather than adopting policies that could antagonise him: “he can 
cause a lot more trouble if he's against us than if we have an "in" with him”710, remarked 
Komer, perhaps the strongest supporter of Kennedy’s Nasser strategy. Third, it shows 
that what might be interpreted as a shift towards Saudi Arabia caused by the 
administration’s realisation of Nasser’s unreliability in Yemen, was in truth a strategy 
primarily designed to gain leverage on Faysal in the context of Kennedy’s policy towards 
Cairo. Indeed, operation HARD SURFACE is not evidence of Kennedy’s 
                                                 









acknowledgement of the impossibility of carrying out the rapprochement with Nasser, 
nor should it be interpreted as Faysal’s success in establishing Saudi Arabia as main focus 
of the White House’s strategies in the Middle East. Kennedy was not willing to interrupt 
his policy towards Egypt, let alone replace Nasser with the Saudi royal family. Until 
Congress approved the Gruening amendment, just two weeks before Kennedy’s 
assassination, the US administration worked unrelentingly to preserve its policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser while simultaneously trying to contain the Yemen crisis in 
order to secure the oil interests in Saudi Arabia. But HARD SURFACE was a “purely 
political effort”711 designed to deter Faysal from prolonging his military operations in 
Yemen, not a testament to Kennedy’s willingness to abandon his policy of rapprochement 
with Nasser and to transform Saudi Arabia into an American proxy in the region. Kennedy 
tried to bolster his strategies towards Nasser until the relationship between Cairo and 
Washington crumbled under pressure from Congress.  
On October 19, 1963, Kennedy sent a frank letter to Nasser, the last missive of 
their extensive correspondence. Kennedy revealed his bitterness “over the UAR's 
failure… to carry out its part of the Yemen disengagement agreement”712 and confessed 
that, as the US government was being “criticized both at home and abroad”, the 
administration’s “policy of friendly collaboration in areas of mutual interest with the 
UAR” was becoming more and more uncertain. Yet even so, Kennedy ended with a note 
of hope, proving once again that the end of the New Frontier’s attempt to do business 
with Nasser did not rest with the White House: “I continue to believe in this policy… The 
alternative… could not but lead to a situation in which the US and UAR, instead of 
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moving closer together, would drift further apart.”713 Disappointments aside, Kennedy 
was not yet ready to turn his back on Nasser. 
Nasser, however, was less sanguine. According to Heikal, after having learned of 
rumours about a possible interruption of the PL-480, the Egyptian president had 
concluded that “although Kennedy had come with new ideas” he was after all imposing 
them with “ruthless means and… without any sense of direction”.714 But more than with 
Kennedy, Nasser’s frustrations lay with Congress, as on November 7, 1963, it amended 
the foreign aid bill with a formula that allowed the US to withhold foreign aid “to any 
country that the President determined was engaging in or preparing for aggressive 
military action against the United States or any country receiving U.S. assistance.”715 As 
a result, during a meeting between Nasser and Badeau held on November 8, 1963, the 
Egyptian president spent most of the time “speaking bitterly and at length against the 
American tactics of using aid to put pressure on him”, ending the conversation saying that 
“he would have to go back to 1957.”716 
But November was also the month of Kennedy’s assassination. His policy in the 
Middle East came to a bitter end, leaving the burden to his vice, L.B. Johnson. 
Significantly, Nasser was shocked by the news of Kennedy’s assassination. Despite the 
growing distrust between the two presidents, he and his people were “genuinely grieved.” 
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Arriving at the office, he said: “My God, why have I dressed, why have I come here? 
There is nothing any of us can do about it”.717 
Although the relationship between the two presidents ended on a sour note, 
Nasser’s sorrowful words reveal however a certain degree of closeness and faith unique 
in the history of US relations with Cairo. Kennedy had indeed managed to establish closer 
ties with the Egyptian leader and to overturn the role that the United States had played 
until that moment with the key player in the Middle East, reducing the influence of the 
Soviet Union by steering the forces of Arab nationalism away from Moscow, and by 
focusing on the US-sponsored programmes of economic development and modernization. 
Much more than Eisenhower, Kennedy had tried to implement a program of foreign 
assistance that could really help the Cairo government tackle the economic issues of 
Egypt, agreeing to a multi-year basis deal that could allow that long-term economic 
planning needed by the government. Kennedy’s ability to seduce Nasser through the PL-
480, his personal diplomacy and his support of Arab nationalism, allowed the 
administration to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute on ice, despite the numerous hindrances 
that it had encountered and the implementation of hazardous policies such as the HAWK 
sale of 1962, while simultaneously convincing Nasser that the New Frontier would not 
repeat the mistakes of the previous administration. 
The nature of Kennedy’s policy towards Cairo was significantly innovative for 
the region, as it was based on an attempt to gently guide the Egyptian leader to a Western-
oriented neutralist course rather than forcefully pushing him in one direction through the 
making of alliances and the use of threats. Kennedy was the first president to clearly break 
with the assumption that Arab nationalism would favour the diffusion of communism and 
to acknowledge and support the existence of the third pole of non-aligned countries, 
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enhancing US prestige in the region by overturning Arab portrayal of Washington as an 
imperialist force in the Middle East that had prevailed since the early 1950s.  
It is also important to acknowledge that, although Kennedy’s policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser was punctuated by highs and lows, the administration had a 
clear, pragmatic idea of what could and could not be gained from Nasser. As expressed 
in Komer’s memorandum to Kennedy, dated January 15, 1962, the policy towards Egypt 
was admittedly based on a long-term programme with scarce short-term benefits. Ever 
the pragmatist, Komer told Kennedy: “despite the inevitability of further ups and downs 
in US-Egyptian relations, it is in our long-term interest to encourage Egypt to steer a 
moderate neutralist course.”718 The tragedy of Kennedy’s overtures to Egypt lies with the 
fact that the New Frontiersman did not live long enough to see the long-term benefits of 
his strategy, but only to experience the disappointments of its short-term costs. But despite 
the Yemen quagmire, by late 1963 the Kennedy administration was still convinced that 
the policy of rapprochement with Nasser could not be jeopardised by the interests of 
Nasser’s enemies: “We make people more, and not less, nationalistic by actions which 
seem to them to be ‘neo-colonial pressure’”719, Bundy told Senator Fulbright a few days 
after the amendment passed Congress, a statement that reflects perfectly the 
administration’s evaluation of Congress’s decision. Indeed, it was Capitol Hill, not the 
White House, which ended the history of Washington’s attempt to do business with 
Nasser. Kennedy never believed, as Bass argues, that “risking Nasser's friendship over a 
deepening American special relationship with Israel was not risking much at all”720, nor 
was he convinced that a friendship with Faysal would give him “more Cold War options 
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in the Middle East.”721 The policy of rapprochement with Nasser remained at the top of 
the administration’s agenda as part of both a regional strategy, and a more comprehensive 
Third World strategy, designed to contain communism. Nasser was the only Cold War 
option for Kennedy, which meant that the policies towards Saudi Arabia and Israel were 
elaborated in the context of the rapprochement with Cairo, not the other way around. 
It is hard to say what would have happened if Kennedy had lived, but arguably 
many of his strategies had allowed the administration to temporarily reduce Moscow’s 
influence in the region, ant to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute at bay while even attempting 
mediation over the refugee issue. Indeed, even if Kennedy benefited from very favourable 
circumstances over which the New Frontier had no real influence, such as for instance 
the friction between Nasser and Khrushchev, he was able to seize the opportunities that 
were presented before his eyes. More so than Eisenhower, Kennedy managed to steer the 
forces of Arab nationalism away from Moscow by presenting the United States as a 
supporter of their nationalist ambitions, and by designing policies that would not be 
perceived as an attempt to polarize the Arab world within the context of the Cold War. 
More than Johnson, Kennedy managed to maintain a balance between his policies 
towards the revolutionary forces in the Middle East and the American interests in Arab 
oil and in the defence of Israel. Indeed, Johnson’s tenacious opposition to Nasser and to 
the Arab reactionaries, and his bold support of Israel, ended up estranging the Arab 
nationalists, reigniting the issue of Palestine, and setting in motion a series of events that 
would culminate with the Six-Day War. 
However, despite Kennedy’s efforts, the New Frontiersmen lacked the ability to 
fully appreciate the gravity of inter-Arab discords. It was not in fact the dispute between 
Arabs and Israelis, but between Arab monarchies and Arab republics, which provoked 
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the turbulence that occurred during the last year of his presidency. Kennedy had managed 
to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute on ice, but by September 1962 the administration realised 
that the heat was coming from the desert as much as from that remote corner of the 
Arabian Peninsula, theatre of the proxy war between conservative and progressive Arab 
world. Even more significantly, Kennedy misjudged Nasser’s pan-Arabist ambitions, 
assuming that their shared idea of development, modernization and self-determination 
could alone be the basis of a comprehensive, mutual understanding. The administration 
pushed an aid programme aimed at turning the Egyptian leader inwards and focusing his 
attention on the economic development of his country, but learned with the Yemen crisis 
that Nasser was a leader whose ambitions were more geared towards foreign than 
domestic policy. With dismay, Kennedy eventually had to come to terms with the fact 
that Nasser the revolutionary had prevailed over Nasser the statesman. 
The paradoxical result of the New Frontier’s experience with Nasser lies with the 
fact that, by the time Kennedy was assassinated, Washington was closer to Saudi Arabia 
and Israel than it was to Egypt. In an attempt to gain leverage on Faysal and on the Israeli 
government and to contain the Yemen crisis, during 1963 Kennedy approved HARD 
SURFACE and pushed Faysal to accelerate his domestic reforms, while simultaneously 
reaffirming Washington’s commitment to the defence of Israel and allowing, by early 
November 1963, the first joint security consultations between the two countries, thus 
setting the basis for a dramatic shift in the US strategies in the region. Significantly, 
Kennedy never wished for the United States to abandon their policy of rapprochement 
with Cairo, nor did he intend to rely on conservative Arab monarchies to pursue Cold 
War objectives. However, by failing to terminate the conflict in Yemen, the Kennedy 
administration failed also to convince Washington of the importance of bolstering the 
strategy of rapprochement with Nasser. Johnson dismissed the idea of dealing with Nasser 
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and shifted the focus of the US Mideast policies towards more stable allies, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, while simultaneously fully embracing Israel’s friendship. The two-pillar 
strategy and the special relationship between the United States and Israel were the 
products of the Johnson administration, but much of their foundation dates back to the 
Kennedy years. Kennedy’s strategies towards Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran came in the 
context of his policy of rapprochement with Nasser. Despite placing the Arab nationalist 
at the top of his Mideast agenda to achieve Cold War objectives, the New Frontiersman 
ensured that the conservative regimes in Riyadh and Tehran would survive the 
revolutionary transformations occurring in the region under Nasser’s progressive 
propaganda722, and he embraced Israel’s bitahon in an attempt to forestall its pre-emptive 
attacks. Ironically, after Kennedy died, Iran and Saudi Arabia were stable enough to cover 
the role of proxies, Israel was by then an integral part of Washington’s regional strategies, 
and the revolutionary Nasser was still stirring up troubles in Yemen. In trying to preserve 
his policy of rapprochement with Nasser, Kennedy had unintentionally set the basis for 
Johnson’s new approach to the Middle East.   
But the bitter end of Washington’s attempt to do business with Cairo was more 
Nasser’s responsibility than Kennedy’s failure. The Egyptian leader failed to take 
advantage of the most significant opening in his diplomacy with Washington’s policy-
makers, embarking on a conflict that would not only be the death of his relationship with 
the United States, but would also mark the beginning of his decline as leader of the Arab 
world. By the mid-1960s, the Syrian regime was openly challenging Cairo’s role in the 
Arab world, since Nasser’s personal focus on Yemen had little to do with the Arabs’ 
ambitions in Palestine723, while the Arab population grew disenchanted with Nasser’s 
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achievements.724 The astonishing 1967 defeat of the Cairo-led Arab coalition against 
Israel, prompted by Nasser’s attempt to regain consensus across the Arab world, marked 
the moment at which his dream of Arab unity collapsed, and the secular and progressive 
precepts encapsulated in his idea of Arab nationalism gave in to more traditional and 
strictly sectarian Islamic values.725 
In summary, how should Kennedy’s policy towards Nasser be assessed? Perhaps, 
conjectures aside, Kennedy’s policy towards Cairo should just be examined for what it 
was and what it meant historically: an ambitious, yet overall bright, footnote in an 
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Chapter 4. Kennedy, Israel and the policy of containment 
 
The making of an unintentional friendship 
Despite the short duration of his presidency, Kennedy was responsible for one of 
the major changes in United States foreign policy in the Middle East. The development 
of a new, closer relationship with Israel not only ended the period of estrangement that 
had characterised the Eisenhower era, but also unintentionally laid the foundation for that 
special alliance that, sealed during the presidencies of Johnson and Nixon, would define 
the American stand in the region for years to come. Indeed, after Kennedy’s death, 
Johnson would take a clear pro-Israel stand, closing on Nasser and cementing a more 
intimate relationship between the two countries726, while Nixon, after the astonishing 
outcome of the Six Day War, would come to regard Israel as a precious, strategic asset to 
contain Soviet ambitions in the region.727 
However, the unintentional element of this relationship constitutes a pivotal 
aspect to the analysis of the outcome of Kennedy’s foreign policy towards Israel.  
Contrary to what has been argued in previous works, where authors such as Douglas Little 
and Abraham Ben-Zvi have implied that Kennedy’s shift towards Israel was dictated by 
geo-strategic considerations728, or that it was caused by his acknowledgement of Nasser’s 
unreliability, as Warren Bass suggests729, or even that it was provoked by the pressure 
exercised by the Israeli Lobby, as Roby C. Barrett disputes730, this work contends that the 
shift in the US-Israel relationship occurred mainly in light of Kennedy’s strategy of 
                                                 
726 Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict…, 123. 
727 Ibidem, 173. 
728 Little, From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed…, 157 and Ben-Zvi, John F. Kennedy and the Politics of 
Arm Sales to Israel…, 98. 
729 Bass, Support any Friend…, 5, 145. 
730 Barrett, The Greater Middle East and the Cold War…, 6. 
184 
 
containment of Israel. In trying to carry out his policy of rapprochement with Nasser, and 
aware that “what [the] Israelis really need and want is [a] reaffirmation of our security 
guarantee”731, Kennedy enhanced Israel’s security and strengthened its bond with 
Washington in the hopes of containing it and forestalling pre-emptive attacks against its 
Arab neighbours. As a result, by the end of his presidency, the New Frontiersman had set 
the basis for the development of a special alliance between the two countries, though such 
an outcome was never really intended.  
Significantly, Kennedy adopted a more balanced approach than his predecessor 
with regards to the Arab-Israeli dispute. During the Eisenhower years, Israel was regarded 
as nothing more than a hindrance in the formulation of the American strategies, which 
were limited to the traditional Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and the 
pre-1958 Iraq. But during the Kennedy years, Israel became part of the New Frontier’s 
even-handed approach to the region, a strategy designed to allow the administration to 
carry out its rapprochement with Nasser while containing the fears of other Middle 
Eastern actors who perceived the Egyptian leader as a threat. Crucially, Kennedy’s close 
relationship with the Ben Gurion government did not derive from his alleged sympathy 
towards Israel, nor from domestic political considerations.732 If it is true that Kennedy 
exploited his connection to the Israeli government for his own domestic benefit, never for 
instance making a mystery of his gratitude for the support of the American Jewry during 
the presidential elections of 1960, it is also true that the reason behind such a friendly and 
even-handed attitude was a critically strategic one. The new administration had not only 
acknowledged that pacts and alliances in the style of the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East 
resolution should give way to programmes of economic development and modernization 
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sponsored by the US that, as argued earlier, would lead the Arab world to embrace 
capitalist development and refuse socialism, but also that containing and limiting the 
tensions between Arabs and Israelis was pivotal to defeating the Soviet Union and 
protecting the Western economic and strategic interests in the region. A quieter Middle 
East would allow Washington to carry out its Cold War strategies without the risk of 
seeing them jeopardised by the rivalry between Arabs and Israelis, and thus the promotion 
of an Arab-Israeli settlement was key for Washington’s Cold War strategies. As Robert 
Komer commented in June 1962, this depended “largely on a sufficiently even-handed 
attitude toward Arabs and Israelis to give us leverage with the Arabs.”733 
Seeking to establish better relations with Nasser, the central focus of Kennedy’s 
approach to the region, the administration decided that, paradoxical as it might sound, the 
enhancement of Israel’s security was the key to lessening the tensions in the region. 
Indeed, given that Israel’s national policy was based on “active defence”, a strategy 
according to which Israel would prevent attacks against its own territory by attacking 
first734, the administration had concluded that only by embracing Israel’s concerns and 
strengthening its security, could the risk of pre-emptive attacks be contained. The State 
Department, Talbot told Rusk in November 1961, was in fact concerned that Israel would 
“come to feel politically isolated and/or in grave military jeopardy” and thus “be tempted 
to engage in pre-emptive military attack against the UAR or Syria, or both.”735 But if the 
Kennedy administration was to offer security guarantees to Israel, Ben Gurion could 
perhaps be manoeuvred to assume a less threatening and hostile stance in the region. Such 
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a position was largely shared among the Kennedy administration. In May 1962 for 
example, Komer made clear: 
“Some kind of satisfactory reassurance to Israel is the essential obverse of our 
policy toward Nasser… We are committed to Israeli’s independence and integrity, as a 
means of forestalling excesses on their part.”736 
 
As a matter of fact, Eisenhower’s toughness with the Israelis had produced the 
counter-effect of exacerbating their fears and sense of isolationism. The Qibya operation 
and the Jordan Water issue of 1953737, were for instance the first signs of Israel’s 
aggressive policy and of the friction and distance between the Israeli government and the 
Eisenhower administration. When the two crises exploded, Eisenhower furiously 
condemned Israel’s attitude, accusing the Ben Gurion government of preventing “the 
restoration of stability... in the Near East”738 and of lacking in the “realism required for a 
successful adjustment into the Near Eastern environment.”739 When the Baghdad Pact 
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was created, one of the reasons behind Washington’s decision not participate directly in 
the organisation was to prevent Ben Gurion from making a similar request.740 Following 
the Suez crisis, the president supported the United Nations resolution to impose sanctions 
on Israel should it not withdraw from the occupied territories, and pursued the arms 
embargo that had started with Henry Truman. Eisenhower furiously stated that he did not 
“care in the slightest whether he is re-elected or not” and that it was necessary to seek an 
UN condemnation of the invasion.741 
Such an attitude, while proving Eisenhower’s tenacity and commendable 
independence from electoral considerations, proved also his inability to move past his 
“black and white”742 view of Middle Eastern affairs and his incapacity to fully appreciate 
the intricate dynamics of the region. The rapid development of the Nasserist wave across 
the region after the 1956 Suez Crisis, Nasser’s acquisition of Soviet weapons after the 
famous 1955 Czech arms deal, and Eisenhower’s seductive approach to the Arab 
monarchies in an effort to protect US oil interests, inevitably added fuel to Israel’s fear 
and aggravated the tensions between the two factions.743 In fact, besides its traditional 
problems, such as being a narrow strip of land, surrounded by hostile Arab countries, 
smaller in population, and fearful because of its troubled past744, Ben Gurion saw in 
Eisenhower’s bitterness a danger for the bitahon, right at the time when the Egyptian 
leader was becoming the ‘Mr Big’ of the Arab world. “If Nasser were to send his Army 
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into Israel... he would exterminate the Jews just as Hitler exterminated them in 
Germany”745, complained Ben Gurion during a meeting with Eisenhower in March 1960, 
worried about the Egyptian acquisition of Soviet weaponry that had started with the 1955 
arms deal. Hundreds of instructors and thousands of aviators, new bombers (much 
improved in terms of capacity to carry bombs), tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy mortars, 
anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, jets, bombers helicopters and torpedo boats were being 
delivered by Moscow straight into the hands of the ever-popular Egyptian leader.746 After 
the 1955 Czech arms deal, many in the Israeli government started to advocate pre-emptive 
strikes against Nasser747, while simultaneously seeking to enhance Israel’s own military 
capability with American arms. However, Eisenhower perceived Ben Gurion’s 
apprehensions as a typical Israeli obsession with the Arab threat, and thus closed the doors 
to any sort of arms shipment to the Ben Gurion government. Declaring to his entourage 
that “Israel will not, merely because of its Jewish population, receive preferential 
treatment over any Arab State”748, throughout the 1950s Eisenhower firmly declined any 
sort of protective arrangement or military contribution to Israel’s security, replying to Ben 
Gurion’s demands that he did not believe that “security lies in arms.”749 Such an 
opposition derived from the administration’s critical belief that Washington’s support to 
Israel was the prime factor responsible for its decline in the region750, and thus that any 
sort of special treatment or favour would be “clearly against United States over-all 
interests in the Middle East.”751 
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But while Eisenhower pursued his strategy of containment of communism and of 
preservation of American and European interests in Arab oil, Ben Gurion grew 
progressively more concerned with the Arab threat, Nasser’s ambitions, and the White 
House’s estrangement. In fact, as Avi Shlaim rightfully argues, if on the one hand the 
Suez crisis had shown Israel’s military superiority over Cairo, on the other it had also 
proved its international isolation.752 The Arab world found itself ideologically reunited 
under Nasser’s leadership, the Soviet Union did not miss the opportunity to side with the 
Arabs, and even the United States condemned the Israeli invasion. In this climate of 
profound uncertainty, the Israeli government concluded that it was critical to obtain 
external security guarantees, an urgency further unveiled by the wave of Nasserism which 
exploded in 1958.753 
With Eisenhower underestimating Israel’s fears, Washington’s stance soon 
backfired, causing the administration to lose leverage with the Israeli government. As a 
result of his sense of isolation and of Nasser’s growing ambitions, Ben Gurion developed 
a progressively more hostile position in the Arab world, as he tried to defend Israel’s 
“right to existence”754 against a possible Arab threat. Israeli policy-makers believed in 
fact that, should Nasser succeed in his unification of the Arab world, a war against Israel 
would take place755, and thus they resorted to pre-emptive attacks in the hopes of deterring 
the Arabs from launching such a war. For this reason, after the Suez crisis, as Nasser’s 
popularity was reaching its pinnacle, the Ben Gurion government pressed the Eisenhower 
administration even harder to obtain some sort of security guarantees. Perhaps even more 
significantly, after the 1958 crisis in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, and the unification 
between Egypt and Syria - the first concrete step towards Nasser’s pan-Arabist objective- 
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Israel began, with the help of the French government, the development of the Dimona 
nuclear facility, allegedly “for the desalinization of seawater”756, but covertly for the long-
term objective of gaining military supremacy in the region through nuclear weapons, the 
ultimate deterrent against the Arabs.   
Arguably the Eisenhower administration had indeed underestimated, or failed 
entirely to take into account, Israel’s “active defence”, the purpose of which was to “keep 
the Arabs psychologically off balance by repeated reminders of Israel’s alertness and 
striking capability”.757 Indeed, even though the Eisenhower administration believed that 
“there was little likelihood that the Arab states would resort to war against Israel”758 (as 
did the Kennedy administration for that matter759), the Ben Gurion government, obsessed 
with the Arabs’ “State of War against Israel”760, believed that only by “constantly 
strengthening the deterrent power of the Israeli defence force” and by “securing the moral 
and political support”761 of the world powers (the United States above all others) could 
the threat of an Arab war of destruction against Israel be averted. In the minds of the 
Israeli policy-makers, deterrence and pre-emptive retaliatory raids, key instruments of 
“active defence”, had in fact “helped discourage the Arabs from larger-scale military 
activities against Israeli territory.”762 
However, this “active defence” constituted a risk to US interests, even more so 
when the Israeli government believed the White House to be insensitive towards their 
concerns. For instance, feeling excluded by Eisenhower’s regional plans, and to a certain 
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degree antagonised by the US government, particularly after the Qibya operation, Israel 
carried out a raid against the Gaza Strip in February 1955, causing Nasser to seal the arms 
deal with Czechoslovakia and allowing Moscow to meddle in Middle Eastern affairs. 
Such a raid was only one of the many attacks carried out by the Israeli government against 
its Arab neighbours763, but its outcome was perhaps the most significant. Realising the 
inadequacy of his military forces, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union to fill the gap 
between the Egyptian and the Israeli army. For this reason, Spiegel’s argument that “when 
heavy pressure on Israel was exercised, US problems were worsened”764, seems to fit 
perfectly in the analysis of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy towards Israel. 
During his own presidency, Kennedy tried to bring balance in Washington’s 
policy towards both Arabs and Israelis through an even-handed approach that would 
placate the Israeli government and allow the administration to deal with the Arabs without 
the threat of Israel’s reprisal policy. The enhanced defence and security of Israel during 
the Kennedy administration, famously through the sale of the HAWK missile system, was 
thus not a goal set out for the president’s own political benefit, nor was it a way to gain a 
“wider range of Middle Eastern options”765 in light of the difficult overtures to Nasser, 
but simply a means to carry out larger Cold War strategies in the region. In the shadow 
of the Dimona nuclear threat and with the policy of rapprochement with Nasser at stake, 
Kennedy dealt with the Israelis through a clever game of quid pro quos, ending the era of 
the bitter relationship between American and Israeli governments and gaining leverage 
against Israelis policy-makers in the pursuit of his strategies towards Cairo. In the process, 
he also unintentionally laid the foundation for the making of a special alliance between 
the two countries.  
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Downsizing the lobby 
Kennedy’s presidency is one which fuels controversy among scholars and 
historians investigating the Arab-Israeli dispute, the US foreign policy in the Middle East 
and the role of lobbies in the American policy-making process. Because of the outcome 
of his policy towards Israel - one that saw its ties with the United States significantly 
strengthened - some authors have placed Kennedy’s domestic political calculations above 
the administration’s strategic concerns in the region, implying that the pressure exercised 
by the Israeli lobby on the Kennedy White House eventually influenced, if not shaped, 
the course of US foreign policy in the Middle East during the early 1960s.766 
The reasoning behind such a misleading assessment lies in the fact that, from his 
early days in Congress, and during his time as a president, John F. Kennedy kept close 
contacts with the Jewish world, spoke eloquently (and sometimes rather incautiously) of 
the “special relationship”767 between the United States and Israel, and candidly confessed 
to his entourage his domestic political concerns over issues regarding Israel.768 But it 
would be a mistake to subscribe to the theory that Kennedy merely adopted a pro-Israeli 
policy in the region for his own political benefit. Certainly, the Israeli lobby eventually 
played a role in the New Frontiersmen’s foreign policy in the Middle East as, together 
with the oil representatives, it eventually moved Congress to interrupt the programme of 
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economic assistance to the UAR through the Gruening amendment in November 1963. 
But if the lobbies managed to exercise their power on Capitol Hill, the same cannot be 
said for the White House.  
It is undeniable that, during his pre-presidential years, Kennedy took a clear stand 
in favour of Israel. After having seduced the Boston Jewish community with the help of 
some preeminent local political figures769, he advocated the need to create an 
“independent Jewish commonwealth in the Near East”770, he spoke of the need to 
“formulate... a new approach to the Middle East” in order to, among other things, “hasten 
the inevitable Arab acceptance of the permanence of Israel”771, and he declared his “own 
deep admiration for Israel and her people”.772 As a congressman, Kennedy opposed the 
United Nations sanctions against Israel, even advocating the need for greater assistance 
to Israel in the withdrawal of its troops from the Egyptian territory.773 He also spoke of 
the need to reopen the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping “by virtue of being a specific 
American commitment”774 and, again in 1956, he strongly opposed Eisenhower’s 
embargo on arms sales to Israel, commenting that “if the Egyptians and Arab States are 
going to receive arms from the Soviets and if we continue to embargo shipments to Israel, 
military imbalance against Israel will result.”775 During a speech in front of a furiously 
cheering crowd at the Yankee Stadium in New York776 for the Israeli Independence Day 
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celebration, Kennedy made clear: “Israel is here to stay. She will not surrender - she will 
not retreat - and we will not let her fall”777, a motto he would often repeat as president 
too.   
However, if Kennedy’s pro-Israel stance appears clear, then so do the reasons 
behind it. With the White House on his mind, Kennedy acknowledged quite early the 
importance of the Jewish constituency for his personal political ascent, as he knew that, 
coming from Congress, he would be conditioned in his campaign efforts by the American 
Jewish community.778 The importance of the Jewish constituency had already become 
evident during Truman’s successful 1948 election as, in the words of Snetsinger, “his 
shift to a pro-Zionist stance… was, after all, one of the key factors in his victory.”779 
Facing a more experienced opponent (after all Richard Nixon had served under the 
Eisenhower administration as vice president), Kennedy hawkishly sought to seduce the 
American Jewish community and obtain the same kind of support.780 
There are at least three reasons why the Jewish electorate constituted such an 
important portion of the overall American constituency for Kennedy’s ascent. First, 
because Kennedy was particularly concerned about the awkward legacy left by his father, 
J. P. Kennedy, who was well known inside and outside of Boston for his anti-Semitism.781 
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By showing sympathy for Israel and its people, Kennedy hoped he would be able to 
distance himself from any unfortunate comparisons.782 Second, because by showing 
support to Israel, Kennedy had managed to obtain substantial financial contribution from 
members of the American Jewish community to run his campaign.783 Even though 
Kennedy came from a very wealthy family (his father was a very capable businessman 
and stockbroker who had accumulated an impressive fortune in just a few years784), he 
was aware that “although he had all the money in the world to spend on it, he [would] be 
subject to criticism”785 if he funded his campaign exclusively using his family wealth. 
Third, because unlike Eisenhower, whose popularity and “war hero” fame preceded him, 
Kennedy was in an open campaign, aware that the votes of American Jews could be 
critical for his victory. His campaign efforts however eventually allowed him to secure, 
in the popular vote, only some 118,000 votes more than Nixon786, an “astonishing margin 
of less than two votes per voting precinct.”787 Given such a narrow margin, it might well 
have been that the 80%788 of American Jews who eventually voted for Kennedy by virtue 
of his pro-Israel stance during the presidential campaign, had influenced the result just as 
they did back in 1948.789 
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Because of the American Jewish community’s critical support for his presidential 
elections790, during a meeting with Ben Gurion held in New York in 1961, Kennedy 
manifested his gratitude by telling the Israeli prime minister privately: “You know I was 
elected by the Jews. I have to do something for them.”791 Such a bold remark, intended 
merely as a sign of gratitude and aimed at generating good-will between the two 
governments, particularly after the Eisenhower era, has further contributed in spreading 
the myth that Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East was largely influenced by 
domestic electoral considerations.792 After all, the history of Kennedy’s relationship with 
the Israeli government might reasonably raise suspicions that such was the case. But as 
shall be discussed, Kennedy’s most historic decisions in relation to Israel, the HAWK 
sale in August 1962 and the joint security talks in November 1963, occurred in light of 
clever strategies of foreign policy, not to repay a supposed debt the New Frontiersman 
had to the Jews. Golda Meir might well have thought the HAWK was proof that the 
United States was Israel’s ally793, but in the minds of the New Frontiersmen the missile 
system had a rather different significance.  
Furthermore, the HAWK sale in particular adds doubt to the legitimacy of 
Kennedy’s decisions, given its coincidence with the congressional elections of 1962. John 
Badeau has for instance recalled that this was the reason why Kennedy agreed to the sale: 
“It was done because the Congress was facing the first election to Congress after Kennedy 
had been elected… [It] is private individual pressures.”794 Roby C. Barrett goes even 
further, arguing that “Kennedy’s offer was to demonstrate support for Israel with one eye 
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on the upcoming presidential campaign in 1964.”795 Knowing all too well the importance 
of the Jewish vote, Barrett suggests that Kennedy thus secured his re-election by making 
such a historical gesture. 
However, beyond the most immediate interpretations of this key moment in the 
history of the US-Israel relationship, a number of other explanations have been provided 
in the literature, which seems to give less and less importance to the Israeli lobby or to 
Kennedy’s own domestic objectives, and more to diplomatic strategies.796 Indeed, even 
if the president did try to maximise the benefits of his decision, making sure that “those 
people who should know about it, know about it”797, the HAWK sale should be 
interpreted as a cleaver manoeuvre of foreign policy, the spill-over effects of which 
benefited Kennedy’s domestic standing, and not the other way around. The HAWK was 
sold to contain Israel, not to strengthen its bonds with Washington or to secure Kennedy’s 
re-election.  
As Bass argues, it is hard to believe that Kennedy, a “political animal”798, was 
oblivious to domestic political considerations, just as it is equally hard to subscribe to the 
theory that his White House had simply adopted a pro-Israel policy. If that was the case, 
how should Kennedy’s intransigency over the Dimona issue be interpreted? Or why 
would Kennedy so consistently cross-check the recommendations of Myer Feldman, the 
only pro-Israel voice in his administration, with Arabists such as Bundy and Komer?799 
And why was he so committed to the rapprochement with Nasser, Ben Gurion’s number 
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one enemy and yet the core of the New Frontier’s foreign policy in the Middle East? Once 
again, despite Kennedy’s imprudent remarks, the documents produced by his 
administration reveal that Washington’s policies towards Israel had little to do with 
Kennedy’s personal ambitions.  
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, a number of studies on the subject tend to agree 
that the Israeli lobby during the early 1960s was unable to exercise direct pressure on the 
Executive.800 Because the United States and Israel relate to each other as sovereign 
countries801, the bond between their two governments is strengthened simply when their 
interests coincide. That is why, as Kenen argues, the power of the lobby increased 
significantly after the Six-Day War, when the United States started to perceive Israel as 
a credible asset to containing Soviet expansion in the region.802 But during the Kennedy 
administration, that was not necessarily the case. If the administration’s overall approach 
to the region, one based on the rapprochement with Nasser, is clear evidence that it did 
not simply adopt a pro-Israel policy, the Dimona issue is perhaps the best testament to 
Kennedy’s independence from domestic political considerations and from the lobby’s 
pressure. His letters to Ben Gurion and Eshkol on Israel’s nuclear research program were 
so severe that certain lines of the documents remained classified until 2004.803 
The issue of the lobbies’ pressure on the Kennedy administration is also quite 
frankly dismissed by some of his closest collaborators who operated from inside the 
White House. As noted earlier, Kennedy’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk admitted that he 
was never pressured on Middle Eastern questions by the Israeli lobby804, a position 
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echoed by Robert Komer in reference to the oil companies: “I have never had any pressure 
put on me or even attempted influence-peddling”.805 Of course, such pressure was 
eventually exercised on Congress, which by 1963, with the Yemen crisis appearing 
nowhere near resolution, became convinced of the paradox of supporting a leader like 
Nasser, who represented a threat to US interests in the region. Yet the rapprochement 
with Nasser was interrupted by the Senate, not by the Kennedy administration, which 
proves that the White House remained largely untouched by the interests of the lobbies.  
Kennedy did make some gestures towards both the Israeli and the oil lobbies when 
he felt that Capitol Hill was becoming unsettled. For instance, in January 1963 he allowed 
some members of his administration, Talbot, Komer, Strong and others, to meet 
representatives of the American oil companies to discuss issues related to the conflict in 
Yemen.806 In May 1963, when the wave of Nasserism nearly caused the fall of King 
Hussein, Kennedy reaffirmed US commitment to the survival of Israel, among other 
reasons, to calm down Congress.807 But such episodes are themselves not enough to argue 
that the lobbies played a role in shaping Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East, let 
alone in influencing important decisions such as the HAWK sale or operation HARD 
SURFACE. If anything, Kennedy’s readiness to listen to their concerns is testament to 
his willingness to bolster the rapprochement with Nasser - whose stand in the region 
appeared to Congress more and more controversial - without seeing it jeopardised by the 
private interests of the lobbies. In the words of Phillips Talbot, Kennedy “understood the 
importance in our domestic policy, and to the Democratic Party, of that body of 
Americans roughly categorized as friends of Israel”, yet when there was “a real issue that 
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was... fairly urgent, we could get to the President and he would stand up on it if he were 
persuaded.”808 
In summary, it would be misleading to attribute a more prominent role to the 
pressure exercised by the lobbies than that of the Kennedy administration’s own strategic 
thinking in the elaboration of its Mideast policies. The documents produced by the 
administration, the testimonies of Kennedy’s entourage, and the events related to for 
instance the Dimona issue or the Jordan crisis in April 1963, refute the argument that 
Kennedy was tied to domestic political considerations or that his administration had 
simply adopted a pro-Israel policy in the region. Kennedy was a clever politician and, as 
such, he knew which strings to pull and when to pull them. But behind his historic 
decisions to enhance Israel’s security, there were clear objectives of foreign policy. 
 
The policy of arms shipment to Israel 
Having scaled down the importance of domestic political considerations in 
Kennedy’s foreign policy towards Israel, one question still remains unanswered. Why did 
the administration contribute so significantly to Israel’s defence and security? Kennedy’s 
enhancement of Washington’s ties with Israel, historically through the 1962 HAWK sale 
and the 1963 joint high-level security talks, might in fact suggest a paradox in his 
approach to the region, one that as seen earlier was centred upon the rapprochement with 
Nasser. 
In Support Any Friend, Warren Bass appears to oversimplify the Kennedy-
Nasser-Ben Gurion conundrum:  
“How can one explain an administration that reached out to both Israel and to 
Israel's nemesis? How to explain an administration that tried to befriend both Nasser and 
Saudi Crown Prince Faysal? How to explain an administration that sold Hawks to Israel 
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to assuage Ben-Gurion's fears of Nasser…? The answer may simply be that Kennedy was 
determined to give himself a wider range of Middle Eastern options”.809 
 
But as argued in this work, Saudi Arabia and Israel did not constitute Cold War 
options for Kennedy. His even-handedness did not derive from attempts to “support any 
friend” in the region, but to secure a working relationship with Nasser without alarming 
or provoking Faysal and Ben Gurion. In Saudi Arabia for instance, Kennedy’s sole 
concern was oil, not transforming the old monarchy into a regional proxy.810 The 
widespread belief among the administration that the royal family would collapse because 
of the grave domestic problems it faced, brought Kennedy to push the wiser Faysal into 
embracing the path of economic, social and political development and modernization in 
order to broaden the regime’s political consensus and avoid internal uprisings inspired by 
the nationalists’ propaganda. Yet the economic partnership between ARAMCO and the 
House of Saud, and Europe’s dependence on Saudi oil, were the only reasons why the 
Kennedy administration supported Riyadh, making sure, during the Yemen crisis, that 
Nasser would not extend the conflict to Saudi Arabia. 
Of course, Israel is different case, yet the overall argument stands: Israel did not 
constitute a Cold War option for Kennedy. In fact, Kennedy’s decision to embrace the 
bitahon ought to be explained in light of his strategy of containing Israel, not as an attempt 
to secure Ben Gurion’s friendship after having acknowledged Nasser’s untrustworthiness, 
as Bass suggests.811 After all, Kennedy never believed that interrupting the 
rapprochement with Nasser and turning to less revolutionary allies was an option, and his 
reaction to the 1963 Gruening amendment shows anything but acquiescence to 
Congress’s decision. For that matter, the Kennedy administration also never fully 
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believed that Israel could be a strategic partner. For instance, when the crisis in Jordan 
exploded in April 1963, the White House’s most immediate concern was Israel’s pre-
emptive manoeuvre aimed at avoiding the establishment of a Nasserite regime in Jordan 
and, possibly, seizing the West Bank.812 Kennedy labelled Israel a “danger”813, not a 
“friend”. 
But more so than Eisenhower, who had adopted a rather tough line with the 
Israelis, Kennedy understood the importance of making gestures towards the Ben Gurion 
government. Indeed, the administration was aware that, with a Mideast policy centred on 
the rapprochement with Nasser through diplomatic and economic means, it was important 
to reassure the Ben Gurion government of the US commitment to the integrity and 
security of Israel.814 Yet such commitment did not derive from Kennedy’s attempts to 
secure a friend in the region, but to forestall Israel’s pre-emptive attacks and keep the 
tensions between Arabs and Israelis at bay.815 
Since the era of Eisenhower, Israel’s “active defence” had constituted a danger to 
the American interests in the region. Throughout the 1950s, the strategy designed by 
David Ben Gurion according to which Israel would prevent attacks against its own 
territory by showing its military superiority through large-scale retaliations816, had 
resulted in a series of reprisal raids817 that, as noted by the Eisenhower administration as 
early as 1953, exacerbated the tensions between Arabs and Israelis, posed a threat to the 
“objectives of achieving political and economic stability and building up area defense 
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potential”818, and reduced dramatically the chances of bringing the Arabs to “peace with 
Israel.”819 Indeed, the Eisenhower administration complained that the numerous border 
incidents, which the CIA, the Departments of State and other intelligence departments 
believed in fact to be caused largely by Israel’s “active defence” and its reprisal raids820, 
were damaging “the US security position in the Middle East by increasing area instability, 
[and] by adding to the difficulty of organizing area defense”.821 
Of course, the Soviet threat amplified the need to prevent Israel from undertaking 
actions that could threaten the stability of the Middle East: “[The] entrance [of] Russia 
into Middle East politics makes Israel’s game extremely dangerous”, warned R. Tyler, 
Consul at Jerusalem, in April 1954, “Israel must be made to… ease border tensions.”822 
The administration feared that the USSR, eager to take advantage of the tensions between 
Arabs and Israelis to expand its sphere of influence, would enhance its relationship with 
the Arab states in order to gain standing in the Middle East, by offering “diplomatic and 
possibly matériel support to the Arab participants”823 against Israel’s aggressive policy. 
As a result, it was not long before the Eisenhower administration concluded that reducing 
the tensions in the region would allow Washington to strengthen “the area for defense 
against the Communist threat.”824 
Because Soviet ambitions in the Middle East constituted “the primary threat to the 
interests of the United States and the West in the Middle East (especially oil, Suez Canal 
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and pipelines)”825, as early as 1953 the Eisenhower administration sought to restrain Israel 
in order to mitigate the Arab-Israeli dispute.826 In February 1953, the American 
ambassador informed the Israeli government that “active defence”  was “unnecessary and 
extremely harmful to [the] interest of Israel as well as [the] US”827, but found the Israeli 
government largely unmoved by such warnings, and ready to reject Washington’s 
concerns on the basis that “reprisals might in certain circumstances, be [the] only effective 
means of self-defence.”828 After all, Ben Gurion was seeking American support, not a 
lesson on how to protect Israel.  
Many of his concerns were, however, not shared by the Eisenhower 
administration, which believed that, since the Arabs were not willing to engage in a full-
blown war against Israel, the reprisal raids were unjustified.829 But the issue was not 
whether the United States thought the Arabs would launch a war of destruction against 
Israel, but that the Ben Gurion government believed the policy of reprisal was the only 
way to “hold down Arab attacks.”830 The key objective of “active defence” was in fact to 
remind the Arabs of Israel’s military superiority, so that they would be less inclined to 
conduct raids against the Israeli territory, let alone launch a war.831 Of course, the 
Eisenhower administration never agreed to such a doctrine. In 1954 Tyler pointed out that 
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“There is… [An] enormous difference between individual acts of infiltrators and group 
reprisals officially undertaken or condoned by governments”832 adding that Israel’s 
arguments about the Arab threat were constructed so that the government could “justify 
her official reprisal raids.”833 However, notwithstanding Eisenhower and Dulles’s 
concerns, Israeli policy-makers remained convinced that the “language of reprisals is 
[the] only one Arabs seem to understand”834, and “active defence” remained a cornerstone 
of Israel’s national policy. 
For the American interests in the region, the most significant consequence of 
Israel’s “active defence” was the incident in Gaza in February 1955, when thirty 
Egyptians were killed in a retaliatory raid conducted by the Israeli army, moving Nasser 
to ask Washington for weapons in order to close the military gap with the Israeli army. 
Finding the doors of the White House closed, as a consequence of Dulles’s suspicion of 
Nasser’s international posture, the Egyptian leader then turned to the Soviet Union, 
sealing the 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia and opening the way for a series of events 
that would result in the 1956 Suez crisis. The administration’s predictions were thus 
proved to be accurate: the Soviet Union did not hesitate to provide Egypt with the military 
aid required and to take advantage of the frictions between Arabs and Israelis (not to 
mention Eisenhower’s own hostility towards Nasser) to gain status among the Arab 
nationalists. The Czech arms deal was only the first in a long series of arms deals between 
the USSR and Egypt, Syria and the post-1958 Iraq. 
As noted earlier, Eisenhower’s condemnation of Israel’s actions contributed 
towards aggravating the fears and sense of isolation of Ben Gurion, who, convinced that 
                                                 
832 Memorandum from the Consul at Jerusalem (Tyler) to the Department of State, April 17, 1954. FRUS 
1952-1954, Vol. IX, 799. 
833 Ibidem. 




without “[The] US Government, Israel could not survive”835, adjusted Israel’s 
relationship with Washington by agreeing to the quick withdrawal of his troops from 
Egypt. But by March 1956, when the diplomatic friction between the two governments 
had been overcome, Ben Gurion sought to acquire weapons from the United States in 
order to counter Nasser’s growing popularity.836 Israel’s fears were clearly expressed by 
Golda Meir in October 1957, when she addressed the General Assembly arguing that the 
Czech arms deal and the events of Suez had increased “the danger of a destructive war”837 
against Israel. The 1958 wave of Nasserism, which led to the creation of the UAR, and 
caused two severe crises in Jordan and Lebanon and the fall of the Iraqi monarchy, further 
contributed in exasperating the Israeli government, which pressed the administration for 
military aid, including the HAWK.838 However, during a meeting held in the White House 
in March 1960 between Eisenhower and Ben Gurion, the American president maintained 
a posture in line with his overall attitude towards arming Israel, and firmly rejected 
Israel’s request. Constrained by Eisenhower’s impassibility, as early as 1958 the Ben 
Gurion government began working on Israel’s nuclear program, building up the Dimona 
facility with French help.839 
Together with Dimona, one of Kennedy’s great concerns in the Middle East, the 
New Frontiersmen inherited the issue of Israel’s “active defence”. Of course, in early 
1961 the Middle East was quieter than it had been in 1958, as Nasser, by then still 
president of the Egypt-Syria federation, appeared more interested in the economic 
                                                 
835 Memorandum from the Ambassador in Israel (Davis) to the Department of State, February 20, 1953. 
FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. IX, 573. 
836 Memorandum of a Conversation, March 28, 1956. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. XV, 225. 
837 Address to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Golda Meir, October 7, 1957. Medzini, Israel’s 
Foreign Relations…, 641. 
838 Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of 
State, July 15, 1960. FRUS 1958–1960, Vol. XIII, 157. 




development of the UAR than in his Pan-Arabist ambitions.840 The reduction of inter-
Arab tensions, the friction between Cairo and Moscow, and Nasser’s willingness to find 
common ground with Washington, resulted in a temporary relaxation across the borders 
that the administration sought to exploit in order to pursue its strategy of rapprochement 
with Nasser. Thus, the Kennedy administration started to discuss the PL-480 (the first 
talk with Egyptian representatives would take place in as early as June 1961), while 
simultaneously trying to keep diplomatic interferences at bay.841 
As the administration sought to generate good will with the Cairo government, 
mainly through the talks on the PL-480 and Kennedy’s personal correspondence with 
Nasser, the New Frontiersmen tried to tackle the Dimona issue and Israel’s security 
concerns, in order to bring stability to the region and thus pursue their Cold War objective 
of fostering a working relationship with Nasser. The first official meeting between 
Kennedy and Ben Gurion, held on May 30, 1961, focused on the nuclear issue and Israel’s 
request for weapons. 
Kennedy was particularly averse to the issue of nuclear development, as he had 
already made clear earlier in March 1961, saying: “with the development of these new 
and terrible weapons war no longer offers any... solution”.842 But the Dimona issue was 
particularly alarming because, as noted earlier, it constituted a serious threat to US 
interests in the region. The administration, although considering an Arab-Israeli nuclear 
war highly unlikely, feared that the Israeli government would take advantage of the 
psychological effects of its nuclear facility to assume a less accommodating attitude 
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towards peace negotiations; that the Arabs would blame the West (after all Dimona was 
being built with French help) for Israel’s achievement; and that Nasser would turn to the 
Soviet Union to acquire more advanced weaponry.843 Thus, despite the good result of the 
first visit to the Dimona site, carried out on May 18, 1961, by the scientists Ulysses 
Staebler, Assistant Director of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Division Reactor 
Development, and Jesse Croach, heavy water expert, who confirmed the peaceful purpose 
of the facility844, the administration concluded it was also advisable to “seek similar visits 
at frequent intervals.”845 During the May 1961 meeting, Kennedy managed to obtain 
permission from Ben Gurion to issue a statement of reassurance to the Arab countries 
with the positive result of the first inspection. If the administration could not stop Israel’s 
nuclear research, the purpose of which was at that stage still peaceful, it could at least 
contain its psychological effects.846 
The second point on the agenda was Israel’s security. In February 1961, the Israeli 
ambassador Avraham Harman introduced the new administration to the problem of 
Israel’s security, arguing that Nasser’s acquisition of Soviet weapons, particularly the 
Soviet MIG-19, had moved the region “into a state of arms imbalance in the UAR’s 
favour”.847 Harman renewed Israel’s request for the HAWK, a ground-to-air defensive 
missile system that, he commented, could be “ideally adapted to the purpose of defending 
Israel’s airfields.”848 During his meeting with Ben Gurion in May 1961, after the prime 
minister had again raised the question of Israel’s security arguing that Nasser’s 
acquisition of weapons had caused a deficit in Israel’s arms, Kennedy expressed his 
reluctance to introduce such a weapon into the Middle East: “should missiles come into 
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the Middle Eastern area, military weaponry will escalate fast”849, he warned Ben Gurion, 
promising however a careful examination of the arms balance in the region. 
Kennedy was, however, more accommodating than his predecessor. The New 
Frontiersman was aware of the importance of generating good-will with the Israeli 
government, particularly because the pro-Nasser shift in American policy had made Ben 
Gurion (together with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran), “vocally unhappy.”850 The 1961 
meeting served exactly that purpose. In June, after Ben Gurion had returned to Israel, 
Barbour informed Kennedy that the prime minister was “particularly pleased with his talk 
with the President”851, and the administration could thus exploit the cordial mood to try 
to work towards the rapprochement with Nasser. Back in 1953 Israeli policy-makers had 
warned Eisenhower that the US policies might have a “dangerous effects on Israeli 
population, whose feeling of isolation and lack of friendship tends to lead to despair.”852 
In 1961, Kennedy made sure they would not feel that way.  
However, the administration had not embraced the theory that an arms imbalance 
existed between the UAR and Israel. During the meeting of February 1961, Harman had 
linked Israel’s request for the HAWK directly to the UAR acquisition of the Soviet’s 
MIG-19, stating clearly: “Israel is now reviewing its circumstances in the light of the 
UAR’s acquisition of the MIG-19.”853 Harman contended that the new weapons acquired 
by Nasser constituted a significant change in the arms balance of the region, and thus that 
Israel’s request was justified on the basis that Eisenhower had promised to reconsider the 
HAWK sale if a change in the status quo occurred. But the administration confirmed that 
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the French Super-Mystere fighter-bomber was “virtually on a par with the MIG-19” and 
that the French Mirage aircraft was “much superior to the MIG-19”854, thus making clear 
that there was no arms imbalance after all.855 
The UAR break-up in September 1961, shifted the administration’s focus from 
the supposed arms imbalance to the issue of Israel’s “active defence”. Indeed, while 
Nasser had clearly expressed his unwillingness to engage in a conflict with Israel, 
particularly in light of the fact that he was more concerned with “rebuilding his political 
stature in Egypt”856 after the secession of Syria, the change in the Syrian government 
reignited that country’s hostilities against Israel.857 As early as March 1962, the 
administration was informed of clashes between Syrians and Israelis on Lake Tiberias, 
caused by Israel’s attempt to withdraw water from the lake through pumping 
installations.858 As a result of the tensions, the Israeli government conducted a large 
retaliatory raid with the purpose of destroying a Syrian military base and deterring the 
new Syrian government from “molestation of Israel’s territory.”859 Fearing new large-
scale hostilities between Arabs and Israelis, which could spoil the rapprochement with 
Nasser and favour Soviet infiltration, on March 20, 1962, Talbot met Harman to remind 
the Israeli government that “the United States continues very much opposed to the 
employment of such raids”860, because it feared they could provoke a spiral of incidents 
and doom the region to the instability of 1956 or 1958: “Violence invites violent 
responses and greater violence still”, argued Talbot, but Harman rejected the warning, 
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leaving the meeting without accepting the department’s argument or expecting his 
government to do so.861 
Rusk promptly informed Kennedy of the situation. On March 28, 1962, the 
secretary of state pointed out that Israel could not “continue to take the law into its own 
hands” and that anything other than condemnation would result in “strong feelings in the 
Arab world against the US”, would spoil the effectiveness of the policy of rapprochement 
with Nasser, and could possibly cause future incidents that could be exploited by the 
Soviet Union to enhance its position among the Arab countries.862 Thus, during the same 
month, the White House approved a draft resolution condemning Israel’s military action 
as a “flagrant violation” of the ceasefire of 1948863, and the incident was eventually 
resolved with the mediation of the UN secretary general, who called on both factions to 
“abide fully by all the provision of the General Armistice Agreement”.864 Significantly, 
Israel’s position on the issue did not change but was, if anything, aggravated by the UN 
decision. In April 1962, Ben Gurion expressed his concerns in front of the Knesset, 
arguing that the text of the UN resolution showed that Israel’s “honour and vital interests 
will be sacrificed to the needs of the Cold War”865, and calling for the use of Israel 
Defence Force (IDF) to forestall aggressions against Israel.866 
The clash between Syria and Israel renewed the issue of Israel’s “active defence”. 
During a meeting between Shimon Peres and members of the State Department on May 
24, 1962, the Israeli deputy defence minister complained that “[The] US assistance to 
[the] UAR increases Israel’s security problems” and that both the French and British 
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governments seemed more inclined to maintain “their own position in the Arab world”867 
than to satisfy Israel’s requests. Thus, Peres insisted that the American HAWK was an 
essential requirement for the security of Israel. While the US intelligence departments 
had informed the administration that Israel’s defence forces were “qualitatively superior 
to the UAR”868 Talbot and McGhee, both present during the meeting, shifted the focus of 
the conversation to Israel’s raids, arguing that they were the cause of Nasser’s decision 
to “embark on major increase in defence with Soviet assistance”.869 After all, the 1955 
raid against Gaza and Nasser’s consequent acquisition of Soviet weapons was a clear 
evidence of the risks behind Israel’s national policy. Yet, once again unmoved by the US 
concerns, Peres ended the meeting commenting that the retaliatory raids were indeed a 
“valuable instrument [of] Israel policy.”870 
The different opinions between US and Israelis policy-makers on the stability of 
the region seemed beyond the reach of any mere diplomatic agreement. On the one hand, 
the Kennedy administration was committed to preventing Moscow from exploiting the 
tensions between Arabs and Israelis to expand its interests in the Middle East, as it 
believed that “active defence” would only result in an exacerbation of regional tensions 
to the advantage of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Ben Gurion government was 
convinced, just as it had been during the 1950s, that retaliation was a key instrument to 
prevent the Arabs from launching a war of destruction against Israel - a threat that the 
administration considered however “too remote to discuss seriously.”871 
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Over the following months, the administration started to discuss the possibility of 
embracing Israel’s bitahon, i.e. making a gesture towards the Ben Gurion government to 
show that the US was committed to the integrity and security of Israel. The reactivation 
of the portion of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration that dealt with external aggressions, 
envisioned by the administration as early as May 1962 to satisfy Israel’s demands872, was 
simply not enough. Ben Gurion was asking Kennedy to provide Israel with “sufficient 
deterrent strength”873 to stop the Arabs’ attacks against his country, and, although he was 
opened to diplomatic understandings with Washington, what he was really seeking was 
“a security guarantee specifically formulated for Israel, and access to a wider range of 
military equipment”874, in particular the HAWK. Furthermore, even Nasser manifested 
his scepticism towards such a solution when, questioned in May 1962 about his view of 
the external guarantees provided by the Tripartite Declaration, “he made a bitter reference 
in this connection to the 1956 action”875 of Britain and France, two of the three signers of 
the declaration. But with the policy of rapprochement with Cairo at stake and the renewed 
hostilities between Israel and Syria, the administration had concluded that forestalling 
Israel’s reprisal policy and easing the tensions in the region was critical for the US 
strategies. In this scenario, the HAWK sale appeared increasingly to be the only way to 
counter Israel’s “active defence”. 
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Bargaining: the HAWK sale and the Johnson Plan 
From a long-term perspective, the HAWK sale of August 1962 constitutes perhaps 
the most significant event of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East as, by agreeing 
to the sale, the Kennedy administration became in effect responsible for putting an end to 
the 13-year policy of arms embargoes on Israel, and for introducing the most sophisticated 
weapon the region had ever seen. Thus, it should hardly come as a surprise that the 
literature identifies the Kennedy presidency as the moment at which the relationship 
between the United States and Israel shifted towards a closer partnership, setting the basis 
for the special alliance we know today. Such an argument is possibly partially responsible 
for having focused the attention of scholars and historians primarily on the relationship 
between Kennedy and Ben Gurion.876 
However, although some of the most insightful works conducted on the subject 
have discussed at length the reasons that brought Kennedy to such a historic decision, the 
literature still presents a gap when analysing the HAWK sale. The arguments presented 
by authors such as Ben-Zvi, Bass, and Little to explain the sale (respectively on the 
refugee issue, the supposed arms imbalance between the UAR and Israel, and the Dimona 
threat) are reasonable explanations for the HAWK sale. After all, the documents produced 
by the administration show that the HAWK sale was linked to Israel’s acceptance of the 
Johnson plan for the refugees; that it was also justified in light of Nasser’s acquisition of 
Soviet weapons; and that it would possibly have deterred the Israelis from producing 
nuclear weapons. But this work argues that, beyond these most immediate explanations, 
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lies a more intricate strategy of foreign policy designed to contain Israel’s “active 
defence”, ease the tensions between Arabs and Israelis, and thus succeed in the policy of 
rapprochement with Nasser.  
Of course, much of Kennedy’s agreement to the sale derived from the 
impossibility of finding a viable alternative for Israel’s request of security guarantees. 
The reactivation of the Tripartite Declaration that dealt with external aggression was not 
enough for Ben Gurion and, in light of the events of 1956, rather unconvincing for Nasser. 
Other forms of security guarantees, such as the US-Israel bilateral defence agreement 
suggested by Harman as early as February 1961, were excluded because the 
administration feared they would be interpreted “as an abandonment of an impartial 
attitude on the part of the United States”877 in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Even the British 
alternative to the HAWK, the surface-to-air missile Bloodhound, was frankly rejected by 
the Israeli government: “Israel has no interest in the Bloodhound”878, commented Golda 
Meir during a meeting with Feldman in August 1962, adding that, since the system was 
inferior, Israel would choose the HAWK, even if it was more expensive than the 
Bloodhound.879 
Because of the impossibility of finding a different course, throughout the summer 
of 1962 the administration became more and more convinced that the HAWK could be 
sold after all. A gesture towards Israel would in fact reduce “any temptation Israel may 
have to take pre-emptive offensive action” against its Arab neighbours880, Talbot told 
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Rusk in June 1962, adding that, despite the UN resolution of April that had condemned 
the retaliation against Syria, Israel’s conduct had not changed. The “active defence” was 
still “portrayed as being necessary to [the] defense of its security”.881 
The regional political backdrop further reinforced the importance of satisfying 
Israel’s request as a means to forestalling Israel’s policy of retaliation. The border 
incidents between Israel and Syria following the UAR break-up, reignited the tensions 
between Arabs and Israelis, giving voice to strident Arab propaganda aimed directly at 
Israel and Nasser.882 Besides the renewed “indoctrination of young Arabs with hatred of 
Israel”883, countries like Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan had started accusing Nasser 
of adopting a soft line with Israel in exchange for US aid, calling for a more active policy 
against Israel.884 Furthermore, in July 1962, the Egyptian leader had also fired the first 
rockets built with German help, allowing the Israeli government to take the issue as 
evidence of Nasser’s hostile intentions, and thus furthering its cause for the HAWK.885 
Finally, from a Cold War perspective, the issue of Lake Tiberias had also given further 
evidence of the importance of keeping Israel’s retaliation policy under control. When the 
border incidents between the two countries exploded in March 1962, Moscow did not 
miss the chance to promise “all out support to Syrians”886 against Israel.  
Of course, the sale of such advanced weaponry to Israel was unprecedented, and 
needed justification. After all, the administration had already concluded that the risk of 
joint aggression by all the Arab states against Israel was very unlikely and that, on their 
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own, no country represented a threat to Israel’s security.887 But having excluded other 
special security arrangements888, and given Israel’s insistence, the US government 
became convinced that the HAWK could in fact become the best way to “reduce any 
temptation Israel may have to take pre-emptive offensive action.”889 Nasser’s acquisition 
of Soviet weapons offered a way to justify the sale of the HAWK and, the administration 
hoped, even to deter him from doing further business with Moscow.890 By request of the 
administration, in mid-July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a document explaining 
that, after Nasser’s latest purchase of the Soviet TU-16, Israel might in fact become 
vulnerable to air attacks, also adding that the HAWK, being merely a defensive system, 
would not alone shift the balance of power.891 It was also explained that the delivery 
would only take place 24 months from the receipt of the funded order, and that the US 
army could begin training no earlier than the summer of 1966.892 Given the military 
justification, and in light of the fact that it would be years before the Israelis could use the 
HAWK, Kennedy decided to agree to the sale, which would be finalised on August 19, 
1962. It is significant however that the administration was aware that “despite [the] 
acquisition by the UAR of TU–16 bombers”, “as a result of Israel’s purchase of Mirage 
III aircraft”, Israel would still enjoy air superiority, as well as on the ground.893 
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Thus, even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested that Nasser’s 
acquisition of Soviet weapons could justify the HAWK sale, Bass’s argument about the 
“dangerous arms imbalance”894, could not alone have brought the Kennedy 
administration to agree to such a historic gesture. Despite Nasser’s acquisition of Soviet 
weapons, the administration had concluded that Israel would still retain overall military 
superiority, even without the HAWK. In addition, the administration’s acknowledgement 
of the improbability of an Arab war against Israel suggests that the supposed arms 
imbalance was not so dangerous after all. Nasser’s unwillingness to engage in hostilities 
against the Israelis had made Israel’s increased defence system, as he commented in 
August 1962, “irrelevant”.895 
Of course, Kennedy sought to maximize the gains of the HAWK sale by trying to 
push forward a compromise on the refugee issue. Indeed, even though the administration 
had decided to keep the issue on ice, primarily because it feared that pressing Nasser to 
find “a quick solution of central problems” could jeopardise the policy of 
rapprochement896, domestic and regional dynamics brought Kennedy to at least attempt a 
mediation. By December 1961, in order to gain prestige in the Arab world, the United 
States had already rejected the draft of the Brazzaville resolution, an Israeli-inspired direct 
negotiation on the refugees within the UN that would have implied the Arabs’ recognition 
of the State of Israel897: “There is not the slightest prospect of the Arabs agreeing to sit 
down with the Israelis”, Rusk told Kennedy in November 1961, adding that the “proposal 
could offer no practical result in advancing the interests of the refugees or a solution of 
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the problem.”898 The Arabs appreciated the administration’s gesture899, but by June 1962 
increased domestic criticism against Kennedy called the US president “to redeem his 
campaign pledges” for a “comprehensive settlement in the Near East.”900 
However, more than with such domestic headaches, the administration was 
concerned with the stability of the region and even more with the rapprochement with 
Nasser. The Arab campaign mounted during the spring of 1962 against the Egyptian 
leader’s soft-line with Israel, focused inevitably on the refugee problem, an issue that, as 
Komer pointed out, always succeeded in distracting the Arab population from the 
domestic failings of its governments.901 The administration was not concerned that the 
new wave of Arab propaganda, which sought to bring Cairo to adopt a tougher line against 
the Ben Gurion government, would result in a war against Israel, but feared that that it 
could prevent Kennedy’s efforts to steer the Egyptian leader towards a more moderate 
course.902 In addition, the refugee issue constituted a particularly sensitive problem for 
Jordan, a country facing serious economic and social issues and whose population was 
predominantly Palestinians. Should the Arab propaganda provoke a successful coup 
against Hussein, the administration feared that the result would almost certainly be an 
Arab-Israeli war.903 
The administration had opened private talks on the refugee issue as early as 
February 1961, when the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs pointed out 
that the problem was in fact a “perennial focal point for argument”.904 Bundy echoed the 
                                                 
898 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, November 26, 1961. Ibidem, 145. 
899 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan, December 25, 1961. Ibidem, 153. 
900 Memorandum from Phillips Talbot to Secretary of State Rusk, June 7, 1962. Ibidem, 290. 
901 Memorandum from Robert Komer to Myer Feldman, May 31, 1962. JFKL, NSF, Box 322, Staff 
Memoranda, Robert Komer, 5-62. 
902 Robert Komer, Memorandum for the President, January 15, 1962. JFKL, NSF, Box 168, UAR, General, 
1-62, 2-62. 
903 “Jordan: Key to Stability”. JFKL, President’s Office Files, Box 119A, Israel, Briefing Book, Ben Gurion 
Visit, 1961. 
904 Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, February 1, 1961. FRUS 1961-
1963, Vol. XVII, 8. 
220 
 
bureau’s position shortly afterwards: the refugee issue was “the best key to progress on 
this entire Arab-Israel problem, including such issues as Suez transit, the Arab League 
boycott, boundaries”905, he told Kennedy in April 1961, also reminding the president of 
his campaign pledge to “initiate action designed to facilitate an Arab-Israel settlement.”906 
Furthermore, as the US covered 70% of the costs of the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which amounted to 
approximately 23 million dollars annually, the administration feared that if progress was 
not made, Congress would not continue to allocate funds.907 
The May 1961 meeting with Ben Gurion offered Kennedy the chance to approach 
the refugee issue. After discussing the Dimona nuclear reactor and Israel’s security 
guarantees, Kennedy stressed the need for Israel to collaborate with the Palestine 
Conciliation Commission (PCC): “The United States is committed to the United Nations 
resolutions on the Palestine refugees”908, Kennedy told Ben Gurion, inviting the prime 
minister to at least adopt a constructive approach towards a possible move by the United 
Nations.909 Ben Gurion was of course sceptical, arguing that the Arabs did not care about 
the Palestinians as much as they cared about using the “refugee weapon” to flood Israel 
with Arabs, but he left the doors open saying “Yes, it is always worth trying.”910 
Seeking to contain the refugee issue and prevent Arab propaganda from steering 
Nasser towards a more hostile course, the US government welcomed the UN decision to 
have the American Dr Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Foundation for 
International Peace, working together with the Palestine Conciliation Committee on a 
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plan for the refugees. After his tour across the Middle East, during which the UN envoy 
tested the Arabs’ and Israelis’ willingness to discuss the refugee issue, Johnson presented 
his proposal to the Kennedy administration on August 7, 1962, essentially based on a 
repatriation or resettlement with compensation deal. The plan entailed several steps: first, 
a round of preliminary discussions to determine “what the possibilities are for repatriation 
and resettlement”911; second, a questionnaire to be distributed among the refugees 
allowing them to indicate their initial preference “for repatriation to Israel… or for 
compensation and resettlement in the Arab countries or elsewhere”912; third, a formal 
interview with each refugee would take place to obtain a final decision on repatriation or 
resettlement; finally, designated officials would start consultations with the governments 
to seek the implementation of the plan. 
The White House considered Johnson’s plan “an even-handed proposal, 
honest…valid for all parties concerned”913, but anticipated Israel’s opposition on the basis 
that the Ben Gurion government feared that a massive number of refugees would choose 
repatriation instead of resettlement.914 A meeting at the White House was called on 
August 14, 1962, and the main subject of discussion was how to obtain Israel’s pledge of 
cooperation with the Johnson plan. Johnson reported that “The chances of success are 
slim” but, he added, “If we don't try this, nothing will be done”. As Kennedy asked what 
leverage the administration had on Israel, Feldman promptly suggested the quid pro quo: 
“If we could tie in the HAWK, it might work.”915 
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By then, Kennedy had in fact already decided to sell the HAWK in order to 
forestall Israel’s pre-emptive attacks, but the administration had not yet made its decision 
public in the hopes of using the HAWK as a possible bargaining card in the negotiations 
with the Israelis.916 In light of the delicate diplomatic period and of the pressure put on 
Nasser by the Arab countries to adopt a tougher line with the Israelis, the administration 
decided to improve the chances of the Johnson plan’s success by linking it to the HAWK 
sale. Feldman was commissioned by Kennedy to fly to Israel and talk Ben Gurion into 
the Johnson Plan, making sure that the quid pro quo would not be seen as a bluff.917 On 
August 15, 1962, Kennedy wrote to Ben Gurion that his special emissary would be sent 
to Israel to discuss such delicate issue, and find the “bases for an understanding”918, while 
simultaneously he instructed Badeau to inform Nasser of the administration’s decision to 
sell the HAWK.919 
The three and a half hour-long meeting between Feldman, Ben Gurion and Golda 
Meir, took place on August 19, in Tel Aviv. Feldman opened the meeting with the news 
that “the President had determined that the Hawk missile should be made available to 
Israel”920, witnessing the Israelis’ ecstatic reaction.921 The special ambassador went on to 
say: “Now, now that you’ve come down off the roof, let me tell you what we think you 
ought to do also.”922 
While the issue of Dimona was discussed with relative calm, on the refugee issue 
Ben Gurion was, as predicted, “much more [sic] tougher.”923 The prime minister 
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reminded Feldman of the threat that repatriation posed to the State of Israel, and refused 
to talk numbers. But after a long discussion, Ben Gurion declared that he could agree to 
the plan if Nasser agreed to re-settle in the UAR those refugees determined by the 
administrator, and if he restrained from producing propaganda aimed at having them 
repatriate or be considered traitors.924 After Feldman’s report, on August 20, 1962, Rusk 
informed him that Ben Gurion’s attempt to place conditions on Israel’s acceptance of the 
plan, would be “inconsistent with the Johnson Plan”, which was based on “good 
faith…without prior specific commitment”, and thus unacceptable for the United 
States925: “I hardly need stress”, Rusk wrote, “that it would be most unfortunate if Israelis 
were to end up with the Hawks… while being responsible for derailing the Johnson 
Plan”.926 Indeed, if the news of the HAWK was to leak before Ben Gurion’s pledge to 
cooperate with the Johnson Plan, the administration would lose leverage on Israel, whose 
acceptance of the plan would then become even more doubtful.  
The day after, on August 21, 1962, Feldman met only with Golda Meir, but the 
result of the meeting was not of great comfort. The foreign minister spoke of the 
“impracticability of the plan”927, as she handed over a five-page letter signed by Ben 
Gurion, in which the Israeli government contested the plan on the basis that the Arab 
rulers had not yet abandoned their plan to destroy Israel: “There is only one way to resolve 
the refugee question”, reads the letter, “and that is for the Arab rulers... to reconcile 
themselves… to the existence of the State of Israel.”928 On his return to Washington, on 
August 24, 1962, Feldman reported that the Israelis distrusted Johnson because he was 
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“considered naïve”, but at least they promised they would not “say anything to obstruct 
implementation of the Plan.”929 
However, on September 20, 1962, during a meeting with Feldman in New York, 
Golda Meir stated clearly Israel’s strong opposition to the plan: “The written plan”, she 
argued, “is stacked against Israel… there is nothing in writing which protects Israel… in 
pushing the plan we have worsened Israel's position in the Near East”.930 The Israeli 
foreign minister argued that on September 10, 1962, Johnson had made some changes to 
the draft proposal and then presented it to the Palestine Conciliation Commission “with 
an attitude of finality”, omitting the key-sentence “Governments would retain the ultimate 
right to decide on the acceptance of refugees.”931 Of course, in the eyes of the 
administration the change did not affect “the substance and intent of the plan”, but 
provided the Israeli government with a perfect pretext to oppose to the plan “without 
public onus for Israel.”932 By late September 1962, when the news of the HAWK sale 
was leaked to the press933, the Israeli government closed the doors to the Johnson plan. 
 
Collapse 
By the beginning of 1963, the Kennedy administration was forced to come to 
terms with the insurmountable differences between Arabs and Israelis, and with the 
impossibility of leading both factions to an agreement on the refugees. By early February 
1963, Johnson reported to Kennedy that his plan was officially “dead”934, and with the 
development of the Yemen crisis, the issue of the new wave of Nasserism, and Israel’s 
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ambiguity over Dimona, the administration disengaged from the plan.935 Kennedy shifted 
the focus of his of his Mideast policy from the intricate refugee issue to more immediate 
concerns, such as Nasser’s war in Yemen, the Saudi oil, the Dimona nuclear reactor, and 
the tensions in Jordan, though he did pledge US cooperation on possible new UN attempts 
to tackle the issue.936 
The administration was however divided over assigning responsibility for the 
unsuccessful outcome of the plan. Many resented the Israeli government’s attitude during 
the negotiations, blaming its lack of cooperation with the US government. “Perhaps”, 
Talbot told Rusk on September 20, 1962, “having now received assurance of the Hawk 
missile the Israelis feel free to take a hard line”.937 It was a reasonable suspicion. During 
the conversations with Feldman about the refugees and the Johnson plan on August 19, 
1962, the Israeli leaders showed no more than a vague interest in solving the dispute, 
certainly not comparable to that shown in the HAWK: during the meeting with Golda 
Meir, Feldman reported: “In the middle of this discussion she told me she had just 
received concrete evidence that Egyptians have guided missiles.”938 Komer echoed 
Talbot’s suspicion: “Israel (having gotten its Hawks) is making an all-out effort to sink 
the Johnson Plan.”939 As a matter of fact, when the news of the HAWK sale was leaked 
in late September 1962, thus making it impossible for Kennedy to withdraw the offer, the 
administration lost the leverage necessary to push Israel to accept the plan. In a cable sent 
to Kennedy in November 1962, Robert Komer summed up:  
“Your administration has done more to satisfy Israeli security preoccupations than 
any of its predecessors. We have promised the Israelis HAWKS, reassured them on the 
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Jordan Waters, given a higher level of economic aid (to permit extensive arms) and given 
various security assurance. In return, we have gotten nothing from our efforts… the score 
is 4-0.”940 
 
From their side, the Israelis took no responsibility over the failure of the Johnson 
Plan. Komer told Kennedy in November 1962 that Israel was “unwilling even to talk 
about the Johnson plan”941, since the small changes on the draft presented by Johnson to 
the Palestine Conciliation Commission were enough for the Ben Gurion government to 
disengage from whatever previous promises it had made. “The United States is not 
prepared to defend with the Israelis any modifications on what… he [Feldman] explained 
to Ben-Gurion”942, Bundy told Komer on September 20, 1962, right after Feldman’s 
meeting with Golda Meir, while Kennedy hoped that the Israelis had stayed “where they 
were when Ben-Gurion talked to Mike.”943 It was not to be so. Israel flatly rejected the 
Johnson plan and any negotiations on his proposal, adjudging that, because of the change, 
it would not have the last word on “how many refugees would be repatriated.”944 
Unsurprisingly, Feldman took Israel’s side. In his Oral History Interview, 
Kennedy’s special counsel recalled spotting sixty-two changes differences between the 
two versions, which inevitably provoked strong opposition from Israel.945 Feldman 
recalled finding out that the State Department had worked with Johnson on a new draft 
while he was in Israel in August 1962, before Johnson met with the Arab delegation: 
“Yes, we decided these changes didn’t really make much difference”946, Talbot and 
Strong confessed, as they aimed to make it slightly more “palatable to the Israeli and more 
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palatable to the Arabs.”947 According to Feldman, from that moment on it became 
impossible to sell the plan to Golda Meir, as she commented:  
“I don’t care what the United States government tells me unofficially what they 
might do. I have to have the Plan recognize something along these lines. Most of the 
changes changed that recognition.”948 
 
The administration was not convinced by such arguments, particularly because it 
could still have provided Israel with written guarantees for their security in relation to the 
number of refugees allowed to repatriate. Also, it considered the plan to be “unaffected 
by the changes made in the language”, and regarded Israel’s reaction as “unjustified and 
contrived.”949 But, as Komer pointed out, the Israelis were not as concerned with the plan 
itself as they were “anxious that the onus for sinking it not fall squarely on them.”950 
On October 4, 1962, Syria announced its “unshakable rejection of [the] Johnson 
plan”, causing the other Arab countries to be “forced to go along” with its position.951 
The Syrian prime minister accused the Johnson Plan of being a “solution aimed only at 
expatriating them and settling them finally outside their homeland”952, but Komer 
sanguinely informed Bundy: “rejection in Arabic means maybe.”953 A few months later, 
Komer would find out that Ben Gurion had a rather different vocabulary.  
On January 23, 1963, after learning from the American ambassador in Israel, 
Barbour, that the Israeli government would not discuss the Johnson plan any further, 
Komer wrote to Kennedy: “Ben Gurion’s conditional ‘Yes’ on refugees is in fact a flat 
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‘no’”954, as he had imposed “a total, final solution which must be firmly accepted 
beforehand by the Arabs” as a requirements of Israel’s agreement to discuss a plan, thus 
imposing “impossible conditions.”955 Ben Gurion’s “no” eventually sunk the plan, forcing 
Kennedy to disengage and to reassure Israel that the US government had “no intention of 
trying to push it further with reluctant parties.”956 
Kennedy’s relationship with the Israeli leaders ended on an even bitterer note. For 
most of 1963, as the administration tried to contain the effects of the Yemen crisis, 
Kennedy tackled the issue of the Dimona facility, growing progressively more concerned 
and intolerant towards Israel’s ambiguous nuclear policy. Back in September 1962, after 
consistent insistence, the administration had managed to organise a second inspection of 
the nuclear facility, but the two scientist of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 
charge of the report, were taken to Dimona without any notice and allowed only a 40-
minute tour of the facility.957 Although the inspection confirmed that the reactor was 
“intended for peaceful purposes only”958, the administration contested that it did not last 
long enough, many areas of the facility were restricted and, since the Israeli government 
had accepted the inspection so unexpectedly, the scientists had not been allowed to 
prepare for it adequately.959 Frustrated with the Israeli government for its lack of 
collaboration on the refugee issue, its opposition to the Johnson plan, its seeming 
ingratitude for the HAWK, and its bellicose attitude in the Arab world (in December 1962 
Ben Gurion threatened retaliation “deep into Syrian territory”960 despite the US attempt 
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to forestall military actions), the Kennedy administration privately complained for 
Israel’s international conduct.961 
The amimut, as Avner Cohen defined Israel’s ambiguity over Dimona962, added 
doubts to the legitimacy of the Ben Gurion government’s intentions surrounding the 
nuclear facility. In March 1963, the CIA argued that Israel was possibly trying to “exploit 
the psychological advantages of its nuclear capability to intimidate the Arabs” and deter 
them from causing troubles on the frontiers963, also pointing out that the “Arab reaction 
to the revelation of an Israeli nuclear capability would be one of profound dismay and 
frustration.”964 Propaganda, riots and violence would rise from the Arab world against 
Israel and its allies, causing anti-US sentiments to grow and limiting US influence in the 
Arab world.965 
By the end of March 1963, the situation was not improving. Kennedy had become 
even more sensitive about the nuclear issue after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 
had brought the world to the brink of a third, and nuclear, world war, and he urged the 
administration to organise as soon as possible “the next informal inspection of the Israeli 
reactor complex”.966 Of course, many of the administration’s concerns were related to the 
possible Soviet gains in the region: “We do not believe that the USSR would be willing 
to provide Arab governments with nuclear weapons”, reads a memorandum prepared by 
the CIA in early March 1963, “The Soviets would, however, see plenty of opportunity for 
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winning political advantage.”967 The CIA argued that Moscow would try to use Israel’s 
nuclear facility to gain sympathy and support from the Arab states, provide the Arab 
states, particularly Nasser, with non-nuclear weapons, and eventually “find the basis for 
a firmer Bloc-Arab alignment against the West”.968 Once again, Kennedy’s attempts to 
find common ground with Nasser and enhance US prestige in the region were threatened 
by Israel’s national policy.  
On March 26, 1963, Rusk met with McCone, the CIA director. During the 
meeting, it emerged that in February 1963, an editorial in the London Jewish Observer 
and Middle East Review had predicted Israel’s future acquisition of nuclear weapons, 
arguing that it would explode a bomb in the near future.969 Fearing that the article could 
in fact fuel the Arab world’s hostility against Israel and the United States, and thus 
accelerate Soviet infiltration in the region, the administration put even more pressure on 
Israel to share, even just privately, the real short and long-term intentions of Dimona.  
“The President is very, very concerned about any proliferation of nuclear 
weapons”, Feldman told Shimon Peres during a conversation in early April 1963, “and 
he hope[s] that Israel would not develop or obtain this kind of weaponry.”970 Peres 
commented that Israel “would not do anything in this field unless it finds that other 
countries in the area are involved in it”971, but Ben Gurion’s letter to Kennedy, dated April 
26, 1963, cast doubt on Peres’s statement: in light of the Tripartite Declaration of Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq, which promised to “establish a military union to liberate Palestine””972, 
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because of Nasser’s acquisition of Soviet weapons, and with the uprisings in Jordan 
prompted by the 1963 wave of Nasserism, Ben Gurion commented that “the Hawk alone 
is not a deterrent.”973 What did the prime minister mean? Could his letter be interpreted 
as an actual declaration that Israel was looking for a more effective deterrent? Could that 
be the atomic bomb? 
On May 4, 1963, Kennedy sent his reply to Ben Gurion. The president was under 
attack from some congressmen who were accusing the administration of having a pro-
Nasser policy in the Middle East.974 Kennedy reassured Ben Gurion of the US 
commitment to the defence and security of Israel, but took the opportunity to give him a 
veiled warning: “the danger which we foresee is not so much that of an early Arab attack 
as that of a successful development of advanced offensive systems”.975 The reference to 
Dimona is clear: Israel’s fears, while understandable, could not in any way justify the 
nuclear proliferation. 
The 1963 wave of Nasserism compelled the administration to tackle the issue of 
Israel’s “active defence” as strongly as Dimona. Seeking to prevent growing tensions 
between Arabs and Israelis, on May 1, 1963, the administration issued a statement of 
security guarantee in the hopes that it could give satisfaction to Ben Gurion, forestall 
Israel’s reprisal policy and avoid the risk of losing ground in the Arab world. “[The] US 
remains, as it has been since 1950, deeply interested in the maintenance of peace and 
stability anywhere in the Near East. It remains strongly opposed to the use of force or 
threat of force between any of the states in that area as well as to the violation of frontiers 
or armistice lines.”976 By September 1963, Israeli leaders advanced the idea of joint 
consultations between the two governments, and just a couple of months later a secret 
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meeting between US and Israeli officials, aimed at discussing the UAR and Israel’s 
missile capabilities took place in Washington.977 Although the administration tried to 
explain that the meeting was “merely [an] exchange [of] views”978, the secret talks of 
November 1963 constituted in fact the first high-level consultation between Washington 
and Tel Aviv on the security of the region.  
With regards to Dimona, on May 10, 1963, the administration decided it was time 
for a new inspection. Barbour was told to press Ben Gurion to allow another visit on the 
basis of the previous apparent spirit of collaboration shown by the Israelis. Fearing that 
Ben Gurion would try to “throw question of Dimona inspections into [the] arena of 
bargaining for things Israel wants”, the ambassador was instructed to take a hard line: 
“This is matter of global responsibility for [the] US Government transcending what we 
expect to be reciprocal give and take in our day-to-day bilateral relations.”979 Almost 
unsurprisingly, from the Israeli Embassy in the United States, Komer was told that “the 
Israelis were determined to get something out of the US in the way of greater security 
reassurances.”980 
The amimut was getting on Kennedy’s nerves. On May 18, 1963, the president 
sent another letter to Ben Gurion, making even clearer Washington’s position on the 
nuclear proliferation issue. A close look at some of the main points of Kennedy’s message 
allows a better understanding of his firm position: 
“I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world 
than the control of nuclear weapons...  the dangers… are so obvious that I am sure I need 
not repeat them here… We are concerned with the disturbing effects on world stability 
which would accompany the development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel… I 
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can well appreciate your concern for developments in the UAR. But I see no present or 
imminent nuclear threat to Israel from there.”981 
 
But the most interesting and significant passage of Kennedy’s letter to Ben 
Gurion, censored for nearly 40 years because it was considered too sensitive, represents 
the pinnacle of Kennedy’s discontent with the Israeli government: 
“This commitment and this support would be seriously jeopardized in the public 
opinion in this country and in the West as a whole if it should be thought that this 
Government was unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as 
the question of the character of Israel's effort in the nuclear field."982 
 
Nevertheless, Ben Gurion’s response was again disappointing. The prime minister 
refused to allow twice-yearly inspections, accepting instead only annual inspections. 
Also, he took back an earlier agreement that inspections be conducted by both American 
and neutral scientists, accepting “either-or, not both.”983 Such conditions clearly worked 
to the detriment of the transparency sought by the Kennedy administration, yet were 
perfect for the amimut: annual inspections allowed a longer time for covert operations984, 
and even if the previous inspection had not been convincing at all, Ben Gurion insisted it 
was effective. In addition, as the scientists had to be either neutral or American, the US 
position was jeopardised in either case: exclusively neutral scientists would deprive 
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Washington of a direct eye on Dimona, while exclusively American scientists would rob 
the inspections of the neutrality needed in front of the international community.  
Kennedy’s reply was not long in coming. On June 15, 1963 he stressed to Ben 
Gurion how important it was that the inspections conformed to international standards, 
thus urging him to agree to twice-yearly visits, and to allow sufficient time and full access 
to the facility. 
Just like in his previous letter, Kennedy warned: 
“As I wrote you on 18 May, this Government's commitment to and support of 
Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain 
reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of the character of 
Israel's effort in the nuclear field."985  
 
This, however, was Kennedy’s last letter to Ben Gurion. On June 26, 1963, Ben 
Gurion resigned after the MAPAI political crisis linked to the “Lavon Affair”986, and Evi 
Eshkol became prime minister.987 The change in the Israeli government did not however 
change the administration’s concerns about Dimona. 
Kennedy tackled Eshkol with the same vehemence he did with Ben Gurion, 
writing on July 5 that, if no progress was made on Dimona, “this Government's 
commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized.”988 While a 
frustrated Komer wished that the administration could “literally force them to back 
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down”, or, more colourfully, “cram our policy down Israel's throat”989, Kennedy waited 
patiently for Eshkol’s reply, which arrived on August 19, 1963. While allowing 
inspections for the end of the year, the prime minister “carefully avoided explicit 
commitment” on the issue of twice-yearly inspections, providing a “sufficiently unclear” 
wording on the matter. With regards to the second point of Washington’s request, 
concerning full access to the facility, Eshkol limited it to the sole reactor but gave “no 
response on the other points”.990 A perfect amimut after all.  
However, after Israel signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty on August 8, 1963, the 
pressure on Dimona was soothed. The US, Britain and the Soviet Union had finally 
reached an agreement within the UN, which committed the countries "not to carry out 
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, 
under water, or in outer space, or in any other environment if the explosion would cause 
radioactive debris to be present outside the borders of the state conducting the 
explosion.991 With the Yemen crisis still to be resolved, and Congress’s pressure on the 
White House on account of Kennedy’s support for Nasser, the administration accepted 
Eshkol’s promises on the inspections and the Limited Test Ban Treaty as temporarily 
sufficient guarantees on Dimona. Kennedy however, would not live long enough to 
witness the effectiveness of his warnings to the Israeli government, or to pursue his anti-
nuclear policy. Following his assassination, Johnson put an end to the American pressure 
on Israel’s nuclear programme and Nixon to the inspections. To this day, the “don’t ask, 
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don’t tell” agreement dominates the frightening understanding between the United States 
and Israel over the nuclear issue.992 
Kennedy had unintentionally laid the foundations of America’s special alliance 
with Israel. In an attempt to secure his rapprochement with Nasser and limit the 
consequences of Israel’s aggressive policies, Kennedy embraced Israel’s security to 
forestall its “active defence” and thus avoid an Arab-Israeli war that could favour the 
Soviet infiltration in the region.  
Kennedy’s most significant actions towards Israel, the HAWK sale in 1962 and 
the 1963 joint consultations on security issues, were indeed adopted in the context of the 
renewed frictions between Arabs and Israelis, whether originating from the inter-Arab 
propaganda of 1962 or in the shadow of the Yemen crisis of 1963. Both Eisenhower and 
Kennedy did not wish to rely on Israel as a regional proxy, but differently from his 
predecessor, Kennedy sought to contain Israel by embracing its security concerns. Of 
course, the administration tried to maximise the gains of such historic gestures, for 
reasons of both domestic and foreign policy. However, whatever secondary intent the 
administration might have had, Kennedy’s policies towards Israel were designed to secure 
the rapprochement with Nasser, which remained the cornerstone of Kennedy’s Mideast 
strategy until Congress’s amendment and his brutal assassination. 
In summary, it would be misleading to argue that Kennedy simply adopted a pro-
Israeli policy, or that he actively sought closer ties with Israel to advance his Cold War 
strategies. Kennedy’s sole Cold War option in the region was Nasser, and in an attempt 
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to contain Israel in order to foster a working relationship with the key Arab leader, he 
unintentionally laid the foundations of the US-Israeli alliance for Johnson to build upon.  
238 
 
Chapter 5. The Yemen crisis 
 
End of the road 
Although from a global point of view the Yemen crisis was one of the least 
significant events that occurred during Kennedy’s short but intense presidency, certainly 
not comparable to the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, from a regional standpoint it 
emerges as a watershed moment in the history of Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle 
East. The involvement of regional players such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, 
and foreign ones such as Britain and the Soviet Union, contributed towards making an 
international quagmire of the 1962-1963 crisis, the unexpected consequences of which 
would influence American posture in the region for years to come.  
The Yemen crisis marked the end of Kennedy’s policy of rapprochement with 
Nasser, and contributed significantly in strengthening Washington’s ties with Faysal and 
Ben Gurion, thus laying the foundations of the US special alliances with Saudi Arabia 
and Israel prompted by the change of administration in late 1963. Indeed, the 
administration’s inability to significantly influence the course of the events in Yemen, 
brought Congress, concerned that the US government was “buying both butter and guns 
for aggressor nations”993 to interrupt Kennedy’s overture to Nasser by passing the 
Gruening amendment in early November 1963. Kennedy opposed the amendment, 
commenting during his last press conference on November 14, 1963, that nothing was 
“more dangerous than to end this program”994, but his death, which occurred just two 
weeks later, prevented the administration from taking significant actions to bolster the 
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rapprochement with Cairo. By ending the programme of economic assistance to Egypt, 
the Congress put a definitive end to Washington’s attempts to do business with Nasser.  
Throughout the crisis, as Kennedy sought to maintain a good relationship with 
Cairo and endure Congress’s pressure, the administration pursued a strategy aimed at 
stabilising Saudi Arabia and enhancing Israel’s security, thus securing US oil interests, 
and containing Israel without openly reversing the positive trends in US-UAR relations. 
By late 1963 however, Washington’s ties with both Saudi Arabia and Israel were so 
enhanced, and those with Cairo so strained, that after Kennedy’s assassination neither 
Congress nor the new US president questioned who America’s Mideast allies really were. 
Indeed, Kennedy’s actions during the Yemen crisis inadvertently laid the foundations for 
the US special alliances with Saudi Arabia and Israel. Kennedy never actively pursued 
this goal, because neither country constituted a real Cold War option for the 
administration, but in trying to stabilise the first and contain the second, the administration 
became in effect responsible for setting the basis for a closer partnership with both the 
Saudi and the Israeli government. 
As noted earlier, although the Kennedy administration did not nurture any great 
sympathy towards the ultra-conservative Saudi regime, it was however aware of the 
importance of preserving the integrity of the country, whose natural resources and close 
ties with the West, enhanced by the economic partnership between the American-owned 
ARAMCO and the House of Saud, had made Saudi Arabia one of Washington’s greatest 
concerns in the region. Since early 1961, the administration had been sceptical about the 
Saudi Royal Family’ chances of survival (much as it was of the Shah of Iran’s, for that 
matter995). In a time marked by the tension between tradition and modernity, progressive 
and conservative regimes, old and new Middle East, many US policy-makers, including 
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Kennedy, had embraced the theory that the old Arab monarchs were doomed to disappear 
if they failed to implement socio-economic and political reforms that could broaden their 
domestic consensus and lead to the internal stability of their countries.996 However, even 
if a revolution in Yemen was a good thing, a similar event in Saudi Arabia, Jordan or 
even Iran, risked jeopardising the multitude of the Western interests in the Middle East, 
whether economic or geo-strategic. Thus, when a new wave of Nasserism developed 
across the region during the Yemen crisis, provoking two coups in Syria and Iraq in early 
1963 as well as severe tensions in Jordan in April 1963, the Kennedy administration 
turned its attention to Saudi Arabia, a country whose political problems caused by Saud’s 
extravagant living and poor financing, had made the country particularly susceptible to 
popular uprisings and internal power struggles. Kennedy pushed acting King Faysal to 
adopt a series of social, political and economic reforms, strengthening Washington’s ties 
with Saudi Arabia through programmes of economic and military assistance (historically 
through operation HARD SURFACE, launched in July 1963), in order to ensure its 
survival in the face of the pan-Arabist and revolutionary propaganda of the UAR.  
The failure to channel the “wave of the future” in a direction that could serve US 
interests, brought Washington to return towards a pre-Kennedy mindset, one in which, as 
the Eisenhower era revealed, the Arab monarchies were considered a safer bet than the 
nationalists, and the Western-oriented Saudi regime was considered a valid alternative to 
Cairo for the role of force of attraction of the Middle East.997 After Kennedy’s abortive 
experiment with the revolutionary forces in the region, L.B. Johnson would come to 
regard the policy of rapprochement with Nasser as little more than a naïve strategy, and 
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would thus significantly strengthen Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Washington through 
the sale of over 100 million dollars in military hardware in 1966.998 It is important to point 
out that, as mentioned earlier in this work, Kennedy promoted the same kind of reforms 
in Iran, where the Shah was facing a severe domestic crisis caused by his authoritarian 
rule. When in late 1962, he finally promoted the reforms encapsulated in the White 
Revolution, the Shah managed to suppress the protests and to retain his power, becoming, 
together with Saudi Arabia, one of the two pillars of Nixon’s regional strategy.  
In terms of long-lasting alliances, the events of 1962-1963 also indirectly favoured 
Israel, moving the country towards the full-blown alliance with the United States that we 
know today. The Tripartite Declaration signed in April 17, 1963 by Egypt, Syria and Iraq, 
informally restored the United Arab Republic after the break-up which had occurred in 
late September 1961999, aggravating Israel’s fears for an Arabs’ “war of destruction 
against Israel.”1000 Complaining of the renewed alliance between the three Arab republics, 
later that month Ben Gurion sent a letter to Kennedy, stating that the HAWK could no 
longer constitute an effective deterrent1001, and hinting shortly after to a pre-emptive strike 
against the Arab threat: “Inaction would be tantamount to suicide”1002, warned Ben 
Gurion, and the Kennedy administration was once again confronted with the issue of 
Israel’s “active defence” and its incessant demands. Furthermore, when in mid-April 
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1963, rumours of a possible coup against King Hussein of Jordan reached the White 
House, the administration’s first objective was to prevent Israel from pre-emptively 
moving its troops to the West Bank, and thus avoid an all-out Arab-Israeli war that would 
endanger US interests and create significant openings for the Soviet Union. Seeking to 
forestall Israel’s active defence, Kennedy, who in late April 1963 had rejected Ben 
Gurion’s “unrealistic” request for a joint US-USSR declaration in support of the territorial 
status quo1003, issued an informal security guarantee in early May 1963, reaffirming the 
US commitment to Israel’s survival.1004 However, as the conflict in Yemen appeared 
nowhere near resolution, and with incessant propaganda directed against Israel by the 
Syrian and Iraqi governments1005, in November 1963, Kennedy agreed to the Israeli 
suggestion of joint consultations on security issues.1006 The secret talks of November 
1963, aimed at giving yet another assurance to the Israeli government, inevitably 
strengthened the bond between the two countries. 
Yemen also became the tomb of British ambitions in the region. As noted earlier, 
throughout the crisis the Kennedy administration urged the Macmillan government to 
recognise the Yemen Arab Republic, to stop aiding the royalists, and in general to align 
its regional strategy with Washington’s. However, unable to trust Nasser and unwilling 
to put in jeopardy its protectorate in Aden, London maintained a posture in line with its 
general mistrust of the Egyptian leader and the Arab nationalists, disregarding Kennedy’s 
warnings and, in early 1963, flatly rejecting the idea of recognising a regime perceived 
as hostile to its own interests in the Arabian Peninsula. However, despite its ambitions to 
retain power in defending its own interests, the Yemen crisis revealed London’s inability 
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to play a significant role independently from Washington, let alone to influence American 
plans in the region. Nasser remained Kennedy’s number one priority in the Middle East, 
and London could do nothing but watch the United States’ firm grip on the Western 
policies in the region. When in 1968 the last British troop evacuated Aden, the United 
States would in fact become the main international actor in the region and the guarantor 
of Western interests, thus completing the changing of the guard.1007 
From a more general perspective, two more considerations can be drawn from the 
analysis of the Yemen crisis. First, that just as during the Eisenhower presidency, the US 
government remained unable to control events in the region. Kennedy criticised 
Eisenhower’s “black and white” approach to the intricate dynamics of the Middle East, 
but like his predecessor, he had to come to terms with the fact that, regardless of what 
strategy he implemented, events in the region would follow their own course. Of course, 
Kennedy showed more flexibility than Eisenhower and a better understanding of the 
challenges that the New Frontier had to face, but the Yemen crisis revealed nonetheless 
that, though the United States could play the role of mediator and adjust its posture in the 
region, it could certainly not dictate events. Secondly, the crisis shows how the US 
struggled to fully appreciate the significance of inter-Arab disputes, and thus 
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demonstrated its own inability to predict regional conflicts between different Arab states. 
For as much as Washington’s analysts prioritised the dispute between Arabs and Israelis, 
perceiving it as the core reason for the instability of the Middle East, conflicts across the 
region developed among different Arab factions as well, and more often than not these 
were more significant than US policy-makers expected. Just like Eisenhower during his 
second term, and even like several presidents after him (such as Nixon during the 1970-
1971 Jordan crisis, or Carter during the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s), Kennedy found 
himself unprepared to deal effectively with the multitude of opposing Arab actors, finding 
himself caught in a proxy war that would redefine the US priorities in the region and 
reshape its alliances.  
 
Yemen coup and recognition 
On the day of Colonel Sallal’s seizure of power and the brutal killing of several 
members of the Hamid al-Din family, the Kennedy administration found itself inevitably 
thrown into the dispute between republicans and royalists, both seeking to influence 
Washington’s position to their own advantage. Shortly after the coup, the Yemeni 
representative at the UN and al-Badr’s uncle, Prince Hassan bin Yahya, met with Phillip 
Talbot in order to convince the administration to support him against the republicans and 
to recognise him as the new leader of Yemen.1008 After arguing at length that the 
revolution did not represent the Yemeni people and trying to assert the legality of his title, 
Hassan soon learned that the royalists were not going to get Washington’s help: the 
assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs promptly told him 
that it would be “virtually impossible to assist him because the United States did not 
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interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”1009, and he was thus forced to fly to 
London, hoping to get a more accommodating response.  
The same fate awaited Anwar Sadat, secretary and main spokesman of the UAR, 
who on September 27, 1962, phoned Badeau offering a “word of advice”.1010 “Ninety 
percent of [the] country’s intelligentsia support [the] coup and republic”1011, he warned, 
urging Kennedy not to associate himself with the royalists or to allow the US allies, Saudi 
Arabia, to press him into doing so. Badeau promptly reaffirmed Washington’s position 
of non-involvement with the Arabs’ affairs, but warned that Aden and the Arab 
neighbours should be left alone: “We would be deeply concerned if [the] new Yemen 
Government undertook [a] campaign against [the] Aden protectorate and British 
flank”1012, he stated, also stressing the US concerns about the stability of the Saudi regime. 
Sadat promptly replied that the UAR government had warned the YAR that they 
“considered it highly inadvisable for them to mix in any way in current British difficulties 
in [the] southern peninsula”1013, and that Nasser was not “after the oil of Saudi 
Arabia.”1014 The UAR, he said, only planned to stay in Yemen until Sallal’s regime was 
definitively stabilised against the Imam’s supporters.  
Several reasons brought the administration to refuse to join either the royalist or 
the republican cause. Kennedy could not openly support Prince Hassan because both the 
UAR, whose support for the republicans had become immediately clear, and the Soviet 
Union, had promptly recognised the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), sending an ultimatum 
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to all the third parties involved to “keep ‘hands off’ Yemen”1015, which brought the 
administration to the immediate conclusion that siding with the royalists would be 
strategically too dangerous. In early October 1962, Komer told Kennedy that “Nasser 
policy is more important than that towards Yemen”1016, implying that supporting Hassan 
would be tantamount to losing Cairo, and would jeopardise more pivotal strategies: 
“What we say, coming after the Hawk offer and Yemen, could greatly affect our relations 
with Arabs and Israel”1017, he also warned, showing the administration’s unwillingness 
to spoil the good results of the Kennedy treatment to Nasser by backing an unknown 
prince in Yemen. Furthermore, given Moscow’s prompt recognition, Komer also warned 
that a policy supporting the old Imamate would allow the USSR to exert even more, if 
not exclusive, influence over the Arab nationalists, who would once again perceive the 
United States as a force opposed to their interests and aspirations, just as they had during 
the Eisenhower years. Finally, Hassan was not young, popular, or charismatic, and the 
administration feared that “by becoming known to be actively associated with Hassan… 
we shall alienate the very elements who are likely to assume power in Yemen sooner or 
later.”1018 This perfectly illustrates the administration’s predictions about the precarious 
future of the most traditional Arab monarchies.  
However, although the administration’s “instinctive sympathy”1019 towards 
Sallal’s new regime, other interests forced Kennedy to withhold, albeit temporarily, the 
recognition of the YAR. Concerned that the Nasserite coup would soon trespass across 
Yemen’s borders and shake the foundations of their own regimes, Saudi Arabia and 
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Jordan (as well as Britain, concerned for its protectorate in Aden) urged the Kennedy 
administration not to recognise the YAR. Knowing all too well the American interests in 
the Saudi oilfields and in the preservation of the Hashemite Kingdom, but unwilling to 
openly choose the Arab monarchies over Nasser, Kennedy tried to buy some time with 
the nationalists while reassuring the Arab monarchies by unveiling the strategy behind 
US support of Cairo: “Our hope is that gradually we can turn [the] UAR attention towards 
its internal problems, thus creating a UAR need for tranquillity, which should be reflected 
in greater calm and peace in the area generally”1020, he explained during a meeting with 
Faysal in early October 1963, stressing the importance for the Arab monarchies of 
accelerating the process of modernization and development of their countries as the “best 
antidote to Nasserism.”1021 Despite Kennedy’s assurances, Faysal remained unconvinced 
by Washington’s rapprochement with Nasser, particularly after Radio Cairo began 
issuing propaganda against Saud, claiming “he will be next.”1022 During the meeting, the 
acting king confessed that the pro-Nasser regime in Yemen was “a mortal threat to his 
position”, and he stood openly against the PL-480, complaining that the US aid to Cairo 
was being used by Nasser for “injurious and subversive activities”, and that “money 
which otherwise would have been spent on food is set free for Nasser's subversive efforts 
in other Middle Eastern countries.”1023 Interestingly, Congress would make similar 
remarks before passing the Gruening amendment.  
As the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 unveiled the danger of a direct 
nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union1024, the Middle 
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East became a smaller concern for Kennedy, who for the entire month pursued his policy 
of non-involvement in order to focus on the Caribbean. As with the Bay of Pigs invasion 
in April 1961, Kennedy kept Nasser in mind and, on October 22, 1962, he wrote a 
message to the Egyptian leader, along with other world leaders, explaining the US 
position on the Cuban issue.1025 He accused Khrushchev of breaking his promise not to 
supply offensive weapons to Cuba, and he explained his actions as means of defending 
the United States and its allies.1026 Nasser replied nine days later: “I appreciate indeed 
your effort to clarify the line of American policy... We confidently state our belief that 
the United States, with its might and prestige, can consolidate the peace more than any 
other nation.”1027 
But by late October 1962, as the heat in the Caribbean was subsiding, the Yemen 
affair was turning into a proxy war between the UAR, backed by Moscow, on one side, 
and the Arab monarchies, backed by London, on the other. Both factions had rushed to 
support their respective protégés, flooding Yemen with troops, advisors, technicians and 
weapons1028, and the administration soon realised that the policy of non-involvement was 
no longer an option. 
There were no doubts in the minds of the administration that recognition of the 
Republican regime was the most promising choice in terms of both regional and global 
strategies. By early November 1962, having learned that the YAR was already “in firm 
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and effective control of most of Yemen”1029, the administration acknowledged the 
improbability of a royalist victory and the importance of siding with the republicans in 
order to gain influence over Nasser, speed up the disengagement and avoid being caught 
supporting the losing faction. Believing that Nasser would not quit Yemen until he had 
ensured victory, Kennedy explained to an increasingly concerned Macmillan that the 
recognition of the YAR could give the administration some leverage to restrain Nasser 
from further adventures. “Paper promises from Nasser and Sallal will give us more to 
build on than if we delay much longer and then end up having to recognize without even 
these”1030, he wrote in mid-November, stressing the need for both Western powers to use 
recognition as a bargaining card while it was still possible. Unexpected support for this 
strategy came from Israel and the American Jewry. Feldman, who at the beginning of the 
crisis in late September 1962 was asked by the president to investigate Israel’s position, 
promptly met the Israeli ambassador and some other Jewish friends, and confirmed that 
if the US wanted to recognise the YAR, it should try to obtain both a promise from Nasser 
to cut down Cairo’s propaganda on the refugee issue and some sort of commitment of 
respect for Israel.1031 
By recognising Sallal’s regime, the Kennedy administration also hoped to prevent 
Faysal and Hussein from prolonging their “futile war in Yemen”1032, a conflict which 
might provoke Nasser into stretching the war beyond Yemen’s borders. Kennedy’s letters 
to Macmillan, sent later in January and March 1963, reveal the administration’s concerns 
over Faysal’s actions. “Faysal’s attempt to bleed Nasser in Yemen would recoil upon 
                                                 
1029 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, November 12, 1962. Ibidem, 96. 
1030 President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan, November 16, 1962. PREM11/3878, November 16, 
1962. 
1031 Myer Feldman, OHI, July 29, 1967, 505-507. Feldman does not mention exactly the dates of his 
meetings, but recalls that by the time he was ready to report to Kennedy, the administration had just 
recognised the YAR (December 1962). 




himself, and lead Nasser to try to undermine the Saudi regime”1033, he wrote, adding that 
only recognition could deprive Nasser “of an excuse to maintain a heavy presence in 
Yemen”. “If we force the UAR to reinforce rather than reduce its presence in Yemen”, 
Kennedy continued, “we may end up with a situation far more threatening to us.”1034 
Komer shared Kennedy’s position, confident that if Washington weighed into the 
dispute to mediate among the factions involved, it could lead the factions to stop flooding 
Yemen with arms and troops. As he told Kennedy on November 21, 1962, “we still face 
the painful task of insuring actual disengagement, but at least we’ll have started the trend 
toward settlement rather than escalation.”1035 Robert Komer was indeed the strongest 
advocate for such a strategy, as he also believed recognition would pay the highest 
dividends on a global scale: “For my money, our real gains in Afro-Asian world in the 
last year have been with Nasser, Sukarno, Nehru, even Toure, not with our so-called 
allies…all things considered, we’re putting some real spokes in [the] Soviet wheel”1036, 
he told Bundy in November 1962, showing once again the administration’s tendency to 
support high-profile neutralist leaders in order to reduce the Soviet gains in the third 
world. 
Of course, Kennedy was not deaf to the monarchies’ pleas. Following UAR 
bombing of the Saudi city of Muwassam, on November 7, 1962, the US government 
began to discuss the possibility of “preparing appropriate military measures to underline 
its Saudi commitment”, making it clear however that such a commitment was 
subordinated to “progress and reform in Saudi Arabia.”1037 Hoping to increase Faysal’s 
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sense of security and gain enough leverage to move Riyadh to disengage, the Kennedy 
administration began to toy with the idea of enhancing Saudi Arabia’s military capability 
with the goal of containing it, through a strategy that much resembled that designed for 
Israel.  
Towards the end of December 1962, the State Department concluded that 
recognition of the YAR was inevitable: the administration had indeed received Sallal’s 
word that he would respect all international obligations, implement social and economic 
reforms, restrain Nasser from manipulating Yemen’s policies and live in peace with his 
neighbours.1038 Shortly after, on December 18, an official statement was released, in 
which Sallal declared that the Yemeni government would “honour its international 
obligations, including all treaties concluded by previous government”, that it would “live 
in peace and harmony with all our neighbours” and that it would focus on its internal 
affairs “in order to ensure the equality of all citizens before law, raise social and economic 
standards of Yemen people and develop the country's heretofore neglected resources for 
the benefit of all the people.”1039 The day after the UAR had released its own statement, 
underlining its willingness to “undertake a reciprocal expeditious disengagement and 
phased removal of its troops from Yemen”1040, Kennedy extended formal recognition to 
the Yemen Arab Republic1041, proving that the rapprochement with Nasser within the 
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broader strategy of supporting the progressive forces of Arab nationalism was the White 
House’s top priority.  
 
Containment, development and viral Nasserism 
Despite its recognition of the YAR, by early 1963 things appeared rather gloomy 
for the White House. The administration found itself caught in a crossfire of criticisms 
coming from the Arab monarchies, Israel and Britain, and even Nasser seemed unmoved 
by Kennedy’s gesture, as by the end of December 1962, he had carried out another attack, 
this time against Najran, a small city in southern Saudi Arabia. As the conflict in Yemen 
appeared nowhere near a resolution, with neither faction seeming willing to disengage 
first, the US government found itself alone in the pursuit of its strategy.  
Indeed, on January 10, 1963, the Macmillan government closed the doors to a 
possible recognition of the YAR, making clear to Kennedy that “recognition in the present 
circumstances would be a recognition of an Egyptian puppet” and “a humiliation for 
us.”1042 Faysal showed no support for Kennedy’s solicitations to disengage, telling Hart 
that he would “feed fires of counterrevolution by all means short of dispatch of forces 
into Yemen.”1043 As noted earlier, even oil giants such as Standard Oil, Aramco, Texaco, 
Gulf Oil and others had their say, meeting with members of the administration such as 
Talbot, Strong and McGhee on January 10, 1963 They complained that the United States 
was providing the UAR, a country regarded as a “police state”, with over 700 million 
dollars per year in foreign aid (a greatly exaggerated figure, as pointed out by Talbot), 
and that Nasser would never go through with a disengagement agreement.1044 The 
                                                 
1042 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, CAB 139/112, January 10, 1963. 
1043 Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, December 28, 1962. FRUS 
1961-1963, Vol. XVIII, 122. 
1044 Memorandum of a Conversation, January 11, 1963. Nina Davis Howland et al., FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 
17, 18, 20, 21. 
253 
 
administration, while confessing its discomfort about Nasser’s propaganda against Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan and even Iran, pointed out that treating Nasser “like the cornered rat”, 
would only stir up more troubles1045: Nasser’s capability for stirring up difficulties in the 
Near East remains”, interjected Strong, “he can foment Palestinian refugee unrest; make 
other Arab governments take an activist line against Israel; and stir up troubles for the oil 
companies.”1046 Finally, when the administration was questioned about the reforms in 
Saudi Arabia, Talbot commented that “the pressures for change in Saudi Arabia were 
such that if it did not take place by evolutionary means it would by revolution”1047, thus 
sharing with the representatives of the oil companies, the administration’s concerns and 
strategies around the Arab monarchies. 
Of course, although the administration had already privately expressed that its 
sole interest in Saudi Arabia was its oil1048, Kennedy sought to make a gesture and limit 
he noises to a minimum. Dispatching Terry Duce, former vice president of ARAMCO, to 
Saudi Arabia in late January 1963, Kennedy hoped to build “a bridge with Faysal and the 
Saudis”1049 by reassuring the acting king that the US government was committed to the 
integrity of his country. Kennedy’s gesture, as argued earlier, was however merely 
designed to reduce some domestic pressure on the White House while keeping in check 
both the Saudis and the oil companies, and should not therefore be interpreted as a sign 
of the lobby’s power over the administration’s policies. Referring to the requests of the 
oil companies, Talbot recalled in his Oral History Interview, “I never got the impression 
that…we really were under instruction to accommodate this.”1050 




1048Memorandum from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, June 7, 1962. JFKL, NSF, Box 156A, Saudi 
Arabia, General, 6-6-62, 6-30-62. 
1049 Parker T. Hart, OHI, April 15, 1969, 50. 
1050 Phillips Talbot, OHI, August 13, 1970, 57. 
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Saudi Arabia was not the only monarchy to openly manifest its discontent with 
Kennedy’s policies. Even more dramatically, in late December 1962 King Hussein of 
Jordan had in fact announced he would recognise some Soviet satellites, a decision he 
took for both economic and political reasons before the Yemen crisis, but that was 
accelerated by Kennedy’s sale of the HAWK and, especially, by US recognition of 
Sallal’s regime.1051 While making immediately clear that no Soviet aid should be received 
by Jordan, pragmatism prevailed over anxiety among US policy-makers: “It seemed 
inevitable that sooner or later [the] King would establish relations with the Soviets”1052, 
argued the State Department later in August 1963, in what might seem a paradoxical point 
of view. However, it was specified that, if anything, Hussein’s slight opening to some 
Soviet satellite could perhaps strengthen his regime by mitigating the allegations that he 
was a Western puppet and by tuning his policies with those of his Arab neighbours.1053 
As the administration sought to find balance between monarchies and nationalists, 
new problems emerged on the Israeli front, as during a meeting with Kennedy in Palm 
Beach on December 27, 1962, Golda Meir raised Israel’s concerns about Washington’s 
tolerance of Cairo’s manoeuvres: “There is a constant shadow of Nasser's ambitions in 
the Middle East”, she complained, a shadow that was now strengthened by the Egyptian 
acquisition of “more arms from the Soviets”, shipped in to fight the war in Yemen. 
Reiterating that “in case of an invasion the United States would come to the support of 
Israel”, Kennedy explained once again the strategic advantage of supporting Nasser: “we 
went ahead in order to try to lessen the impact of the fighting on Saudi Arabia and the 
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risk that a pro-UAR regime might take over in Saudi Arabia… this seemed an action in 
your interest.”1054 
Although the administration tried to reassure the parties involved that its 
diplomatic leverage with the UAR was critical to maintaining a certain degree of control 
over events, Kennedy concluded that a frank latter to Nasser would not hurt after all. 
Seeking to proceed towards a termination of the hostilities, at the end of January 1963, 
Kennedy wrote to the Egyptian leader that his actions in Yemen could “prejudice our 
growing rapport”, stressing however that the message was intended to “clear the air”1055 
rather than to threaten him.  
As the conflict in Yemen dragged on, on February 9, 1963, news of a pro-Nasser 
coup in Iraq arrived in Washington. Rusk sent Kennedy a memorandum, explaining that 
a coup led by Colonel Abdul Karim Mustafa had manage to overthrow and kill Qasim, 
and establish a new nationalist government “with a strong pan-Arab bent.”1056 Seeking to 
“encourage a constructive Iraqi role in the Yemen problem”1057, and hoping to foster a 
new, better relationship between Washington and Baghdad, which had previously been 
tarnished by Qasim’s close association with Moscow, the US government agreed to grant 
recognition. The administration believed that closer ties with the new regime in Iraq 
promised to pay high dividends on both a political and economic level, by favouring 
constructive relationships with the Arab neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and oil-
rich Kuwait, and by opening the country to international investors after “Qasim's 
restrictive measures against foreign business.”1058 Of course, if on the one hand promoting 
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neutralism over communism in Iraq fulfilled Kennedy’s larger regional and global 
strategies, on the other recognition of the new regime further exacerbated the fears of 
Nasser’s nemeses, as the coup of February opened the road for a second wave of 
Nasserism that, resembling that of 1958, promised to unleash panic across the region. As 
a matter of fact, on March 6, 1963, Komer rightfully predicted “a period of heightened 
fluidity in inter-Arab politics”, and thus suggested: “Best policy for us is to sit tight and 
be prepared to deal with whoever comes out on top”, adding one warning: to choose Saudi 
Arabia over the revolutionary forces in the region, who were once again able to re-write 
the geopolitical map (as Kennedy had commented on the occasion of the 1958 uprisings), 
would be tantamount to jeopardising the US interests in the Saudi oilfields.1059 Kennedy 
would respond to the 1963 wave of Nasserism during the following months, when the 
attempted coup in Jordan, and the Iraqi and Syrian hostile propaganda against Israel 
forced the administration to take special measures to contain the Ben Gurion government, 
laying the foundations of the US-Israel alliance.  
Seeking to forestall an inevitably hostile reaction, Kennedy promptly agreed to 
make gestures towards Israel and Saudi Arabia, both concerned at Nasser’s seemingly 
increasing power in the region. The administration hoped that small diplomatic tokens 
could restrain Israel from undertaking pre-emptive attacks against the UAR, stabilise 
Saudi Arabia, and perhaps restrain Nasser from escalating the conflict in Yemen. On 
March 2, 1963, Kennedy pledged to ensure “Israel’s security and well-being, its right to 
exist as a state” - a generic commitment intended to reassure Ben Gurion without spoiling 
the US position among the Arabs – thus resisting, at least for time being, “any Israeli 
attempts to formalize or institutionalize a special American-Israeli relationship.”1060 
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Indeed, as noted earlier, Kennedy did not actively seek to establish closer ties with Israel, 
but such a result was the unintended outcome of a strategy largely designed to contain the 
country. After all, Ben Gurion had obtained the HAWK, doomed the Johnson Plan, and 
had still not come clean on Dimona, and Kennedy was less and less inclined to jeopardise 
the US position in the Arab world (to Moscow’s advantage), in order to openly favour an 
ambiguous leader like Ben Gurion.  
With Saudi Arabia, Kennedy pursued a double policy intended to enhance its 
security with the goal of both appeasing Faysal on one hand and deterring Nasser on the 
other, while simultaneously strengthening the regime through political, social and 
economic reforms. In keeping with his strategy of securing US interests in Saudi oil 
without reversing the trend in the US-UAR relationship by openly favouring Faysal over 
Nasser, Kennedy strengthened Washington’s ties with Riyadh through a clever 
diplomatic manoeuvre, which would be implemented later, in early July 1963. During a 
meeting in the White House on February 25, 1963, it was decided to send a special 
emissary, Ellsworth Bunker, to Saudi Arabia in order to “offer the politico-military 
reassurance of a ‘plate glass fighter squadron’”1061, should Faysal agree to disengage. 
Operation HARD SURFACE, as the manoeuvre later came to be known, consisted of 
“eight F-100 tactical fighter aircraft and one transport-type command support aircraft”1062 
and was aimed at assisting Faysal in the development of “a better air defense capability 
of their own.”1063 Kennedy made clear that the offer to Faysal should not assume the 
American Air Force would stay permanently on the mission, but simply for a few months, 
just long enough to get the disengagement process to start. It was, to put it in Komer’s 
words, no more than a “token”.1064 
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As noted earlier however, Kennedy’s decision to approve operation HARD 
SURFACE cannot be seen as a testament to his intention of shifting Washington’s 
regional goals from the revolutionary forces of the Arab nationalism to the traditional 
Arab monarchy. Warren Bass has for instance argued that the operation constituted in 
effect “a glum terminus for the attempt to woo Nasser”1065, yet he seems to exaggerate 
the impact of an operation carried out by a squadron that lacked “the radar, 
communications, and munitions necessary to perform an effective air defense 
function.”1066 The aim of HARD SURFACE was in fact simply to provide a “credible” 
warning to Nasser, so as to deter him from thinking of moving his troops into Saudi 
Arabia1067, and not to make the House of Saud the centre of the American regional 
strategies.1068 After all, Kennedy had imposed strict rules of engagement1069, and had 
made sure that he would have the last word on any action taken by the US Air Force.1070 
Furthermore, as Robert Komer would point out later in August 1963, the US military 
support to Saudi Arabia was mainly intended to “buy some time for Saudi Arabia to 
modernize”, given that progress and development were “the only way these monarchies 
can survive.”1071 Even though the administration believed that there was “more smoke 
than fire”1072 in the theory that Nasser would march into Saudi Arabia, the risk of internal 
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uprisings fomented by the UAR propaganda constituted a much more serious threat than 
a direct invasion. Thus, the administration chose to avoid any risk: by dispatching its air 
force, the US government hoped to deter Nasser from extending the conflict beyond 
Yemen’s borders long enough to allow Faysal to stabilise his regime internally.  
While the administration kept a close eye on the US economic missions to Saudi 
Arabia and on Faysal’s reform plan (as early as January 1963 Hart reported in fact some 
setback on its implementation1073), on March 2, 1963, Kennedy sent another blunt letter 
to Nasser: “I think there is a real risk that events might lead to a collision involving the 
interests of our two countries. The question is how to avoid such a collision.”1074 Even 
Komer admitted that Kennedy’s message was one of the strongest he had ever seen.1075 
The president explained the purpose of Bunker’s mission, inviting Nasser to respect his 
part of the agreement: “unless UAR stops overt attacks on Saudi Arabia [the] United 
States Government will be forced [to] review its policy toward UAR.”1076 Although such 
letters might reasonably give the impression that Kennedy was linking the PL-480 to 
Nasser’s disengagement, the future correspondence between the two leaders and the 
administration’s private talks on Nasser show that the New Frontiersmen still perceived 
Nasser as “the bulk of the Arab world”1077, and were not willing to put an end to the 
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‘Kennedy treatment’. On March 4, 1963, Nasser met Badeau, agreeing to “make an initial 
cut in its forces simultaneously with a temporary Saudi suspension of support to the 
royalists.”1078 Ever the pragmatist, Komer reassured Kennedy that “Nasser’s reply to your 
warning is just about as responsive as could be expected”1079, given that the royalists were 
still being supplied by the Arab monarchies. Nasser had agreed to “hold off further attacks 
for a few weeks to give our mediation efforts a chance”. “His answer”, Komer added, 
“also shows that our new policy has given us leverage with him.”1080 
That same month however, the administration’s efforts to terminate the conflict 
in Yemen suffered from two setbacks. The first one was caused by an article published 
by Hedrick Smith of the New York Times, entitled “US Assured by Nasser Attack on 
Saudis Will Halt”1081, in which Smith claimed: “The United States has been assured by 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser that the United Arab Republic will suspend its military 
attacks on against Saudi Arabia” and that “the commitment came in response to a stern 
Unites States warning.”1082 Even worse, Smith wrote that “In return for the Egyptian 
commitment to suspend such attacks, the United States is reported to have promised that 
it would make a maximum effort to persuade Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia to cease 
giving aid to Royalist forces in Yemen.”1083 The wording of the article seemed thus to 
imply that the Saudi disengagement would follow the Egyptian withdrawal, while in 
actual fact Nasser had made abundantly clear that he would stay in Yemen as long as 
Faysal supported the royalists. To put the “agreement” in that way seemed a clear 
provocation to the Egyptian leader, and an indirect attack on his prestige in the Arab 
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world. Kennedy promptly told Badeau to inform Nasser that the White House was “highly 
embarrassed by the "distorted stories" in the US press”1084, and to invite him to pursue 
the disengagement plan regardless. Komer’s reaction to the news gives an idea of the full 
extent of the danger: “Disaster has struck. You know this is the one thing Nasser can’t 
take. For it to get out publicly that he was forced to back down would cause him to lose 
tremendous face. We’re in trouble.”1085 Nasser’s response in fact, was the renewal of a 
“small scale bombing of the two Saudi towns”, adjudging that Saudi support to the 
royalists was still “going full blast.”1086 Although the Egyptian leader justified the new 
attack in light of continued Saudi support for the royalists, Komer reported: “We are 
convinced that Nasser's renewed small scale bombing of the two Saudi towns is a 
carefully calculated answer to the leak that we warned him and he agreed to lay off”.1087 
Critically, with this new bombing, the chances of calming down Faysal diminished 
dramatically. 
Even more dramatically, on March 8, 1963, the Syrian government was 
overthrown in a Ba’athist coup, bringing to power, just as in Iraq, a pro-Nasser regime. 
Rusk promptly told Kennedy that “similar factors which motivated our prompt 
recognition of Iraq are operative in this case”1088 and that Komer and the State Department 
advocated swift recognition. Indeed, the new Syrian regime had announced its intentions 
to respect international obligations, it met the legal criteria, was strongly anti-communist 
and sought friendly relations with the West, was anti-Israel though wished to maintain a 
defensive posture, and would seek Arab unity but “will undoubtedly seek to preserve 
Syria's identity”.1089 More importantly however, the administration hoped that the new 
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regimes in Iraq and Syria could result in some strategic “advantages for the United 
States.”1090 In fact, as the CIA reported on March 13, 1963, Nasser clearly expressed that 
he did not want “a coup in Saudi Arabia, nor for that matter in Jordan”, being now too 
busy dealing with the new regimes in Syria and Iraq. “The Nationalists” it was reported, 
“now have their hands full digesting the two coups in recent weeks. Two more now would 
be too much of a good thing.”1091 Furthermore, not only did both governments in Baghdad 
and Damascus, incidentally strongly anti-communism, seem eager to maintain a certain 
degree of independence from Cairo, but Nasser himself appeared “not entirely happy 
about the coups”: after describing the newly-formed governments as “largely incompetent 
and irresponsible”, the Egyptian leader admitted his scepticism about his chances of 
avoiding embarrassments caused by the two new regimes1092, as well as his doubts about 
provoking coups in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, being particularly “concerned about [the] 
United States reaction.”1093 Hoping to gain some leverage against Nasser by showing 
support to Arab nationalism, and that the new coups would “distract” him from the 
conflict with Saudi Arabia, on March 13, 1963, Washington extended formal recognition 
to the new Syrian government.  
 
The brave, young king  
While the Kennedy administration hoped that recognition of the new regimes in 
Iraq and Syria would give it leverage on Nasser, and so restrain him from instigating 
similar coups in Saudi Arabia, the 1963 wave of Nasserism increased Faysal and 
Hussein’s fears about Nasser’s ascendancy, as well as Ben Gurion’s concerns about 
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greater Arab unity. Seeking to contain the effects of Nasser’s renewed influence and avoid 
widespread panic across the region, by mid-March 1963, the administration 
acknowledged the “urgency of bringing the Yemen conflict to an early close” and having 
Faysal withdraw his troops and focus on internal reform.1094 
Ever the strategist, Kennedy appealed to the Saudis’ fear, if not their very survival 
instinct, in order to speed up Faysal’s disengagement. On March 14, 1963, Kennedy wrote 
that the Yemen crisis was no longer an internal conflict within a small country, nor was 
it any more a battlefield of clashing interests; it was on the contrary the spark plug of “a 
new atmosphere in the Arab world”, the symbol of Nasser’s redemption, the clear 
indication that the old monarchies were not welcomed in this newly-shaped Middle 
East.1095 “The Egyptian offensive in Yemen seems to us on the eve of success. Our 
intelligence confirms your remarks that revolutionary ideas are abroad in your country”, 
Kennedy continued, “Frankly I think it is emphatically in your interest that the 
disengagement process begin”. In short, Kennedy concluded, “we want to help you, but 
you must make it possible for us to do so”.1096 
By early April 1963, Kennedy’s warnings finally seemed to be paying off. 
Because of the White House’s warning and the increasing domestic pressure caused by 
Saudi Arabia’s economic and social problems1097 (the State Department made clear that 
Faysal’s actions in Yemen would “strengthen opposition elements in Saudi Arabia and 
weaken Saud regime”, and that the Royal Family was “on a course of self-
destruction”1098), Faysal appeared more inclined to cut off Saudi aid to the royalists, to 
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establish a demilitarised zone on the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and to 
cooperate with the United Nations towards disengagement, provided that the UAR carried 
out its own part of the agreement.1099 For his part, even Nasser appeared progressively 
more inclined to cooperate with the disengagement plan. Concerned about Kennedy’s 
reaction to a possible nationalist takeover in Saudi Arabia and Jordan and, given the 
mixed results of the recent coups in Iraq and Syria, the Egyptian leader confessed he did 
not want to “get the blame” if Faysal fell.1100 
Enthusiastically praising Nasser’s “constructive and statesmanlike approach”, on 
April 18, 1963, Kennedy wrote to Cairo: “United States policy has not changed, nor do I 
see any current reason to change it”. Kennedy concluded his letter by expressing “a word 
of congratulation on the agreement in principle announced in Cairo on the formation of a 
new and enlarged United Arab Republic” able to meet “the aspirations and views of the 
Arab peoples concerned”.1101 Despite the harsh words that Kennedy had previously 
written to Nasser in order to obtain his cooperation in the disengagement plan, their April 
correspondence shows that the rapprochement with the UAR was still key to the New 
Frontier’s overall strategy for the Middle East. 
However, by mid-April 1963, the Kennedy administration was forced to shift the 
focus of its Mideast policy from Sanaa to Amman, where the explosive situation in Jordan 
and the threat of a possible Israeli invasion risked provoking a full-blown Arab-Israeli 
war. On April 17, 1963, the administration was informed that King Hussein could fall 
victim to an imminent Nasser coup1102: Radio Cairo had indeed been fuelling the 
                                                 
1099 Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, April 7, 1963. FRUS 1961-
1963, Vol. XVIII, 209. 
1100 CIA Telegram, March 13, 1963. JFKL, NSF, Box 168A, United Arab Republic, General, 1-63, 3-63. 
1101 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic, April 18, 1963. 
FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVIII, 215. 




Jordanian population’s anger against the king for his support of the royalists in Yemen, 
for his opposition to pan-Arabism, for his close ties with the West and, allegedly, with 
Israel, and for opposing the nationalist ambitions of the Jordanian people.1103 Advocating 
a war of destruction against Israel, Cairo’s propaganda found a receptive audience in a 
population composed largely of Palestinians, and they quickly started rioting in the streets 
of Amman demanding the fall of Hussein and the annexation of Jordan to the UAR, 
leaving King Hussein with no support but his army. Concerned for the events of Iraq and 
Syria, back in early April 1963 Shimon Peres had confessed to Kennedy that “If there 
should be outright intervention by the UAR, this would certainly call for a reaction by 
Israel.”1104 Thus, when in mid-April, tensions exploded across the streets of Amman, the 
administration was once again confronted with Israel’s “active defence” and the risk that 
Ben Gurion would escalate the turmoil in Jordan to a war against the UAR, incidentally 
seizing the opportunity to grab the West Bank. The administration however, did not 
perceive Israel’s fears as justifiable, as it believed that the “trouble was largely caused by 
enthusiastic students” rather than by a direct plot orchestrated by the UAR, adding that, 
given the Yemen affair, Nasser would not “risk Israeli military intervention in Jordan”.1105 
Sensing Washington’s growing agitation, on April 27, Barbour promptly cabled 
that Israel appeared “concerned but not excited” about the turmoil in Jordan, and that he 
had seen no indications that Ben Gurion planned on seizing the West Bank.1106 Arguing 
that the Israeli government “prefers no essential change in Jordan’s status quo”, the 
ambassador described the West Bank as a possible “economic and demographic liability” 
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for Israel, thus implying that the alarmism was perhaps unjustified. The ambassador 
stressed however that Ben Gurion would not tolerate the presence of Nasser’s troops so 
close to his own territory “for it would not be Jordanian internal affair any more than 
Soviet rockets in Cuba was internal affair”.1107 
Ben Gurion’s subsequent letter to Kennedy seemed indeed to confirm Barbour’s 
last remark. “Recent Middle East events... adversely affect area stability and Israel's 
security” he commented, adding that Israel would not acquiesce to such attempts at 
“liberation”.1108 If some UAR devotees toppled Hussein, Ben Gurion made it clear that 
Israel would not sit by and watch. Therefore, when the very same day Under Secretary of 
State Ball phoned McNamara to inform him that “there may be coups in Jordan today if 
it didn't occur during the night”, and that they might be carried out “with the complete 
knowledge of the UAR”, the administration’s concern shifted immediately towards Israel: 
“The real problem is whether the Israelis will sit still”, Ball told McNamara. “Suppose 
they didn't?” asked the latter.1109 
A meeting was thus immediately called in the White House: Kennedy’s top aides 
were all present to discuss how to react to a possible Israeli move. Somehow anticipating 
the dramatic events of 1967, James Grant, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Near 
Eastern and South Asian affairs, commented that if Israel intervened and “grabbed the 
West Bank, it would prolong Arab-Israeli hostility by 15 years”1110; consequently, Grant 
continued, the UAR might at that point launch direct attacks against Israel, Israel might 
react against Egyptian targets and the war might explode. Kennedy interjected explaining 
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how Ben Gurion’s letter had given evidence that the real problem was going to be Israel’s 
move. “Israel is really the danger, since it wants to move first if there is a coup in 
Jordan”.1111 Fearing that Israel could exploit the situation in Jordan to take control of the 
West Bank, Kennedy ordered joint talks between his ambassadors and the Israeli and 
Egyptian leaders. At that point, the president continued, it was necessary to contact the 
Israelis and urge them “not to take precipitate action”, while at the same time to “make 
sure that Nasser understood the consequences if Israel moved.”1112 Secretly, Kennedy 
instructed his administration to allow the use of US military force “to maintain status quo 
in Jordan”1113, should the situation take a turn for the worse. By the end of April, however, 
good news arrived from Jordan. Macomber cabled that “recent relative absence public 
disorders, together with other surface indicators, tend suggest possibility that immediate 
threat internal turbulence may, for time being, be subsiding”1114, and the Kennedy 
administration could heave a sigh of relief: Hussein was not killed or overthrown and 
Israel did not intervene. For the time being, Nasser’s fixation with Yemen and Kennedy’s 
warnings to Ben Gurion had prevented the explosion of an Arab-Israeli war. 
However, as the Jordan crisis temporarily obfuscated the conflict in Yemen, it had 
also brought the Arab-Israeli conflict to the fore and, while Hussein’s concerns were 
growing quieter, domestic pressure and criticism against Kennedy’s Middle East policy 
was as loud as ever. During the first session of the 88th Congress on April 30, 1963, 
Senator Keating expressed the Congress’s disappointment:  
“I hold no brief for the old monarchies that still govern in some of the Arab lands... 
But it is one thing... to make their way forward through a process of self-reform; it is a 
completely different thing when the government of the United Arab Republic... sends in 
its agents to subvert them... as it did in Yemen.”1115 
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Later in May, as news of the German technicians’ activities to build up Nasser’s 
rockets spread across Washington due to Israel’s incessant, and largely exaggerated, 
propaganda (the administration had in fact concluded that “Israel will probably retain its 
overall military superiority a vis-à-vis the Arab states for the next several years”1116), 
everybody began to question Kennedy’s foreign policy in the Middle East. An article 
which appeared in the New York Post on May 1, pointed out that the Kennedy 
administration was under harsh criticism of its Mideast policies voiced by dozen senators, 
who “assailed the administration for building up President Nasser while he continues to 
threaten the peace and the stability of the Middle East”.1117 The friends of Israel in the 
Senate did not seem able to let the issue rest. On May 8, Senator Javits levelled 
accusations that “the foreign aid from [the] US... enables him [Nasser] to use Egypt’s 
cotton crop for the purpose of buying Soviet-bloc arms... jeopardising peace and 
security... to the State of Israel”.1118 He complained the administration had moved “rather 
precipitately... to recognise the new regime in the Yemen”, adding that “enough problems 
have been raised for us by Syria and Iraq with the UAR… whose declared intention is the 
liquidation of Israel”. The senator concluded by saying: “I believe we have made and are 
making some extremely grave mistakes”.1119 
Faced with mounting criticism, Kennedy privately began to question his own 
approach to Nasser: “What [have] we gained from our policy toward Nasser?...We 
naturally wanted to stay on the right side of him, but what about the growing accusation 
that our support was helping him pursue expansionist policies?”1120 Although frustrated 
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by the domestic pressure against his foreign policy, and by the difficulty of terminating 
the conflict in Yemen, the Kennedy administration still believed that the benefits of the 
rapprochement with Nasser outweighed the criticism against it: “Nasser had put the Israeli 
problem in the icebox, he had shown restraint on various international issues where 
previously he had been strongly anti-US, etc.”, pointed out Grant, promptly followed by 
Robert Komer, who stressed that “it was necessary to distinguish between the sheer 
physical fact that the UAR was the largest power in the Arab world and hence the natural 
focus of Israeli concerns and the question of whether the UAR was actively pursuing an 
anti-Israeli policy.”1121 Once again, the true nature of Israel’s concerns and demands had 
left the administration rather sceptical. 
 
The shift that wasn’t 
Once the fear of an Israeli takeover in Jordan appeared to have subsided, over the 
following months the Kennedy administration sought to calm down Capitol Hill 
explaining that it was not “US food which [is] creating problems in the Middle East”1122, 
while pursuing its strategies to terminate the conflict in Yemen. The events that would 
take place between May and November 1963 marked the moment at which the shift in 
US policies in the Middle East came to completion, yet, as argued earlier, such a result 
was not intended. Although authors such as Little, Ben-Zvi and Bass, have reasonably 
interpreted Kennedy’s 1963 policies towards Saudi Arabia and Israel as a testament to 
the administration’s attempt to find new regional assets, Kennedy’s overall approach to 
the Middle East was still centred around Nasser, as the final correspondence between the 
two presidents reveals. Kennedy’s attempt to stabilise Saudi Arabia and prevent the fall 
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of the royal family, and to contain Israel and forestall its active defence, resulted in the 
involuntary enhancement of Washington ties with both countries.  
On May 1, 1963, as discussed previously, Kennedy issued an informal statement 
of security guarantee to Israel with the purpose of containing both Congress’s pressure 
and Israel’s pre-emptive strikes against Nasser’s supporters in Jordan.1123 Kennedy had 
refused Ben Gurion’s idea of a joint US-USSR statement in protection of the territorial 
status quo1124, but seeking to contain Israel, he further strengthened its bond with the 
United States. During the same month, the administration tried breathe new life into the 
disengagement plan, but financial stringency was considerably delaying the UN efforts. 
The administration urged A. Stevenson, Washington’s permanent representative at the 
United Nation, to press Secretary-General U Thant to cut the number of UN observers 
from 200 to 50, and so to give an impulse to the disengagement plan.1125 By early June 
however, the impossibility of getting Faysal and Nasser to agree to share the expenses of 
the UN mission resulted in a chronic impasse of the disengagement efforts and a further 
escalation of the hostilities. The UN plan was ready, but it could not get started.1126 
Kennedy also tried to deter Nasser from causing more troubles in Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Yemen. Admitting that the administration was taking harsh criticism from 
Congress for its pro-UAR policies, on May 27, 1963, Kennedy wrote to Nasser, 
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reaffirming his commitment to pursue a policy of economic assistance to the UAR, and 
endorsing Nasser’s revolution as proof of the “Arab's ability to evolve his life towards a 
better future.”1127 Kennedy warned the Egyptian leader however that an arms race, let 
alone a nuclear one, between Arabs and Israelis contained “the seeds of disaster” and that, 
should worse come to worst, “the Arab forces might not be at any advantage.”1128 
Although Nasser’s reply, which arrived on June 11 1963, seemed to be rather moderate, 
as he commented that he was ready to discuss with Kennedy issues such as the Arab-
Israeli dispute and the Yemen conflict 1129 (later in the summer of 1963, Cairo would also 
the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement, one of Kennedy’s great achievements1130), news of new 
problems in Yemen reached the White House in early June 1963. The UN plan was “fully 
in effect”, pointed out the Department of Defense, but “the political situation in the 
Yemen is deteriorating and… the Sallal regime cannot last.”1131 Indeed, the YAR leader 
had executed three coup plotters and was now allegedly seeking formal union with the 
UAR “as a way to save his regime.”1132 While promising the US government that he 
would terminate the conflict, Nasser was thus preparing the reinforcements to send into 
Yemen, in an effort to prevent his protégé from falling.1133 
Issues emerged on the Saudi front as well. On June 12, 1963, after learning that, 
in light of Nasser’s renewed bombing, Faysal had pointed out that the situation “had 
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become intolerable and he could no longer depend on [the] promises made”1134, Rusk 
warned Kennedy that relations with Saudi Arabia were reaching “a dangerous low 
point.”1135 The acting king complained that throughout the crisis the Saudi government 
had in fact embraced the path towards the development of their country, reforming the 
cabinet, abolishing slavery and implementing a full set of social and economic reforms to 
strengthen the regime against the wave of Nasserism, just as Kennedy had prescribed 
during 1961-1962.1136 Now, as Yemen heated up again after the scare in Jordan, Faysal 
had concluded that “the United States has let him down and is failing to live up to its 
assurances of protection.”1137 But as the first UN observers were expected to reach Yemen 
by June 13, 1963, the US government was ready to pay off its debt. On June 12, 1963, 
the HARD SURFACE squadron was put on a 48-hour alert.1138 
However, although operation HARD SURFACE was ready to begin, a 
controversy exploded on June 14, 1963 over the presence of personnel of Jewish faith in 
the American mission to Riyadh. This delayed the deployment of the US Air Force, 
incidentally causing great embarrassment in Washington, and adding doubts to the mind 
of a president already little inclined to put up with civil rights abuses. Back in May in 
fact, when the State Department was laying down the rules for the mission, it had been 
decided to exclude personnel of Jewish faith, in order to avoid any possible Saudi 
opposition to Jewish people entering Saudi Arabia, a country that had always denied visas 
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to American Jews. Although the State Department did not share the reasons behind such 
a decision, it decided to avoid any obstacles in the operation. However, on June 10, 1963, 
Senator E. Celler leaked to the New York Times the information that there were indeed 
American Jews among the personnel selected to take part in the operation. Nasser 
immediately took the opportunity to stir up the Arab world against Faysal, accusing him 
of having agreed to the entry of Jewish people onto holy Saudi soil in exchange for US 
protection. In response, on June 14, Faysal summoned Hart to urge the White House to 
denounce Celler’s statement and to communicate that he would not “let any U.S. 
servicemen enter the Kingdom until he received a U.S. response to this demand.”1139 The 
same day, during a meeting at the White House, Talbot officially announced: “The 
projected Hard Surface air squadron to Saudi Arabia has been temporarily suspended.”1140 
After weeks of embarrassments and negotiations, on June 27, the administration managed 
to find common ground with the acting king: an official communication was released 
declaring that “Saudi Arabia had not altered its visa policy with respect to persons of the 
Jewish faith and still retained the sovereign right to screen applicants for visas on the 
basis of its own policies”. To avoid embarrassment and to balance out the respective 
positions, the administration added: "Our own policy of non-discrimination among 
American citizens on grounds of race, creed or colour is firmly established”. By June 29, 
the US Air Force was finally on its way to Saudi Arabia, and the awkward setback was 
put behind them.1141 
Despite Kennedy’s efforts, by mid-summer 1963, Washington’s relations with 
Cairo were collapsing. The oil and Jewish lobbies in America found new fuel for their 
campaigns against Nasser when the Egyptian leader began using mustard gas against the 
                                                 





royalists, which put even more pressure on Kennedy’s Nasser policy.1142 During a 
meeting with Badeau held on July 11, 1963, the Egyptian leader admitted that a new 
“bomb was being used which had been manufactured in UAR, of which he did not know 
precise chemical content”1143, but when the ambassador tried to stress the impact of the 
news on the international community and on the White House, Nasser refused to take any 
responsibility: “If military commander in Yemen felt air bombing and support was 
necessary for [the] troops, the decision would be his”.1144 However, if on the one hand 
Nasser appeared oblivious to the administration’s domestic concerns, on the other hand 
Capitol Hill was more and more averse to the policy of rapprochement. Indeed, a number 
of senators complained that UAR activities posed a direct threat to Israel1145, frankly 
stating: “Mr President, it is incredible to me that the United States continues, even under 
these circumstances, to supply Nasser with US foreign aid.”1146  
The growing wave of protests coming from Capitol Hill flooded the White House, 
and although Komer wished everyone to realise “that we've never been in [a] better 
position in [the] Arab world; we're on reasonably good terms with revolutionary Arabs, 
yet without losing our old clients. This is right where we want to be, despite pain and 
strain involved in staying there”1147, an assessment not too far from reality, Kennedy’s 
policy of rapprochement with Nasser seemed to be moving towards a bitter end. Trying 
to gain leverage on both Faysal and Eshkol, during the fall of 1963 the Kennedy 
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administration inadvertently strengthened its ties with both Saudi Arabia and Israel, while 
Senator Gruening began to draft the amendment against the UAR. 
On October 8, 1963, in support of operation HARD SURFACE, the president 
directly approved the deployment of two tactical fighter squadrons and a second carrier 
strike force from the Sixth Fleet. For added certainty, Kennedy also ordered the stationing 
of some B-47s in Spain.1148 Such a strategy, Kennedy told Secretary of Defence 
McNamara, was aimed to “unequivocally spell out [the] US intentions and assure other 
friendly nations of our firm intention to honour our commitments”, in order to put an end 
to the conflict in Yemen. “Above all”, Kennedy continued “the US desires to confine the 
conflict to the area of the Middle East.”1149 Of course, by extending the duration of HARD 
SURFACE and enhancing the US presence in the area in defence of Saudi Arabia, 
Kennedy strengthened the bond with the country, but that was not his goal. Kennedy 
sought to prevent the conflict from escalating and compromising the US oil interests in 
Saudi Arabia, to gain time until a political settlement in Yemen could be reached, and to 
deter Faysal from walking out of the disengagement plan.1150 HARD SURFACE, 
Kennedy clearly stated, would stay in Saudi Arabia “so long as the Saudis continue 
adhering to the disengagement agreement.”1151 
At the end of October, Hart explained to Faysal that Kennedy was ready to 
withdraw HARD SURFACE if the Saudis resumed their arming of the royalists, but 
would leave it longer (until the end of the year) if the Saudi government continued to 
support the UN mission and the disengagement plan.1152 Faysal yielded. On November 6, 
1963, the administration was informed that the Saudi government had agreed to extend 
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the UN mandate in Yemen and to respect the disengagement agreement. “Last month we 
indicated to Faisal that we would withdraw Hard Surface should Saudi Arabia resume its 
aid to the royalists”, Talbot told Bundy, “This played an important role in getting Faisal 
both to continue to go along with UNYOM [United Nations Yemen Observation Mission] 
and to refrain from resuming his aid to the Yemeni royalists.”1153 HARD SURFACE, it 
was thus decided, would stay in Saudi Arabia until the end of the year.  
Kennedy did not live long enough to see the US Air Force leave Saudi Arabia. 
His death prevented the US president from completing his strategy, leaving the reins of 
the US Middle East policy to L. B. Johnson, and thus prompting a shift in the US regional 
strategy. As Douglas Little suggests, Johnson disengaged the air force from the Arabian 
Peninsula in light of increasing US commitment in Southeast Asia1154, but by then the 
new president had already made up his mind about Nasser. The Johnson administration 
might as well have terminated operation HARD SURFACE by late January 1964, but it 
was in effect responsible for allowing significant arms sales to the old Arab monarchy. 
November 1963 was also the month of the first joint consultations between the 
US and Israeli governments. Back in late September 1963, Golda Meir had met with Rusk 
and other members of the administration to discuss Israel’s security concerns. The Israeli 
minister explained that her government was particularly concerned about Nasser’s use of 
poison gas, his collaboration with German scientists to build up missiles, and his 
advancement in the field of military power, and stressed therefore how important it was 
for Israel to “maintain a strong deterrent.”1155 Thus, when Rusk commented that “it would 
be useful for the United States and Israel to exchange views on this situation”, Meir seized 
the opportunity to plan a joint conversation on November 12, 1963, in order to discuss 
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the UAR and Israel’s military capability.1156 A few days later, after learning that the 
Israeli government planned to use the November 12 talks to advance further requests for 
arms purchases, Rusk cabled Barbour, specifying that the November talks he had 
suggested were merely designed to “exchange views on specific information Israel might 
have that has given rise to Israeli concern about [the] UAR progress in [the] development 
[of] missiles and other sophisticated weapons affecting [the] UAR-Israel military 
balance.”1157 The administration agreed to the idea of receiving Israel’s intelligence on 
Nasser’s military force, but was not willing to let the consultation become a platform for 
Israel to ask for more arms. 
The November talks also had another purpose, in line with Kennedy’s strategy of 
containment of Israel. Indeed, during the summer of 1963, the Syrian and Iraqi 
governments had built up strong propaganda against Israel on account of the imminent 
diversion of the Jordan waters, which, the administration feared, could provoke Israel’s 
retaliation.1158 To make things worse, during the summer of 1963 new tensions emerged 
between Israel and Syria. On July 13, 1963, a group of Syrian soldiers imprisoned three 
Israeli citizens, and just one month later, two Israeli farmers were murdered in 
Almagor.1159 Thus, during a session in late August 1963, the Knesset warned: “The 
responsibility for defending the territorial integrity of the State… lies with the 
Government of Israel… The Government of Israel will be in duty bound and entitled… 
to take steps to defend itself”.1160 In light of the renewed tensions, further exacerbated by 
the crisis in Jordan just a few months earlier and by Nasser’s campaign in Yemen, Komer 
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warned Kennedy of the importance of forestalling “a possible Israeli reprisal raid, which 
would seem increasingly likely if [the] crisis continues.”1161 After all, back in late May 
1963, Kennedy had already made clear that it was “ important to give serious 
consideration to Israel's strong desire for a more specific security guarantee”, in order “to 
forestall possible Israel preventive warfare and to prevent proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.”1162 Thus, when on October 28, 1963, Talbot met the Israeli ambassador 
Harman, who confessed in fact that “the hostile combination of Syrian and Iraqi forces 
would place increased strain upon Israel’s defence effort”, also warning that Israel was 
“reserving its position” on the issue1163, the administration was faced once more with the 
danger of Israel’s pre-emptive strikes. Kennedy knew that with the consultations of 
November Israel was attempting “to get greater security assurance”1164 from the US 
government, but was willing cooperate in order to “forestall military hostilities and/or a 
decisive break with the Arabs.”1165 Incidentally, during the November talks, the 
administration had concluded that Israel needed new tanks in order “to meet [the] 
anticipated UAR tank build up by 1965.”1166 Once again, Kennedy’s attempt to contain 
Israel resulted in the establishment of a special bond between the two countries.   
November was the month in which the ‘Kennedy treatment’ came to an end. On 
November 7, 1963, Congress approved the Gruening amendment by a vote of 65 to 13, 
which imposed a termination of the US foreign aid programme to any country engaged 
in a conflict against another country receiving US assistance. The Egyptian press reacted 
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fiercely to the Senate’s amendment. The newspaper Al- Ahram entitled its first page 
“Israel hides behind the American Senate”; Goumhouriya wrote “Israel creates a crisis in 
Washington”; and Akhbar el-Yom wrote “America tries to protect Israel.”1167 The Cairo 
government also manifested its deep dissatisfaction to Badeau, pointing out that the 
amendment was a “true indicator of Zionist strength in [the] US”1168, while Nasser 
commented that, despite the great improvement of the US-UAR bilateral relations 
prompted by the Kennedy administration, he would now have to revisit his posture.1169 
The Kennedy administration reacted negatively to Congress’s intervention. 
During a press conference on November 8, 1963, Rusk commented:  
“I must say that I am very much concerned about the tendency in the Congress to 
legislate foreign policy... These are responsibilities carried by the President of the United 
States. They are very heavy responsibilities. The President is the one whom the country 
will hold responsible if things go badly”1170 
 
The secretary of state concluded: “So I would very much hope that the Congress 
would withhold its hand and not try to legislate in detail about the application of an aid 
program to a particular country.”1171 McGeorge Bundy echoed Rusk’s position, arguing 
that the effects of the amendment were “the opposite of what supporters of the 
Amendment must have intended”, and that such pressure would only make people more 
nationalistic.1172 From Cairo, Badeau cabled that he was “gravely disturbed by the 
Gruening amendment against the UAR”, and that it would certainly jeopardise all the 
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“efforts to reduce tensions in the region.”1173 Talbot and other members of the State 
Department were also particularly “cast down about [the] gathering criticism of our 
Yemen policy”1174 while Komer, taking advantage of a meeting with the Israeli Minister 
Gazit on November 21, 1963, expressed his anger saying that “the Gruening amendment 
had so limited our freedom of action with the Arabs as to make it very difficult for us to 
be as forthcoming with Israel in the refugee or other issues as we would otherwise 
like.”1175 With a clear reference to Israel’s active defence, Komer roared: “How could one 
define ‘aggression’, much less ‘preparing for’ aggression? It was even possible that Israel 
could be called to account under this amendment as a result of a reprisal raid.”1176 
Holding the major responsibility for the success or failure of US foreign policy, 
Kennedy too attacked Congress’s intervention: “This is the worst attack on foreign aid 
that we have seen since the beginning of the Marshall Plan”, he complained during what 
ended up being his last press conference on November 14, 1963; “The President bears 
particular responsibilities in the field of foreign policy. If there are failures in the Middle 
East... it is usually not the Senator who is selected to bear the blame, but it is the 
administration, the President of the United States.”1177 Kennedy warned that there was 
nothing as dangerous as the Congress’s amendment, and added:  
“I am asking the Congress of the United States to give me the means of conducting 
the foreign policy of the United States, and if they do not want me to do so, then they 
should recognise that they are severely limiting my ability to protect the interests. That is 
how important I think this program is.”1178 
 
Speaking specifically about Nasser, Kennedy said:  
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“I don’t think… that the language that the Senate adopted… particularly 
strengthens our hands or our flexibility in dealing with the UAR. In fact it will have the 
opposite result... these threats that the United States is going to cut off aid is a great 
temptation to Arabic countries to say, ‘cut it off’. They are nationalist, they are proud, 
they are in many cases radical. I don’t think threats from Capitol Hill bring the results 
which are frequently hoped”.1179 
 
Despite the administration’s objections, the amendment, combined with 
Kennedy’s untimely death, marked the end of the New Frontier’s attempted new 
strategies for the Middle East. By terminating the policy of rapprochement with Cairo, 
Capitol Hill ended the era of Washington’s attempt to do business with Nasser, 
crystallising the shift in US regional strategies prompted by the Kennedy administration’s 
policies of containment and stability. Indeed, when he became president, L. B. Johnson 
embraced friendship with both the Israeli and Saudi governments, firmly opposing Nasser 
and the other Arab nationalists and steering the course of the US foreign policy in the 
Middle East in a more familiar, and less experimental, direction. It was the beginning of 
a new phase in the US-UAR relations, one that the Egyptians called “Violence”.1180 
  
                                                 
1179 Ibidem. 




By the time Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963, shortly 
after the Gruening amendment had passed the Senate, the steep barren mountains of 
Yemen were still peppered with thousands of Nasserite troops busy fighting the golden 
army sponsored by Faysal. In late 1963, approximately 36,000 UAR troops were 
entangled in a Vietnam-style guerrilla war against the royalist tribes, funded by tens of 
millions of Saudi government dollars. By early 1967, the numbers had doubled, the use 
of chemical weapons had stopped being news, and the Arab world found itself marching 
at a blistering pace towards the Six-Day War. Indeed, only with the explosion of the third 
Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, did Nasser’s gloomy adventure in Yemen begin to end.  
Much to Washington’s surprise, this “internal dispute in a remote corner of the 
Middle East”1181 as Badeau defined it, ended up becoming the tomb of Kennedy’s foreign 
policy in the Middle East and the springboard for Washington’s reassessment of its 
posture in the region. By failing to end the conflict in Yemen, Kennedy failed his 
rapprochement with Nasser, allowing Congress to shift the course of US foreign policy. 
By moving away from the Arab nationalists and closer to the Arab monarchies, 
Washington rejected Kennedy’s strategies, finding itself resuming that mindset 
emblematic of the old Eisenhower-Dulles era, in which moderate traditional Arab regimes 
were chosen over progressive Arab republics to function as regional proxies in protection 
of the Western economic and geopolitical interests in the Middle East. 
The main result of the Yemen crisis was the failure of Kennedy’s policy towards 
Nasser. Since the early stages of its mandate, the Kennedy administration had embraced 
the theory that Eisenhower’s hostility towards Nasser was responsible for the decline of 
Washington’s prestige in the region and the consequent improvement of Moscow’s stand. 
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Seeking to correct such a trend, the administration promoted programmes of economic 
development and adopted a skilful personal-based diplomacy running through the hands 
of a president who was naturally more supportive of progressive over conservative 
regimes, modernity over tradition, new over old Middle East. 
However, the assumption that, given Egypt’s grave economic problems, Nasser 
could be encouraged through a large programme of economic assistance – the PL 480 - 
to turn inwards and restrain from foreign adventures, constituted the Kennedy 
administration’s biggest miscalculation. The Egyptian leader, whether because he was 
obsessed with his pan-Arabist vision, or because he was eager to redeem his prestige in 
the Arab world after the UAR break-up in 1961, or even because he was simply unable 
to stop the spiral of events that took the Middle East by storm in 1963, found himself 
entangled in a war that he himself would later recall as “my Vietnam”1182, a guerrilla 
conflict that could not be won and that was costing over 80 million Egyptian pounds per 
month.1183 
It was however Capitol Hill, not the White House, that ended the era of 
Washington’s attempts to court Nasser. Unable to directly influence the White House, the 
oil and the Israel lobbies in America had eventually managed to exercise enough pressure 
to divert Congress’s posture in a direction that could better serve their interests. Thus, 
even though by the time the Gruening amendment had passed the Senate, Kennedy had 
already adopted a tougher tone in his personal diplomacy with Nasser, the decision to put 
a definitive end to Washington’s tolerance of Cairo rested with Capitol Hill. Indeed, the 
administration’s reaction to the Gruening amendment shows that, despite the Yemen 
issue, Kennedy still placed confidence in the policy of rapprochement, as much as he 
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believed that ending the programme of foreign assistance to the UAR would be 
detrimental to the US Cold War strategies in the region. “What happens in Yemen itself”, 
Komer told Kennedy in late September 1963, “remains far less important to us than to… 
maintain decent relations with Nasser, and keep the USSR from making real gains.”1184 
It is no coincidence that the administration’s immediate concerns related to the political 
openings that the amendment could create for the Soviet Union: “Strong anti-US reaction 
[is] certain to encourage [the] Soviets in [the] belief [that] they can exploit [the] situation 
to strengthen their own influence”, reads a cable from the Embassy in Moscow dated 
November 6, 1963. “Atmosphere of hostility to [the] US and gratitude to [the] USSR… 
inevitably plays into Soviet hands in number of ways.”1185 Despite all the domestic and 
international problems that the policy of rapprochement with the UAR entailed, the 
Kennedy administration saw no alternative to Nasser in fighting the Cold War in the 
Middle East. “In the game of competitive co-existence”, Komer told Kennedy in mid-
January 1963, “we can hardly afford to let the major neutralists become clients primarily 
of Moscow.”1186 
It would thus be misleading to interpret Kennedy’s 1963 policies towards Saudi 
Arabia and Israel as an attempt to build up Washington’s relations with the two countries 
as an alternative to Nasser, as Bass has argued.1187 “Those who cavil over our Nasser… 
policy also ignore the absence of any realistic alternative”1188, continued Komer, proving 
that the enhancement of US ties with both Saudi Arabia and Israel was not a purposely 
designed strategy aimed at finding new regional assets, but the unintended result of 
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Kennedy’s policy of stability and containment in the wake of the Yemen crisis, the Jordan 
uprisings and the frequent tensions between Syria and Israel.  
However it was supportive of the Arab nationalists, the Kennedy administration 
also acknowledged the economic and geostrategic importance of countries like Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan, not to mention Iran, and thus sponsored programmes of reforms aimed 
at stabilising these regimes by broadening their domestic political consensus. By doing 
so, Kennedy hoped to prevent them from the revolutionary changes prompted by Nasser’s 
progressive propaganda, which could put in jeopardy the multitude of Western interests. 
But the administration did not actively seek to rely on the old Arab monarchies as regional 
allies to defeat the Soviets in the Middle East, but simply to protect the US interests in 
the context of the rapprochement with Nasser.  
The events of 1962-1963, forced the administration to adopt some special measure 
that paved the way for the American special alliance with the Saudi Royal Family. HARD 
SURFACE was, as Bass points out, the most significant military operations to Saudi 
Arabia before the Gulf War in 19901189, and thus represented a significant commitment 
for the US government. Yet if Kennedy’s overall policies towards Saudi Arabia are a 
testament to the importance of American interests in the Saudi oilfields, the strategy 
adopted through HARD SURFACE is clear evidence of his attempt to gain leverage on 
Faysal, and to prevent the conflict in Yemen from jeopardising the larger Cold War 
objective that was the rapprochement with Nasser. Kennedy dispatched the US Air Force 
to Saudi Arabia, but made the quid pro quo crystal clear to the government in Riyadh: 
should Faysal resume his support for the royalists, HARD SURFACE would immediately 
be terminated.  
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HARD SURFACE eventually outlasted Kennedy, and contributed significantly to 
reshaping American strategies in the region. Johnson withdrew the air force shortly after 
Kennedy’s assassination, but made clear that Washington would not abandon the Saudi 
Royal Family to its fate. Privileging a programme of foreign assistance based primarily 
on military aid, thus resembling the Eisenhower Doctrine more than the attitude of his 
immediate predecessor, Johnson provided Saudi Arabia with 100 million dollars in 
military hardware and with a 400 million dollars in air-defence programmes.1190 
Interestingly, Johnson also provided the Shah with Phantom Jets and a credit of 200 
million dollars for arms purchases1191, but this time, no strings were attached. The days 
of JFK’s “more reforms before more arms” were long gone, and the new president 
deemed the Iranian regime stable enough to protect US interests in the Persian Gulf.1192 
The wave of Nasserism that spread from Yemen across the entire region, also 
brought Kennedy and Israel closer together, laying the foundations for the alliance that 
would definitively flourish under the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. However, the 
enhancement of Israel’s ties with Washington was not a goal set out by the administration 
to either contain Nasser, as Ben-Zvi has argued1193, or to secure it as a regional ally, as 
suggested by Bass1194, but to forestall Israel’s active defence. During the Jordan crisis, 
the Kennedy administration found itself once more confronted with the issue of Israel’s 
reprisal raids, and with the fear that Ben Gurion would launch a pre-emptive strike against 
the UAR troops, should they move into Jordan, in order to prevent the formation of a pro-
Nasser regime so close to Israel. It was in fact Israel, not Cairo, that proved the biggest 
headache for the administration: “I'm beginning to think that the immediate problem is 
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less Jordan than Israel’s obvious effort to take advantage of current tensions”, Komer told 
Bundy on April 30, 1963, adding that “Israel’s patent attempt to embrace Hussein... is so 
much a kiss of death to the brave young king”.1195 If the Israeli army was to march into 
Jordan, the administration had little doubt that it would also try to seize the West Bank 
and cause a third Arab-Israeli war. 
Kennedy put the Cold War priorities before such regional dynamics, rejecting Ben 
Gurion’s suggestion for the joint US-USSR guarantee on the territorial status quo, but he 
agreed to the idea of an informal security guarantee issued by the US government in early 
May 1963, which incidentally served the purpose of “calming down on [Capitol] Hill.”1196 
Although the New Frontiersmen were little inclined to give in to Israel’s pressure, they 
were even less inclined to let the Ben Gurion government threaten the stability of the 
Middle East. Just a few months later, in November 1963, the administration also agreed 
to an informal meeting aimed at discussing Israel’s intelligence on the UAR missile 
capability, thus placing another milestone in US-Israeli relations. For the first time, US 
and Israeli intelligence exchanged valuable information on regional security issues.  
Was Kennedy purposely laying the foundations of the US-Israeli alliance? It 
hardly seems so. Although Bass argues that Kennedy had made the assumption that 
“Israel was not an aggressor state”1197, and was thus willing to provide Israel with 
defensive military aid, the strategy of containment implemented by the administration 
seems to prove the opposite. It is in fact no coincidence that the three most significant 
concessions made by the Kennedy administration, the HAWK sale in August 1962, the 
security guarantee in May 1963, and the November 1963 talks, happened at moments 
when Israel’s active defence was likely to cause more troubles than contributing to its 
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defence and security. The HAWK was sold after the clashes between Syria and Israel on 
Lake Tiberias in March 1962, and because of Israel’s immediate concerns surrounding 
Kennedy’s pro-Nasser policy and Cairo’s acquisition of Soviet weapons. The 
administration did not buy into the argument of a military imbalance, but agreed to the 
sale to restrain Israel from launching pre-emptive attacks against its enemies. Similarly, 
the security guarantee issued in May 1963 was a direct response to Israel’s growing 
concern about the wave of Nasserism that had just nearly caused the fall of King Hussein, 
while the November talks were designed to placate Israel’s fears of Nasser’s military 
capabilities, of Arab propaganda against Israel, and of the renewed hostilities against 
Syria.  
Furthermore, Ben Gurion’s rejection of the Johnson Plan and the Israeli amimut 
over Dimona, did arguably even less to move Israel on the top of the New Frontier’s 
strategic assets in the region. While bitterness and frustration about Israel’s objection to 
the refugee plan remained in the State Department for years1198, the ambiguity over the 
nuclear facility in the Negev desert, moved Kennedy’s tolerance of Israel very close to an 
early end. The final correspondence between the president and the Israeli leaders, showed 
in fact a much tougher side of Kennedy, one that not even the revolutionary Nasser had 
ever witnessed. Bass has suggested that the Yemen crisis eventually moved Kennedy to 
choose Israel over Nasser1199, but the documents produced by the administration tell a 
different story. Kennedy was seeking to contain Israel and, by doing so, he became in 
effect the unintentional founding father of that special alliance that lasts to this day. 
Looking back at the administration’s Middle East agenda, it is ironic to note that 
the main consequences of Kennedy’s new approach to the region were largely unintended. 
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Kennedy did not seek a closer partnership with Saudi Arabia or Israel, but rather he sought 
to reverse the dangerous trend prompted by the Eisenhower administration in the US 
foreign relations with Third World, neutralist countries. Kennedy was committed to 
defeating international communism by supporting Third World neutralism, and in the 
Middle East that meant that establishing a working relation with Nasser was the only 
course of action. But in trying to open a new era in US-UAR relations, the New Frontier 
found itself inevitably drawn into inter-Arab disputes and Arab-Israeli tensions, and thus 
compelled to offset its pro-Nasser policy with strategies of containment and stability that 
ended up strengthening Washington’s ties with both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Courting 
Nasser came at a price. Cairo’s nemeses had little sympathy towards Kennedy’s policy 
of rapprochement with Egypt, and sought security guarantees that could counterbalance 
Nasser’s growing popularity in the region, and the US government’s support of the 
revolutionary Arab leader. Kennedy agreed to such requests not because he sought to take 
advantage of any regional opening he could find, but because he was trying to find a 
balance between the larger Cold War objective that was Nasser, and the US regional 
interests in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Kennedy’s even-handedness came in the context of 
the policy of rapprochement with Nasser, not as a mere attempt to “support any friend”.  
Much to the New Frontiersmen’s dismay, Congress believed that the short-term 
costs of supporting Nasser outweighed the long-term benefits, and Kennedy’s foreign 
policy in the Middle East crumbled under the pressure and criticism that would eventually 
give rise to the Gruening amendment. Had Kennedy not been assassinated, there can be 
little doubt that the administration would have tried to contain the effects of Congress’s 
decision in an attempt to pursue its overtures to Nasser. “President Kennedy was angered 
and distressed by this Amendment, and we understand was considering making a 
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statement on the matter when he signed the Aid bill”1200, Talbot told Rusk on November 
23, 1963, just one day after Kennedy’s assassination. Kennedy had no intention of closing 
the chapter on the Egyptian leader, but his premature death prevented him from shielding 
his relationship with Nasser from Capitol Hill. Just as he had repeatedly warned, by 
interrupting the programme of economic assistance to the UAR, Washington effectively 
lost its leverage on one of the most preeminent Arab leaders in the history of the Cold 
War.  
But in just three years, and despite the severe international crisis that escalated the 
US-USSR confrontation to dangerous levels, the New Frontier managed to open a new 
chapter in the history of the American foreign policy in the Middle East. Arab nationalism 
was not a threat, but rather an opportunity; Nasser was not a communist agent, but a 
preeminent neutralist leader; the American oil interests could be better secured through 
programmes of social, political and economic reforms, rather than with American arms; 
and Israel could be better contained by meeting its security concerns, rather than by firmly 
opposing its demands.  
Perhaps, had Kennedy dealt with President Sadat instead of President Nasser, or 
with Prime Minister Shimon Peres instead of Ben Gurion, his foreign policy in the Middle 
East would not have looked like a failure by the time of his assassination. But Nasser’s 
crusade across the Arab world soon became Kennedy’s own cross to bear, and the 
administration’s intricate system of compromises, agreements and quid pro quos became 
after all the only valuable instrument to tame the untameable. Kennedy asked the parties 
involved to put the Arab-Israeli issue “on ice”, he promptly disengaged from the Johnson 
plan for the refugees when he realised that a reasonable agreement could not be reached, 
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and he did not force the regional players into broad agreements that could facilitate US 
goals in the region. Indeed, Kennedy proved less willing to resolve larger regional issues 
than he was to confine them, and more inclined to promote small steps towards mutual 
understanding, than he was to find comprehensive solutions for central problems. While 
his charm, his mannerisms, and his use of the media have in fact “introduced the modern 
political era”1201, his diplomacy in Middle East also set an important precedent. It is 
indeed hard not to notice the resemblance between Kennedy’s “step-by-step 
approach”1202 and Kissinger’s “step-by-step” diplomacy.1203 
The Yemen crisis, however, taught a valuable lesson to the New Frontier. Inter-
Arab hostilities proved to be as dangerous as Arab-Israeli tensions, and it was in fact the 
clash between monarchies and republics that eventually compromised Kennedy’s foreign 
policy in the Middle East. With some irony, Kennedy’s fear that something like 1958 
could happen to him1204, eventually became a dangerous reality that found the US 
government once again unprepared. The administration had hoped that establishing a 
working relationship with Nasser could be enough to bring stability in the Middle East, 
but was eventually forced to come to terms with the unpredictability of Nasser’s pan-
Arabism, and with the implications of the revolutionary transformations that were 
occurring in the Middle East. By failing to prevent an Arab hot war, the administration 
compromised its own Cold War.  
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Of course, although unable to prevent it or terminate it, the Kennedy 
administration deserved some credit for at least containing the crisis. Kennedy never 
involved US military force in the conflict, never allowed Jordan or Saudi Arabia to fall, 
and never created political opportunities for the Soviet Union by openly turning against 
Nasser. Although the Kennedy experience inevitably reveals America’s inability to direct 
the course of events, it also offers a valuable lesson in diplomatic and mediation skills. 
Indeed, as Komer commented some years later, despite his failure to end the conflict, 
Kennedy had still been able to somehow mediate between all the forces involved, to set 
the right policy, and to keep Yemen from turning into something much bigger.1205 
Komer’s assessment seems appropriate. The administration managed to maintain a good 
relationship with Nasser, to hold Israel’s ambitions at bay, and to secure its interests in 
the Saudi oilfields. Rapprochement, containment and stability proved indeed to be 
Kennedy’s best tools to fight the Cold War in the Middle East. 
  
                                                 





A comment on the sources 
Rapprochement, Containment and Stability: Kennedy’s Cold War in the Middle 
East, is a work that aims at discussing the Kennedy administration’s policies and policy-
making towards the Middle East. Although a non-US perspective would have added 
considerable value to this thesis, I have deliberately chosen to focus on the American side 
of the story, for two reasons: first, because of the intrinsic problems that sources in Arabic, 
Hebrew and Russian present. As an English speaker, I would have not been able to 
analyse and elaborate on non-English documents. Second, because of the difficulty, both 
financial and practical, that seeking out such documents entails. Limited personal 
funding, and strong censorship on documents relating to the foreign policy of Egypt and 
Israel, would not have allowed me to develop a comprehensive analysis of the regional 
events that occurred during the early 1960s. 
I have however consulted memoirs and other primary sources on Egypt, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Soviet Union, whenever they were available in English. 
The volumes of Israel’s Foreign Relations, the Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, 
Keesing’s contemporary archives, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
documents, integrated the non-US perspective provided in the National Security Files of 
the John F. Kennedy Library. Hart’s and Badeau’s memoirs were helpful in obtaining an 
insight into Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The diaries of Heikal, Nikita Khrushchev, Harold 
Macmillan and King Hussein also served a similar purpose. Among the secondary 
sources, some works have been of great influence: the research of, among others, 
Avraham Avi-hai, Avner Cohen, Robert Dallek, Adeed Dawisha, Louis Fawcett, John 
Lewis Gaddis, Robert O. Freedman, James P. Jankowski, Roger E. Kanet, Nadav Safran, 
Avi Shlaim, Daniel Yergin, and Zaki Shalom, has added a valuable contribution to my 
personal knowledge and to this thesis. 
In the writing of this thesis, I have found myself in dialogue primarily with four 
authors who have dealt with the subject, Warren Bass, Douglas Little, Abraham Ben-Zvi 
and Roby C. Barrett. Their works on the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration 
towards the Middle East remain to this day crucial instruments for the understanding of 
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the subject, and thus the obvious starting point for any historian who wishes to investigate 
the US Middle East policies in the early 1960s.  
I have however attempted to provide a nuanced understanding of the policies of 
the Kennedy administration, and thus I have primarily relied on a number of primary 
sources, yet they also presented challenges that have inevitably limited the amount of 
information available: many American documents, particularly those regarding arms 
sales, nuclear programmes and other issues related to the national security of the United 
States, remain classified to this day. Although appreciative of the need to protect certain 
information, I remained disappointed by the impossibility of providing, some 70 years 
later, a full picture of the Kennedy administration’s policies towards the Middle East. 
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